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Summary 
Knowledge-based competitive advantages, 
national innovation systems, and develop-
ment 
Knowledge has always been central for eco-
nomic growth. Yet the speed at which knowl-
edge is created, accumulated, applied, and 
distributed has increased, and so has the impor-
tance of knowledge as a source of competitive 
advantages relative to the cost of capital and 
labor. Competitive advantages that are based 
purely on lower costs are often not sustainable, 
because new competitors can easily undercut 
prices and invalidate existing cost advantages. 
If labor is cheap enough, for example, this may 
even nullify much higher efficiency. In con-
trast, the ability to provide unique or superior 
goods and services, or to provide them faster, 
allows a firm to achieve a premium price, 
which leads to higher profitability, provided 
costs are comparable to those of competitors.  
The latter competitive advantages are based on 
knowledge. They require much effort, for ex-
ample observing market trends, detecting new 
niches, recombining production factors in an 
innovative manner, and undertaking risky in-
vestments. At the same time, such knowledge-
based advantages are harder to copy, and hence 
limit the number of competing providers and 
allow for above-average profits. As competi-
tors will always seek to break into profitable 
markets, firms (and nations alike) have to en-
gage in a permanent search for new differenti-
ating opportunities. The long-term competi-
tiveness of firms and nations thus depends on 
their ability to organize innovation systemati-
cally.  
In the past, innovation was considered a unidi-
rectional process in which findings from sci-
ence and technology are transferred to new 
commercial applications. Today we have come 
to learn that innovations arise from continuous 
interactive and cumulative learning, searching, 
and exploring which involves manifold feed-
back loops. Innovation not only requires effec-
tive internal organization and substantial re-
search and development (R&D) activities at 
the firm level, but also joint learning through 
interaction within supply chains and other forms 
of inter-firm cooperation as well as regular and 
systematic interaction between firms and insti-
tutions, for instance universities and other re-
search and technology organizations.  
The concept National Innovation System (NIS) 
is a useful analytical tool for understanding 
how innovations come about as well as for 
assessing the functioning of knowledge-based 
activities in a given economy. Moreover, it 
provides guidance for the design of policies. 
An NIS is a system of actors (firms, organiza-
tions, government agencies, consumers, etc.) 
who interact with each other in ways which 
enhance the innovation performance of a na-
tional economy. The main idea of the concept 
is that overall performance depends not only 
on how each individual actor performs, but 
also on how these actors work together in 
knowledge generation, acquisition, and use. 
The concept emphasizes the need to combine 
improvements at three interdependent levels: 
— The internal organization of firms. Firms 
need to shift from simply using technol-
ogy to creating and developing technol-
ogy. This has to go along with continuous 
improvement of their internal learning 
routines.  
— Inter-firm relationships. Firms rarely in-
novate alone. As they become ever more 
specialized, firms are obliged to operate in 
networks and to rely on interactions to ac-
quire complementary know-how from ex-
ternal sources.  
— Relationships between institutions and 
firms. Neither market forces nor inter-firm 
networks are sufficient to guarantee high 
levels of innovation. Market failure may 
occur especially in R&D, information, and 
training markets. Universities, schools, 
training centers, research labs, and other 
support institutions are needed to compen-
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sate for market failure. Furthermore, gov-
ernments should offer incentives for pri-
vate sector R&D, support the transfer of 
knowledge, and provide for a political, le-
gal, and economic framework that reduces 
uncertainty and encourages investment.  
According to the NIS concept, supporting in-
novation is hence a cross-cutting issue affect-
ing almost every field of economic policy. The 
innovative capacity of an economy depends on 
both general factors (including the macroeco-
nomic environment, the regulatory context, 
labor market conditions, etc.) and specific in-
novation policies (e.g. R&D financing, start-up 
promotion).  
At the outset, national innovation policy re-
quires a vision of future development trajecto-
ries and windows of opportunity for interna-
tional specialization. Such a vision needs to be 
based on a stakeholder dialogue and has to be 
translated into specific, targeted and coherent 
programs. Among these programs, promotion 
of innovative entrepreneurship is highly impor-
tant, taking into account that the private sector 
constitutes the basis for innovative activities in 
an economy. Innovative firms not only create 
additional employment, they also help to con-
tinuously renew the entrepreneurial structure, 
to improve the allocative efficiency within a 
country, to build a culture of innovation, and 
thus to speed up structural change. This calls 
for specific programs to promote entrepreneur-
ship in general and to support private-sector 
R&D. Moreover, innovation should be pro-
moted through specific policies geared to in-
creasing knowledge flows within entrepreneu-
rial clusters and value chains and to encourag-
ing cooperation between the private sector and 
scientific institutions.  
Thailand’s need to strengthen knowledge-
based competitive advantages 
For Thailand in particular, increasing the 
knowledge content of economic activities is an 
urgent need. In the 1980s and much of the 
1990s, Thailand was one of the fastest growing 
countries in the world. From 1985 to 1995 its 
real annual GNP grew by 8 % on average. 
Increases in international trade and (mainly 
export-oriented) foreign direct investments 
(FDI) had been the driving force behind the 
Thai economic development in the past dec-
ade. In 1996, before the crisis, international 
trade accounted for 70.5 % of GDP.  
The crisis of 1997 – when GNP fell by 10.4 %, 
and per capita GNP even decreased by 40 % 
compared to 1996 – revealed fundamental 
structural weaknesses. Thailand’s economic 
boom had largely been due to growth of factor 
inputs, especially of capital stock. Most FDI 
was directed to Thailand for reasons of low 
wages, and not for the availability of a skilled 
workforce and other knowledge-intensive in-
puts. The rapid increase in real wages was not 
matched by increasing productivity. Total Fac-
tor Productivity (TFP) growth accounted for 
only 12 % of total growth during the 1980-
2000 period and was mainly concentrated in 
agriculture. TFP growth in industry and ser-
vices was even negative. Both foreign and 
domestic investment was confined to relatively 
knowledge-extensive sectors, such as agricul-
ture, assembly of imported parts (e.g. in elec-
trical, electronics and automotive industries), 
real estate, construction, and tourism. Further-
more, technologically more complex activities 
were (and still are) mainly performed by for-
eign companies whose technological capabili-
ties and productivity far exceed those of local 
companies. Due to this technological gap for-
eign companies are reluctant to build linkages 
with local suppliers or research institutions. 
Some of the most important economic sectors 
thus continue to be technological enclaves.  
Since competitiveness in Thailand’s traditional 
activities is highly dependent on labor costs, 
competition from low-cost locations has be-
come a serious threat. Since FDI is, if at all, 
very weakly embedded in the local entrepre-
neurial and institutional tissue, rising labor 
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costs for Thai workers are causing mobile 
transnational companies to seek cheaper loca-
tions, notably in China and Vietnam. If Thai-
land is to improve (or at least maintain) its 
current level of socioeconomic development, 
the country’s economy will have to upgrade 
toward more knowledge-intensive and higher 
value-added activities and build indigenous 
innovative capabilities.  
The present study shows that Thailand’s NIS is 
not yet sufficiently developed. Compared to 
other countries in the region, both the govern-
ment and the private sector in Thailand have 
invested little in education and technology 
development capabilities. The number of inno-
vative firms is low and many organizational 
capabilities necessary for innovation are lack-
ing; the quantity and quality of inter-firm as 
well as industry-science relationships is lim-
ited; and institutional support lacks both strate-
gic orientation and implementing capacities. 
As a consequence, Thailand’s international 
competitiveness indicators have systematically 
declined, and Thailand presently ranks low on 
global competitiveness indicators, especially in 
technology-related dimensions of competitive-
ness. 
Innovation policies in Thailand 
Against this background, the study looks into 
four areas of innovation policy which are cru-
cial for the functioning of NIS, yet seem to be 
relatively weak in the Thai case. These are, 
respectively: 
— the process of policy formulation, imple-
mentation, monitoring, and evaluation; 
— inter-firm linkages; 
— industry-science relations; 
— formation of innovative entrepreneurs. 
Other specific innovation policies, such as 
education and human resource policies in gen-
eral or the development of technical and engi-
neering skills in particular as well as integrated 
policies to strengthen the overall system of 
metrology, standards, testing, and quality as-
surance, are also very important to increasing 
Thailand’s competitiveness in knowledge-
intensive fields. It would be beyond the scope 
of this study, however, to analyze all aspects of 
these rather broad issue areas. 
a) The process of policy formulation, im-
plementation, monitoring, and evalua-
tion 
Both public and private effort requires direc-
tion. Strategic planning based on well-designed 
surveys, benchmarking studies, and a continu-
ous stakeholder dialogue makes it possible to 
identify economic strengths and weaknesses 
and pursue proactive rather than reactive poli-
cies. Implementation of the policies identified 
should be cost-effective, and service delivery 
should be organized in a businesslike manner. 
This calls for the establishment of a clear per-
formance measurement framework permitting 
the results of evaluations to flow into the future 
allocation of budget funds. These requirements 
are becoming especially important in times of 
fast-changing markets and growing competi-
tion as well as in the context of the complex 
shift of the economy from a labor-intensive to 
a knowledge-based economy. 
Regarding the process of policy formulation, 
international experiences suggest that system-
atic foresight and benchmarking activities are 
important tools for achieving a strategic vision 
of future technology and market trends, and 
thus of competitive advantages. In addition, 
modern planning processes need to involve the 
important stakeholders, especially from the 
private sector. And finally, ministries and other 
institutions involved in the process of policy 
formulation need to be closely coordinated.  
In Thailand, the process of policy formulation 
has traditionally not included visionary ap-
proaches involving foresight activities, and 
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stakeholder participation as well as ministerial 
horizontal cooperation have been low. Despite 
some reforms – e.g. a few recent foresight 
activities, increased participation in drafting 
the 8th and 9th National Plan, and the estab-
lishment of new coordinating bodies – Thai-
land still lacks vision and commitment with 
regard to innovation policy, and policy coordi-
nation remains weak. Moreover, ad hoc politi-
cal decisions taken at high policy levels are 
increasingly interfering with the planning pro-
cedures and targets set by the ministries. 
In a similar vein, shortcomings have been iden-
tified in the implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation of innovation policies: 
— The responsibilities for policy formula-
tion, funding, and program implementa-
tion are not clearly separated; 
— some implementing agencies are not cus-
tomer-oriented, do not operate in a busi-
ness-like manner, and their programs are 
not cost-effective; 
— budget allocation is often not sufficiently 
linked to previous performance; 
— monitoring and evaluation appear to be 
irregular procedures, with widely varying 
evaluation approaches and variable de-
grees of transparency. Plans often do not 
include performance indicators, and inde-
pendent evaluation bodies are lacking. 
Many of these shortcomings might be over-
come by the newly established system of per-
formance-based budgeting, which was decided 
upon by the government in 2002 and requires 
every ministry to define and monitor key per-
formance indicators. Yet defining relevant and 
measurable indicators, training evaluation 
staff, and, above all, avoiding ad hoc political 
interference will be challenging tasks when it 
comes to implementing the new system. 
b) Inter-firm linkages 
The Thai economy is characterized by a dualis-
tic structure, with, for the most part, large for-
eign corporations in the role of technology 
owners and most Thai firms displaying low 
levels of technological capabilities. Therefore, 
fostering vertical linkages between large tech-
nologically advanced companies and local 
firms is an urgent policy task. Incentive sys-
tems and programs are needed to augment 
technology transfer in favor of Thai firms, to 
develop innovative supply chain relationships, 
and to embed footloose foreign investors in 
national production systems.  
However, promotion of inter-firm linkages is 
not a priority concern in Thailand. And what is 
more, the few existing instruments – most 
prominently, the OTOP program – focus on 
horizontal linkages between local firms in 
traditional industries, hence neglecting the 
need to bridge the technological gap between 
FDI and the local economy. There are no sig-
nificant policy incentives to induce large com-
panies to support local partners, and specific 
programs aimed at improving the performance 
of SMEs with a view to making them more 
attractive as suppliers to large firms are largely 
lacking. Currently, three entities are concerned 
with supplier development, but only one of 
them – the BUILD program – has gained a 
certain reputation, and even this program is 
poorly funded. In addition, BUILD activities 
are mainly limited to awareness-building and 
matching between SMEs and large customers. 
In order to fully exploit the benefits of spill-
over effects from large high-productivity firms, 
a more comprehensive approach to supplier 
development is needed. This would include 
targeted programs to strengthen the competi-
tiveness of promising local suppliers. Interna-
tional experiences suggest that engagement of 
important large customer companies in the 
design and implementation of such programs is 
a decisive success factor. Moreover, it is im-
portant to pursue a multiagency network ap-
proach involving business associations and 
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sector-specific institutions (such as the EEI, 
TAI, or NFI) in order to provide, in a coordi-
nated way, specialized and complementary 
support. This calls for better cooperation be-
tween BUILD and such sector institutions. 
c) Industry-science relations  
The performance of innovation systems de-
pends on the density and quality of industry-
science relations. Firms increasingly rely on 
inputs from scientific institutions, including 
technological solutions and skilled graduates. 
Academic institutions also benefit from coop-
eration with industry, as the private sector pro-
vides know-how, finance, employment oppor-
tunities for students, and helps to keep curric-
ula up to date.  
Thailand has a diversified infrastructure of 
research and technology organizations and 
holds strong potentials for industry-science 
relations. Besides the many universities, the 
government has set up specialized research and 
technology organizations: three large research 
institutions under NSTDA and several semi-
public technology institutes in key industrial 
areas. In addition, different organizations for 
funding research were created.  
However, a cultural gap appears to constitute a 
divide between the two “subsystems” of re-
search and production. Thai universities have 
relatively poor research capabilities and most 
of their research has little industrial relevance. 
Scientific institutions rarely collaborate with 
industry. Teaching personnel lacks industry 
experience, a fact which is also reflected in a 
lack of cooperative education and industry 
internships, university curricula that are not 
industry-oriented, research organizations un-
able to win research contracts from the private 
sector, the very low number of new industrial 
enterprises created by university staff, etc. The 
challenge is to bridge this gap, bringing actors 
from both “subsystems” together in order to 
develop common approaches to relevant prob-
lems. 
Public awareness for these issues has recently 
increased and some reforms are under way, but 
much remains to be done: 
— Cooperative education should be pro-
moted, supporting joint education with 
private firms, involving industry associa-
tions in curricula development, and inte-
grating internships in university studies;  
— personnel working in industry-related 
institutions should more often be recruited 
from industry;  
— exchange of researchers and other staff 
between academic institutes and firms 
should be supported, e.g. by recognizing 
industry exposure for personal career 
schemes and by introducing more flexible 
regulations for remunerative secondary 
employment for scientists;  
— incentives should be set at universities and 
other institutions to give greater weight to 
joint research and technology transfer; 
— business start-ups by academic staff and 
fresh graduates should be supported; 
— although some fiscal incentives have re-
cently been created to foster private-sector 
R&D, incentive schemes need to be 
adapted to the needs of SMEs; 
— whenever scientific institutions provide 
services to the private sector, they should 
focus on areas which are not commercially 
viable (“public goods”) or otherwise charge 
cost-covering fees. This is important to 
avoid distorting existing service markets;  
— academic institutions should give more 
attention to patenting and licensing of in-
tellectual property. 
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d) Entrepreneurship development pro-
grams  
Since innovations play a crucial role for the 
development and dynamics of a knowledge 
economy, it is important to support entrepre-
neurs who introduce such innovations in the 
market. This is especially true for Thailand, 
where technologies are mainly imported, the 
indigenous innovative capacity of firms is low, 
and the lack of innovative enterprise start-ups 
is obvious. In 2002, the government pro-
claimed the ambitious goal of establishing 
50,000 new enterprises within the next two 
years and announced the allocation of 2 billion 
baht toward that end. At first sight, this sug-
gests that entrepreneurship development ranks 
high on the political agenda. Nevertheless, a 
number of shortcomings remain: 
— There is a lack of strategic orientation 
toward market creation, innovation, and 
competitiveness. Most entrepreneurship 
programs provide general management 
and technical training and financial sup-
port for SMEs in traditional industries. 
This may contribute to short-term em-
ployment creation in such industries, but it 
contributes little to technology develop-
ment and the exploitation of new market 
opportunities. In Thailand the rate of en-
trepreneurial activity is already high, but 
largely confined to basic activities. Entre-
preneurship programs should therefore 
support promising business ideas in inno-
vative areas.  
— There is a gap between political goals and 
implementing capacities. Up to now train-
ing programs and business incubators have 
had very limited outreach, and it unclear 
how the government target of 50,000 new 
enterprises is to be reached with the insti-
tutional capacities given. 
— Some instruments for entrepreneurship 
development that are widespread and in 
common use in other countries are lack-
ing. Thai policy focuses on training pro-
grams. The number of business incubators 
is very limited, and most universities and 
research organizations do not actively 
support spin-offs. The overall education 
system does not concentrate on promotion 
of entrepreneurship, e.g. there are only 
very few innovation awards. Moreover, 
funding of innovative start-ups is still a 
major problem.  
— Thailand does not use a holistic policy 
approach. International experience sug-
gests that none of the above-mentioned 
policy instruments alone can offer a solu-
tion. An integrated entrepreneurship de-
velopment strategy is needed that includes 
the entire range of policy instruments and 
organizes support institutions in networks 
offering complementary and coordinated 
services.  
Case studies 
In this study, the electrical and electronics 
manufacturing and shrimp-farming sectors 
were selected to illustrate how building knowl-
edge-based competitive advantages pertains to 
a wide range of economic activities. Both sec-
tors are not only highly relevant to the Thai 
economy in terms of export earnings and em-
ployment creation but are also currently under 
pressure to increase their knowledge-intensity 
and innovative capacity. Innovation policies, 
albeit with a different focus for each sector, are 
therefore called upon to assist in the upgrading 
of local firms, creation of linkages between 
local and foreign firms, and efforts aimed at 
solving of specific (e.g. social and environ-
mental) problems in collaboration with scien-
tific institutions.  
a) Strengthening knowledge-based com-
petitive advantages in the electrical and 
electronics industry 
The electrical and electronics sector is impor-
tant for the national economy, since it contrib-
utes 4 % to the country’s GDP, employs a 
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workforce of more than 400,000, and accounts 
for nearly 35 % of Thailand’s exports. With 
exports amounting to US$ 23.6 billion in 2000, 
the sector is Thailand’s biggest export earner, 
with a positive trade balance of US$ 6.2 billion.  
For Thailand, it is useful to distinguish be-
tween the electrical and consumer electronics 
segment on the one hand and the electronic 
component and computer/peripherals segment 
on the other. The former displays a higher 
involvement of local companies. Firstly, local 
SMEs serve the needs of the domestic market 
in lower-tech product segments such as rice 
cookers, lighting equipment, fans, and radios. 
Secondly, many joint ventures have been set 
up between Thai and mainly Japanese compa-
nies in both electrical appliances and consumer 
electronics. In contrast, the electronic compo-
nent and computer parts segment is export-
oriented and almost entirely dominated by 
transnational corporations (TNCs). Its most 
important activities are assembly and testing of 
integrated circuits (ICs), printed circuit boards 
(PCBs), and computer parts such as hard disk 
drives (HDD). In this segment, the supplier 
base is very weak. National value-added is no 
higher than 10-15 %. More value-creating 
activities such as design, product engineering, 
and R&D are carried out abroad.  
Thailand faces competitive pressure from two 
sides. Competing on factors such as quality, 
flexible production, and design capabilities, 
technologically-advanced countries like Ma-
laysia and Singapore are currently attracting 
the higher value-added, technology-intensive 
investments. From below, latecomer countries 
such as Vietnam and China are competing on 
cost advantages. Catching up technologically, 
these countries are able to engage in labor-
intensive mass production similar to that cur-
rently carried out in Thailand.  
Currently, Thailand is worried about competi-
tion from China. However, realization of its 
inability to compete on factor cost could lead to 
a new strategic outlook: Rather than trying to 
compete in labor-intensive mass production, 
the best chances for sustaining Thailand’s elec-
trical and electronics sector must be sought in 
entering knowledge-based market segments 
currently occupied by Malaysia and Singapore. 
Industry trends render this optimistic scenario 
plausible: TNCs, while concentrating on prod-
uct development, design and marketing, out-
source manufacturing services to specialized 
subassemblers and contract manufacturers. At 
the same time, flexible production capabilities 
are required, i.e. supply of customized prod-
ucts in small batches on short notice. This im-
plies an increased need for a local supplier 
base capable of quickly providing specialized 
tools and parts. Based on interviews in Thai-
land and experiences from neighboring coun-
tries, we have identified several promising 
opportunities:  
— Chip design activities are in increasing 
demand. Given the number of well-
educated chip designers and companies in 
IC and PCB manufacturing, IC and PCB 
design as well as embedded systems may 
be seen as a hitherto untapped market.  
— Suppliers could engage in precision engi-
neering (high quality tools, moulds and 
dies, jigs and fixtures) and high quality 
plastics and metal parts (for casings, key-
boards, etc.) as well as indirect materials 
(foam, cardboard, packaging, printing 
manuals). 
— In export manufacturing Thai firms could 
specialize in subassemblies (mass manu-
facturing on a contract basis for transna-
tional customers). 
— In the electrical parts and appliances seg-
ment, there is scope for Thai companies to 
design and manufacture niche market 
products and to create their own brands for 
both domestic and regional export mar-
kets. Examples of promising markets are 
seen in the fields of energy-saving tech-
nology and products requiring adaptation 
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to local environments (air-conditioning, 
PABX switchers, uninterrupted power 
supplies etc.). 
Keeping the electrical and electronics industry 
competitive and tapping these opportunities 
requires a concerted drive that puts technologi-
cal upgrading and embedding of the TNC-
driven export sector at the heart of the agenda. 
The main challenges pertain to: 
— Policy formulation, i.e. formulating a 
shared vision and implementing jointly 
designed programs. Electronics currently 
lacks political support and has not been 
included as one of the five priority “clus-
ters” for government action. Even though 
a Master Plan was drafted in 1998, it nei-
ther provides a common, shared vision nor 
specifies concrete actions to be taken to 
achieve these goals. Important bottlenecks 
such as international standards certifica-
tion are not even mentioned in the plan. 
The lack of political support and orienta-
tion can be attributed to the fact that in-
dustry players are unable to find a com-
mon platform and jointly address the gov-
ernment. Industry associations as well as 
the Electrical and Electronics Institute rep-
resent only certain subsectors. As a result, 
there is little joint action in the industry. 
— Human resource development. Electrical 
and electronics companies in Thailand 
generally perform low- to medium-skill 
activities, mostly in assembly. Capabilities 
to design new products and production 
technologies or to provide specialized ser-
vices are to a large extent lacking. Tradi-
tionally neither higher education institu-
tions and training programs nor the firms 
concerned have invested sufficiently in 
skills development. Although Thailand 
now trains 60,000 electronic and electrical 
technicians and engineers annually, and 
companies are increasingly setting up in-
house training facilities, these increases 
are not sufficient if the companies con-
cerned intend to increase their global 
competitiveness. However, higher educa-
tion institutions and training programs are 
still not systematically linked to the pri-
vate sector.  
— Technological upgrading. In order to tap 
the market opportunities described above, 
technological upgrading needs to take 
place at the firm and sector levels. At the 
firm level, upgrading with regard to qual-
ity, just in time delivery, technology inten-
sity, product differentiation, design capac-
ity, etc. is crucial. As the internal market is 
not very demanding, however, especially 
many Thai SMEs have failed to realize the 
urgent need to upgrade. Few national 
standards are mandatory, and competition 
is price-based, providing little incentive 
for product differentiation. Therefore, sec-
tor-wide approaches are needed to foster 
standardization and a culture of high-
quality production, to enhance technologi-
cal capabilities, promote inter-firm net-
works, and to attract technologically more 
complex investments to Thailand. 
— Linkage creation and embedding. Embed-
ding denotes the building by foreign com-
panies of linkages to local companies and 
institutions by integrating them into their 
value chains and by collaborating with re-
search and technology organizations. The 
Thai government has paid very little atten-
tion to embedding the industry and proac-
tively supporting the development of an 
indigenous supplier base capable of sup-
plying quality products. Neither have there 
been supplier development programs fo-
cusing on capability development nor have 
leading companies been given incentives 
to create vertical linkages and to engage in 
technology transfer. Only recently has the 
BUILD program begun to seek to enhance 
the creation of vertical linkages, and a few 
cooperation projects involving TNCs, re-
search centers, and universities have been 
initiated. 
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b) Strengthening knowledge-based com-
petitive advantages in shrimp aquacul-
ture 
Thailand is the world’s largest producer and 
leading exporter of farm-raised shrimp. Shrimp 
farms cover an area of 80,000 hectares, ac-
counting for approximately 3.5 % of the coun-
try's total exports of goods and services. Fa-
vorable agro-climatic and economic conditions 
as well as the particular organizational struc-
ture of the Thai shrimp sector, including a 
large national conglomerate with cutting-edge 
technological expertise, account for Thailand’s 
comparative advantage in shrimp production. 
The Charoen Pokphand (CP) is Thailand’s 
largest transnational company and the world’s 
largest shrimp feed producer. In Thailand, CP’s 
operations range from feedmills, hatcheries and 
demonstration farms, laboratory testing and 
diagnostic services for shrimp farmers to shrimp 
processing plants. The CP Group alone employs 
400 consultants who provide advisory services 
to farmers. Shrimp-farming has positive em-
ployment effects. Taking family members into 
account, the number of people dependent on 
the shrimp industry is approximately 300,000. 
Farm-raised shrimp production is one of the 
fastest-growing industries worldwide. 
Economic success is being achieved at high 
environmental costs. For some years, shrimp 
farming was very profitable, as environmental 
costs could easily be externalized. Today, with 
diseases spreading throughout the country, and 
import countries banning shrimp that have 
been treated with antibiotics, environmental 
problems have increased to an extent that they 
challenge the viability of the sector itself: 
— Wild-caught broodstock (shrimp larvae 
are difficult to reproduce in captivity) has 
become extremely rare. Revenues from 
shrimp-farming decrease as broodstock 
caught from the sea become scarcer and 
smaller, and thus have less economic 
value. 
— In the past, many shrimp ponds were es-
tablished in mangrove areas and other 
wetland ecosystems. The destruction of 
these ecosystems has far-reaching eco-
nomic consequences for Thailand’s sea-
food sector. Since two-thirds of the fish 
caught for human consumption live in 
coastal mangrove ecosystems or depend 
on them, their destruction threatens many 
species of fish and other marine resources. 
Fishing is becoming less and less profit-
able, and entire coastal communities that 
depend on fishing are becoming impover-
ished.  
— Due to high stocking rates and disposal of 
wastewater into irrigation canals, virus 
diseases have spread throughout the whole 
country, leading to frequent crop failures 
and substantial economic losses. Short-
term solutions focused on heavy usage of 
a wide range of industrial chemicals, 
mainly antibiotics; but these chemicals not 
only have a negative impact on the quality 
of soil and water, they also threaten ex-
ports as importing countries impose in-
creasingly rigid conditions.  
— Apart from chemicals, groundwater and 
soil quality are affected by saline water 
which is transported in enormous amounts 
to inland shrimp farms. 
What is needed to cope with these environ-
mental and economic challenges is knowledge-
intensive innovations at different levels. If 
Thailand manages to become a leader in eco-
efficient farming systems, this will both mini-
mize the environmental impact of shrimp-
farming and increase its efficiency. A shared 
vision about the future of Thailand’s shrimp 
industry needs to be developed with the par-
ticipation of all the relevant actors (including 
those indirectly affected by shrimp farming, 
such as fishermen, rice farmers, and environ-
mentalists). Research priorities, codes of con-
duct, market differentiation, and marketing 
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strategies etc should be derived from such an 
integrated perspective. Looking at the most 
urgent reforms, Thailand has to  
— intensify existing research cooperation 
between industry and science. For many of 
the above-mentioned problems of Thai-
land’s shrimp aquaculture, technological 
solutions still have to be developed, and 
this in some cases requires considerable 
research effort. Among the most pressing 
research issues are domestication of 
broodstock, detection and treatment of 
diseases, genetic improvement, and secure 
and efficient pond management tech-
niques. 
— Improve pond and waste water manage-
ment systems, e.g. closed-water systems 
for treating waste water in a sedimentation 
pond before releasing it into drainage sys-
tems. Moreover it is necessary to reduce 
stocking rates with a view to using fewer 
chemical inputs and feeding materials. 
The use of sufficient pumps and aerators is 
crucial to maintain good water quality. 
According to our empirical research, 
farmers have made positive experiences 
with less intensive farming systems.  
— Reduce the use of chemicals. Although 
awareness has considerably increased, the 
use of antibiotics is still widespread 
among shrimp farmers. The fact that feed 
and chemical corporations are the main 
advisers to the shrimp farmers is hamper-
ing the search for less intensive but still 
economically viable farming methods, 
given that these firms are interested in 
maximizing their feed and chemicals in-
puts. Therefore the public sector should be-
come more active in the promotion of eco-
efficient farming methods, e.g. by support-
ing research on its viability, providing test-
ing services, or exploring market opportu-
nities for organically grown shrimp.  
— Improve regulation and legal enforcement. 
Shrimp culture is affected by a large num-
ber of laws and regulations, including land 
laws, water laws, environmental laws, 
fishing laws etc. To guarantee enforce-
ment of government regulations, it is es-
sential to improve the coordination of the 
departments in charge of different issues 
related to shrimp production.  
— Promote good cultivation practices. Bear-
ing in mind that many thousand farms 
throughout the entire country are engaged 
in shrimp farming, any attempts to enforce 
command-and-control mechanisms for en-
vironmental protection would far exceed 
the capacities of Thailand’s public admini-
stration. It is therefore necessary to com-
plement government regulation through 
industrial self-regulation based on stan-
dards and codes of conduct. Such stan-
dards not only contribute to internalizing 
the environmental costs of shrimp-farming 
but they are also an important means to 
regaining consumer confidence, differen-
tiating the market, and thus increasing the 
competitiveness of the shrimp sector. 
To further boost the competitiveness of the 
sector, Thailand should embark on develop-
ment of high-end markets, such as ready-to-eat 
products, delicacies, and organic markets. 
Value-added can be augmented by developing 
brand names.  
There is a good possibility that Thailand will 
manage to meet these challenges. Several uni-
versities and the Department of Fisheries have 
placed emphasis on shrimp research, and BIO-
TEC funds a special Shrimp Biotechnology 
Program, which reflects a national research 
priority in this sector. Furthermore, several 
private-sector companies are highly committed 
to shrimp-related R&D. In some cases, there 
are concerted efforts under way to advance 
research. Much of public research is directed 
toward the achievement of eco-efficiency. 
Most farmers appear to have established extra 
sedimentation ponds, and land use regulation 
has improved. In other areas, e.g. avoidance of 
antibiotics and establishment of standards and 
codes of conduct, not enough is being done. 
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Introduction  
Knowledge and innovation have always been 
important sources of competitiveness and thus the 
basis for sustainable economic growth. But today 
the effective creation, diffusion and utilization of 
knowledge determines economic success more 
than ever before. 
Especially for Thailand, increasing the knowledge 
content of economic activities is an urgent need. 
In the 1980s and much of the 1990s, Thailand was 
able to achieve robust economic growth through 
an open-door policy towards foreign direct in-
vestment. Its rates of GDP growth and poverty 
reduction were among the highest worldwide. Yet 
both foreign and domestic investment remained 
confined to rather knowledge-extensive sectors, 
such as agriculture, assembly of imported parts 
(e.g. in the electrical, electronics and automotive 
industries), real estate, construction, and tourism. 
Furthermore, technologically more complex ac-
tivities are mainly performed by foreign compa-
nies, whose technological capabilities and produc-
tivity far exceed those of local companies. Due to 
this technological gap, many export-based activi-
ties have not built significant local linkages, either 
with suppliers or with research institutions. Since 
competitiveness in these activities is highly de-
pendent on labor costs, competition from low-cost 
locations such as China and Vietnam has become 
a serious threat, and some foreign investors have 
already relocated assembly operations in these 
countries. If Thailand is to improve (or at least 
maintain) its current level of socio-economic de-
velopment, the country’s economy has to upgrade 
towards more knowledge-intensive and higher 
value-added activities and build indigenous inno-
vative capabilities.  
Innovation is an incremental and systemic pro-
cess. It not only requires effective internal organi-
zation and substantial research and development 
(R&D) activities at the firm level, it also calls for 
joint learning through interaction within supply 
chains and other forms of inter-firm co-operation 
as well as effective interaction between firms and 
institutions, for instance universities and other 
research and technology organizations. Successful 
transition towards a knowledge-based economy 
thus depends on the efficiency of interactions at 
three levels – intra-firm, inter-firm, and between 
firms and institutions – which together constitute 
the National Innovation System (NIS). 
The present study shows that Thailand’s NIS is 
not yet sufficiently developed: the number of in-
novative firms is low and many organizational 
capabilities necessary for innovation are lacking; 
the quantity and quality of inter-firm and industry-
science relationships is limited; and institutional 
support lacks strategic orientation as well as im-
plementing capacities. The study looks into four 
areas of innovation policy which are crucial for 
the functioning of NIS yet appear to be relatively 
weak in the Thai case. Each policy area cuts 
across the three levels of NIS mentioned above. 
Looking at each policy area, the report discusses 
its relevance, describes the current status in Thai-
land and gives some policy recommendations 
based on successful international experiences: 
• The general process of policy formulation, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
needs to be improved in order to create vi-
sions which give direction to innovation and 
help to focus support programs and improve 
the efficiency of program implementation; 
• Inter-firm linkages need to be enhanced to 
foster learning, innovation and other syner-
gies, with special emphasis on vertical link-
ages that involve technological spillovers 
from large corporations to local SMEs and 
contribute to embedding foreign firms in the 
national economy; 
• Industry-science relations should be sup-
ported with a view to increasing knowledge 
flows from the academic sphere to the econ-
omy and promoting a culture of joint prob-
lem-solving in order to enhance technological 
upgrading; 
• Entrepreneurship development programs 
are needed to create new innovative firms and 
foster structural change, but also to strengthen 
existing companies. 
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The present study selected the electrical and elec-
tronics manufacturing and the shrimp-farming 
sector to illustrate how building knowledge-based 
competitive advantages pertains to a wide range 
of economic activities. Both sectors are not only 
highly relevant to the Thai economy in terms of 
export earnings and employment creation but are 
also currently under pressure to increase their 
knowledge intensity and innovative capacity. In-
novation policies, though with a different focus 
for each sector, are therefore needed to assist in 
upgrading local firms, linking local and foreign 
firms, and solving specific (e.g. social and envi-
ronmental) problems in collaboration with scien-
tific institutions.  
1 Knowledge, innovation and 
development 
1.1 Why are knowledge-based competitive 
advantages important for develop-
ment? 
Economic growth is crucial for development, 
since growth can help reduce poverty and secure 
peoples´ living standards. In an increasingly liber-
alized global economy a nation's GDP can only 
grow if it builds competitive advantages which 
provide for increasing exports and economic sus-
tainability of domestic production. Knowledge has 
always been central for economic growth.1 Yet the 
speed at which knowledge is created, accumu-
lated, applied and distributed has increased, and 
so has the importance of knowledge as a source of 
competitive advantages relative to the cost of 
capital and labor.  
Early growth theories used capital and labor to 
explain growth rates. A sustained rise in the rate 
of savings and investment was considered to be 
the main source of economic growth. Besides 
capital, growth was seen as depending on the 
quantity of labor employed in the economic proc-
                                                     
1  See David/ Foray (2002). 
ess. Yet already in the 1950s the neoclassical 
theorist Solow showed that an important part of 
output growth cannot be attributed to the accumu-
lation of capital and labor.2 This part – the famous 
“Solow residual” – was ascribed to “technological 
progress.” Technological progress means that the 
traditional factors are being employed in a more 
efficient manner. This obviously requires knowl-
edge: knowledge about who should act, what 
should be done and when, where work should be 
carried out, and how best to optimize effective-
ness. Technological progress is thus of a largely 
qualitative nature and cannot be described and 
measured as easily as the traditional production 
factors.  
Neoclassical theory considered technological pro-
gress to be exogenous and freely accessible for 
everybody. The mechanism behind technological 
change (learning, searching and formal R&D) 
remained inside a black box.3 Due to this short-
coming, traditional theory was unable to account 
for differences in income growth rates or income 
levels across countries with similar capital and 
labor costs.  
Later, Endogenous Growth Theory4 sought to fill 
this gap by “endogenizing” technological change. 
This was done by modeling an R&D sector which 
steadily improves existing technologies. Not only 
the quantity of products but also their heterogene-
ity and quality is considered important. The new 
theory also emphasized the role of human capital 
and education as an engine of economic growth. 
Moreover, the theory incorporated the concept of 
externalities (spillovers) which are linked with 
investment. 
We use the term “knowledge-based economy” to 
refer to this quantitative and qualitative (though 
always gradual) shift towards a new pattern of 
economic specialization that is driven by know-
how rather than by factor-cost differentials. An 
economy can be defined as knowledge-based if 
                                                     
2  Solow (1956). 
3  Rosenberg (1994). 
4  See Romer (1986), Lucas (1988). 
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competitive advantage is less a function of natural 
resources than a function of technology and inno-
vation.5 
The present study defines competitiveness, fol-
lowing Krugman, as the “ability to produce goods 
and services that meet the test of international 
competition while (…) citizens enjoy a standard 
of living that is both rising and sustainable.”6 
Looking at ways of achieving competitiveness, 
Porter distinguishes two basic types of competi-
tive advantage: lower cost and product differentia-
tion: 
“Lower cost is the ability of a firm to de-
sign, produce and market a comparable 
product more efficiently than its competi-
tor. At prices at or near competitors, 
lower cost translates into superior re-
turns. (…) Differentiation is the ability to 
provide unique and superior value to the 
buyer in terms of product quality, special 
features, or after-sale service. (…) Dif-
ferentiation allows a firm to command a 
premium price, which leads to superior 
profitability provided costs are compa-
rable to those of competitors. The low-
cost firm produces a given output using 
fewer inputs than competitors require. 
The differentiated firm achieves higher 
revenues per unit than competitors.”7 
Competitive advantages that are directly related to 
lower costs face the risk of factor mobility. Lower 
costs in different forms of production or different 
locations can eliminate economic rents. The abil-
ity to differentiate leads to innovation rents, be-
cause knowledge-based competitive advantages 
are more specific and harder to replicate.  
“Pure cost advantages are frequently 
less sustainable than differentiation. One 
reason is that any new source of lower 
costs, even one less sophisticated, can 
nullify a firm’s cost advantage. If labor is 
                                                     
5  See OECD (1999), pp. 15 ff. 
6  As cited in Haque (1991), p. 8. 
7  Porter (1990), p. 37. 
cheap enough, for example, even much 
higher efficiency can be nullified, unlike 
the case with differentiation advantages 
which normally must be matched to be 
exceeded. In addition, pure cost advan-
tages are more vulnerable because new 
product designs or other forms of differ-
entiation can eliminate a cost advantage 
in delivering the old ones.“8  
The crucial factor for differentiation is the capa-
bility to innovate. Innovation can relate to “a new 
product, but also a new process of production, the 
substitution of a cheaper material, the reorganiza-
tion of production, internal functions, or distribu-
tion arrangements leading to increased efficiency, 
better support for a given product, or lower cost, 
or an improvement in instruments or methods in 
doing innovation”.9 The long-term competitive-
ness of nations reflects their engagement in per-
manent processes of innovation. Highlighting the 
various features of innovations in more detail will 
further illustrate the concept of knowledge-based 
economy.  
1.2 The systemic character of innovation  
The concept of innovation has gradually evolved 
from a unilinear model to the systemic view. In 
the past innovation was considered a single and 
linear event involving transference of findings 
from science and technology to new commercial 
applications. Today innovation is seen as a con-
tinuous and omnipresent, gradual and cumulative 
process of learning, searching and exploring 
which involves manifold feedback loops, rather 
than a unidirectional process.10 Thus it is difficult 
to localize innovations as unique events in time 
and space. Innovation refers here not only to the 
first introduction of a piece of knowledge into an 
economy but to the overall process of invention, 
its successive diffusion and reinterpretation by 
                                                     
8  Ibid., p. 50. 
9  Kline/ Rosenberg (1986), p. 179. 
10  OECD (1992), pp. 24 ff. 
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using and trying out. Innovation comprises the 
development of new products, new techniques, 
new forms of organization and new markets. 
The following features outline the systemic char-
acter of innovation:11 
1. In today's economy, innovations are not ex-
traordinary occurrences which cut through 
and abruptly transform otherwise "innovation-
free" everyday business routines. Rather, in-
novation is a continuous, gradual process, one 
that takes place constantly and everywhere – 
although by no means with the same dyna-
mism. This process results in constant 
changes in products, production techniques, 
organizational processes, marketing, etc. 
There are many areas in which innovations 
are systematically pursued. This is particularly 
evident in cases where specialized R&D de-
partments are set up. But systematic pursuit of 
innovations can also frequently be observed in 
the routine operations of companies and insti-
tutions. Modern concepts of organizational 
development aim to create "learning organiza-
tions" with clearly defined goals and indica-
tors that are used to constantly monitor goal 
attainment and ensure that no time is lost in 
effecting process adjustments as soon as dis-
crepancies are noted between targets and ac-
tual results. Today, mechanisms designed to 
check performance against defined goal pa-
rameters are firmly established in many or-
ganizations. Employees are given incentives 
to be on the constant lookout for possible im-
provements. In business practice this becomes 
evident in the widespread adoption of con-
cepts like continuous improvement processes. 
Under framework conditions in which techno-
logical parameters and markets are changing 
at an ever increasing pace, it is furthermore 
becoming more and more important for com-
panies to be able to go beyond fixed parame-
ters ("single-loop learning") and to establish 
                                                     
11  Based on Lundvall (1992); Nelson (1993); OECD 
(1999). 
procedures aimed at regularly and systemati-
cally questioning these parameters ("double-
loop learning").12  
2. The innovation process is increasingly mov-
ing away from the linear course of the past 
towards a circular-cumulative process involv-
ing numerous feedback loops. These loops 
occur not only within individual firms, as de-
scribed in the above point, but also between 
the stages of a value chain. In the early phases 
of industrial development the phases "inven-
tion," "innovation" (that is the further devel-
opment of an invention to the point of market-
ability) and "diffusion" (establishment in the 
market) usually followed one another in clear 
succession. What we have today is an iterative 
process in which innovations are continuously 
tested and adapted. Users' requests, for exam-
ple, are incorporated in the development pro-
cess at an early stage, established products or 
processes are systematically reviewed and 
modified. 
In this way innovation becomes an interactive 
process in which numerous actors work col-
lectively to produce reciprocal external ef-
fects. Thus reality is increasingly departing 
from the picture drawn in Schumpeter's13 
early work, where innovations were to a large 
extent the individual achievements of creative 
individuals. Interaction takes place principally 
between firms in up- and downstream stages 
of the value chain (e.g. synchronized product 
development involving parts suppliers), but 
can also be observed among firms at the same 
stage of the value chain (where it serves e.g. 
to achieve economies of scale) and between 
firms and scientific, research, training, busi-
ness-promotion, and other institutions. The 
importance of intensive cooperation with sup-
pliers and research institutions has been 
stressed for decades now. More recently, in-
teractions between manufacturers and de-
manding lead users have also been accorded 
                                                     
12  Morgan (1998), pp. 79 ff. 
13  Schumpeter (1911/12). 
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great importance. Lead users frequently create 
incentives or apply pressure to induce produc-
ers to improve products. Porter refers, over 
and above this, to the innovation-driving ef-
fects created by challenging and differentiated 
demand.14  
3. Knowledge can never be 100% codified; it is, 
qua experience, always bound in part to peo-
ple and institutions (tacit knowledge) and as 
such is not readily transferable. Furthermore, 
a wholly private appropriation of the out-
comes of investments in new stocks of knowl-
edge is seldom possible. Spillovers, i.e. unin-
tended transfers to third parties, is more or 
less unavoidable. The production factor 
"knowledge" is in this sense highly vulnerable 
to market failure. This, too, is of relevance to 
the question of business locations. Transfer of 
tacit knowledge hinges on interpersonal con-
tacts; specialists are not totally mobile, and 
specialized regional pools of skilled workers 
are therefore at times essential. This means 
that production processes cannot be broken 
down at will and distributed across business 
locations with factor-cost advantages. 
4. The interactive character of innovation proc-
esses implies a great need for coordination of 
the various actors involved. The amount of in-
formation needed on product features, mar-
kets, potential cooperation partners, techno-
logical options, organizational forms, and the 
like is constantly increasing, making decision-
making more and more complex. The increas-
ing specialization and differentiation of value-
added processes leads at the same time to the 
creation of new interfaces between subsys-
tems. New, knowledge-intensive forms of 
moderation are called for to ensure that this 
wealth of information is properly structured 
and communicated between the various actors 
involved, without this leading to an explosion 
of transaction costs. These "interfacing ser-
vices" include, for example, the assessment, 
evaluation, and legal formulation of impend-
                                                     
14  Porter (1990), pp. 109 ff. 
ing make-or-buy decisions, mergers or acqui-
sitions, the coordination of logistic subsys-
tems, establishment of quality standards along 
the value chain, moderation of communica-
tion processes in multicultural teams and 
among business partners, to mention but a 
few. 
5. Locational specialization is shaped by histori-
cal developments and is to this extent path-
dependent. Locations which are still in the 
early stages of the profile-building process 
have, initially, a multitude of specialization 
options – viz. all options which offer them 
comparative advantages based on cost factors. 
However, any initial specialization calls for 
specific investments, e.g. in relevant training 
programs. Since innovations are of a cumula-
tive nature and build on existing stocks of 
knowledge, constellations of actors, prefer-
ences and interactions, this initial specializa-
tion inevitably pre-shapes the further path of 
development. Possible economies of scale and 
external effects must be considered in the fu-
ture allocation of scarce resources, which 
means that that alternative patterns of spe-
cialization for which no initial investments 
were made are, comparatively, less profitable 
and are therefore abandoned. 
6. High levels of private and public investment 
are required to create efficient, specialized 
business networks with high synergy poten-
tials. Many inputs for knowledge-based clus-
ters have, at least in part, the character of pub-
lic goods, particularly in the fields of R&D, 
training, and regional strategy formulation. 
Such fields are in need of public institutions 
and policy instruments if a socially optimal 
outcome is to be achieved. The more target-
oriented and specific these inputs are, the 
greater the path dependence of the regional 
specialization pattern.  
7. The systemic character of innovation and 
networking among firms and between firms 
and the public sector requires development of 
Information and Communication Technolo-
gies. These technologies have dramatically 
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reduced the costs of storing, handling, moving 
and combining information, and have made 
different patterns of national and international 
networking possible.15 This has increased the 
possibilities, and the pressure, to come up 
with new combinations of codified and tacit 
knowledge and interactive learning. While 
most earlier episodes of technical change have 
centered on particular products or industrial 
sectors, information technology is generic. It 
impacts on every element of the economy, 
both goods and services, as well as on R&D, 
production, marketing and distribution.  
1.3 Challenges for developing countries 
in the knowledge-based economy 
The knowledge intensity of economic affairs dif-
fers substantially between nations. Developing 
economies have starting points very different from 
those of industrialized countries. The economic 
growth trajectory and the role of developing 
economies within the global division of produc-
tion are still mainly based on the comparative 
advantage of lower labor costs and endowments 
with specific natural resources, factors which are 
reflected in relatively low productivity, value 
added, and factor incomes. Modernization is often 
limited to small pockets of competitive enter-
prises, while a huge proportion of the population 
remains trapped in a vicious circle of low produc-
tivity and low income. Moreover, short-term 
strategies to exploit competitive advantages are 
often pursued at the expense of the environment, 
thus leading to depletion of resources. The knowl-
edge-based economy thus poses the threefold 
challenge for these countries to achieve integra-
tion into the global knowledge economy, and 
combine this with a pattern of economic devel-
opment that is more equitable and ecologically 
sustainable. The innovation systems of most de-
veloping countries are not well prepared to con-
front this threefold challenge:  
                                                     
15  Kline/ Rosenberg (1986), p. 280. 
— Only very few firms are able to make sub-
stantial technological innovations. Most firms 
even lack the technological capabilities re-
quired to systematically choose the most ade-
quate technological alternative and to effi-
ciently incorporate, utilize and adapt acquired 
technologies. 
— The enterprise structure is often highly polar-
ized, the degree of specialization low, and na-
tional value chains tend to be relatively short 
and dependent on imports of critical products 
and services (and the know-how incorporated 
in them). Linkages and knowledge flows 
within value chains are thus often poorly de-
veloped and do not contribute to substantial 
innovative synergies.  
— In the same vein, research and technology 
institutions are usually not sufficiently up-to-
date and diversified, and their linkages with 
the private sector are weak, which means 
foregoing potential synergies and spillovers.  
— The ability (and sometimes even the willing-
ness) of governments to create a broad con-
sensus in society about innovation-oriented, 
competitive, ecologically sustainable and eq-
uitable development paths as well as to de-
sign and implement economic policies ac-
cordingly is often quite limited. Sometimes 
the general business environment (e.g. in 
terms of political stability, rule of law, prop-
erty rights etc.) is anything but investment-
friendly. But even those countries that suc-
ceed in creating a favorable investment cli-
mate mostly fail to build a common under-
standing of the concrete development trajec-
tories they need to follow, and this is a crucial 
precondition for a focused and articulated na-
tional innovation policy. The process of pol-
icy formulation and implementation is often 
not systematic and target-oriented. Moreover, 
well-designed policies designed to cope with 
specific challenges in terms of human capital, 
entrepreneurship development, technology 
acquisition, research and development, indus-
try-science relations, inter-firm linkages etc. 
are rarely in place.  
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2 How to generate, acquire and use 
knowledge within a National Inno-
vation System 
As we saw in the section above, the creation, dif-
fusion, and use of knowledge are vital to eco-
nomic growth and change. Firms, researchers, and 
policy-makers are therefore challenged in many 
ways to find solutions for coping with steadily 
increasing flows of knowledge and new technolo-
gies. They not only have to understand how tech-
nological changes influence the economy and 
society but also have to design policies to cope 
with these changes. 
Section 2.1 present and discusses the National 
Innovation System (NIS) approach with a view to 
developing an understanding of the components, 
relationships and attributes that underlie knowl-
edge-driven development. Section 2.2 discusses 
the three main levels of NIS: the internal 
organization of firms, inter-firm relationships, and 
relations between firms and their institutional 
environment. Section 2.3 then explains how NIS 
contribute to upgrading economic activities. 
Section 2.4 identifies the most important areas of 
economic policy and introduces the distinction 
between promotion of general framework 
conditions conducive to innovation and specific 
innovation policies in a narrower sense.  
2.1 The concept of National Innovation 
Systems as an analytical framework  
An NIS is a system of actors (firms, organizations, 
government agencies, consumers, etc.) that inter-
act with each other in ways which enhance the 
innovation performance of a national economy. 
The main idea of the concept of innovation sys-
tems is that overall performance depends not only 
on how each individual actor performs but also on 
how these actors work together in knowledge 
generation, acquisition, and use. The concept 
represents a useful analytical tool for understand-
ing how innovations come about and for assessing 
the functioning of knowledge-based activities in a 
given economy. Moreover, it may also provide 
guidance for the design of policies.  
The focus on national systems reflects the fact 
that national economies differ with regard to the 
structure of their production systems and institu-
tional setups.16 The success of an NIS thus de-
pends on a variety of nation-specific factors such 
as market conditions, managerial and technologi-
cal competences of enterprises, public infrastruc-
ture and regulations, norms and values, and the 
intensity and effectiveness of interaction between 
knowledge-using and knowledge-producing enti-
ties. It is because of these particularities that inno-
vation activities differ among countries. Yet as 
nation-states become more open to cross-border 
trade and investment relations, NIS increasingly 
become subject to external influences. Transna-
tional corporations in particular shape local pro-
duction systems to a much greater extent than they 
did a few decades ago. Moreover, nation-states 
increasingly act in accordance with international 
agreements, and even some research and technol-
ogy organizations exercise influence beyond na-
tional boundaries. On the whole, although the 
degree of nation-specific similarities justifies the 
analysis of national systems, NIS must always be 
viewed as open systems.  
The concept of NIS emphasizes the need to inte-
grate three different levels: 
— The internal organization of firms; 
— Inter-firm relationships; 
— Relationships between institutions and firms. 
Besides these three main levels, the concept rec-
ognizes the importance of general framework 
conditions, including a stable political and macro-
economic environment supportive of entrepreneu-
rial activities, up-to-date infrastructure, an educa-
tional policy that promotes entrepreneurial spirit 
and innovative behavior, etc. A thorough discus-
sion of all these conditions would obviously go far 
beyond the scope of this study. Therefore they are 
only briefly mentioned in Chapter 2.4, and the 
                                                     
16  OECD (1999), p. 21. 
 Tilman Altenburg et al. 8 
study will emphasize the role of some selected 
specific innovation policies.17 
2.2 The three main levels of interaction 
within NIS 
This section will discuss how learning at the three 
main levels is organized and how knowledge 
transfer can be effected as a means of laying the 
foundations for innovation. 
2.2.1 The internal organization of firms 
In an age of global competition firms need to 
adapt their internal capabilities to changing mar-
ket conditions. Generation of and interaction be-
tween technological, organizational, and social 
innovations is important to ensure cost-efficiency, 
quality, diversity, and responsiveness, and to im-
prove the innovative capability of a firm,.18  
Technological innovations imply an internal shift 
from simply using technology (in the form of ba-
sic operations, skills and capabilities, technician 
and craft skills) to creating and developing tech-
nology.19 However, creating technology does not 
simply mean a growing share of R&D-intensive 
production, it also refers to engineering skills, 
own design manufacturing (ODM), own brand 
manufacturing (OBM), and innovations in market-
ing.  
Productivity gains tend to be higher if technologi-
cal change is accompanied by organizational 
innovations. The most prominent change today is 
                                                     
17  The concept of systemic competitiveness (Esser et al. 
1996) provides a useful analytical tool to analyze how 
political systems, macroeconomic conditions, social 
norms and values and other general factors interact with 
firms and organizations in their efforts to increase com-
petitiveness. 
18  Altenburg/ Hillebrand/ Meyer-Stamer (1998), p. 9. 
19  Indicators for measuring this shift towards developing 
technology include ratios of R&D expenditures, number 
of researchers, and patenting. 
the transition from a “Fordist” style of production 
(standardized mass production) to more flexible, 
“post-Fordist” systems.20 To produce cost-efficient-
ly and to ensure quality as well as responsiveness 
to the market, profound organizational changes 
are needed within the production process. Such 
innovations enable the firm to deliver just in time 
and reduce stocks, to improve quality and detect 
errors earlier, to reduce the time span between the 
development of new designs and their introduc-
tion to the market, etc. 
Social innovations, e.g. reduction of hierarchies, 
internal decentralization of decision-making pow-
ers, broader incentive schemes, promotion of par-
ticipation and cooperation, and increased trans-
parency are further important elements of innova-
tion. To enhance communication and knowledge 
transfer within a given firm, and to generate pro-
cess innovations, it is vitally important to establish 
feedback links and effective connections between 
different entities of the firm. 
The competitive advantages and innovative capac-
ities of firms are strongly related to their internal 
learning routines and feedback loops (see Figure 
2.1).21 In order to become or remain innovative, 
firms need to reinvent themselves continuously, 
rearranging both their mission and their internal 
structures. Since these tasks require the acquisi-
tion, transfer and utilization of knowledge at dif-
ferent stages of entrepreneurship development, 
continuous training of entrepreneurs and workers 
and support for organizational change are essen-
tial parts of any NIS.  
                                                     
20  Altenburg (1996), p. 59.  
21  Dosi/ Teece/ Chytry (1998), p. 209. 
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Although innovative capabilities need to be de-
veloped in firms of all size categories, it is also 
important to acknowledge certain differences be-
tween large and small firms. SMEs differ from 
large corporations in terms of the skills and pro-
fessional training of their managers. They tend to 
have more limited financial and human resources, 
less access to information, and shorter planning 
horizons. In addition, they are often more risk-
averse and reluctant to call in outside help.22 In 
most cases, SMEs depend more on technology use 
than on technology development, since they as a 
rule do not engage in systematic R&D. They pre-
fer to perform trouble-shooting activities than to 
establish formalized mechanisms to systematically 
accelerate incremental innovations. In contrast, 
large corporations quite often use and deepen their 
economies of scale by engaging in systematic 
R&D activities and reinventing themselves con-
tinuously. To remain competitive, SMEs therefore 
need to specialize, to find niches of production 
and to deliver products and services that capitalize 
on their specific advantages – such as flexibility 
and quick decision-making procedures – and ap-
                                                     
22  See OECD (1999), p. 51. 
propriately complement the scale-intensive pro-
duction of large corporations.23 
2.2.2 Inter-firm linkages 
As we have seen, the innovative capacity of firms 
depends on their internal competences and flexi-
bility. But firms rarely innovate alone. As product 
life cycles and delivery times grow ever shorter, 
and firms become more specialized, the latter are 
forced to operate in networks and to tap more 
external sources for complementary products and 
services. Among these external sources, inter-firm 
collaboration is by far the most important channel 
for acquiring and exchanging knowledge. Empiri-
cal studies have confirmed that, on average, col-
laborating firms are more innovative than non-
collaborating ones.24 These collaborations may be 
based on formal links like legal titles, contracts or 
property rights, or on informal mechanisms to 
                                                     
23  Pfirrmann/ Hornschild (1999), p. 62. 
24  OECD (1999), p. 53. 
Figure 2.1: Product and information flows within an innovative firm 
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exchange information or create trust. They can 
take on the form of horizontal or vertical linkages.  
Horizontal linkages arise between companies 
operating at the same stage of the value chain. 
Although competition in product and process de-
velopment may deter firms from cooperating, 
there is scope for horizontal cooperation in fields 
where firms pursue common interests (e.g. bar-
gaining for lower input prices, sharing consulting 
costs, pooling resources for large projects, or in-
creasing bargaining power vis-à-vis major cus-
tomers). In this way individual firms may jointly 
increase their economies of scale.25 Yet policy-
makers often overestimate the willingness of firms 
to cooperate. Entrepreneurs are often reluctant to 
interact with other firms operating in the same 
market because they fear leakage of critical know-
how that may lead to others imitating their prod-
ucts or capturing their markets.  
For these reasons knowledge transfer is usually 
more intense within vertical linkages, i.e. between 
firms operating at different stages of the value 
chain, like buyers and suppliers. As production 
                                                     
25  Pfirrmann/ Hornschild (1999), p. 62. 
becomes increasingly more complex, firms out-
source activities and integrate into vertical coop-
eration, which allows them to develop specialized 
capabilities while intensifying links with external 
sources of complementary products and services.  
As production can be seen as a sequence of value-
adding stages, the term value chain (VC) refers to 
the full range of activities required to bring a 
product or service from conception to production, 
consumption, and final disposal after use. For-
ward linkages refer to relationships to the user, 
backward linkages relationships to the supplier 
within a VC. They can take the form of subcon-
tracting, joint ventures, licensing, or franchising. 
Intermediary producers in one particular VC may 
also feed into a number of other VCs.26 
The division of labor within VCs is becoming 
more and more complex. This is due to more 
stringent quality requirements, the need to trace 
products back from the consumer along the entire 
value chain to the first supplier, shorter product 
life cycles, etc. As a result, many VCs can no 
longer be based on anonymous spot-market trans-
                                                     
26  Kaplinsky/ Morris (2001), p. 4. 
Figure 2.2:  Vertical inter-firm linkages and governance of value chains 
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actions but require intense coordination regarding, 
for instance, agreements on product standards, 
harmonization of logistic concepts, electronic data 
exchange formats, etc. (see Figure 2.2). As a re-
sult, VCs gradually evolve from a simple, unidi-
rectional succession of production steps towards 
integrated systems requiring differentiated forms 
of governance and knowledge management. The 
term governance of value chains has recently been 
introduced to describe how product and process 
standards are set and enforced. In many VCs lead 
firms emerge which undertake the tasks of defin-
ing standards, coordinating the VC, monitoring 
the process, and sanctioning in cases of non-
compliance with standards. Kaplinsky and Morris 
suggest that the ability to govern a given value 
chain often resides in intangible competences such 
as R&D, design, branding, marketing, which are 
characterized by high entry barriers.27 
In such a system the advantages of SMEs (flexi-
bility, specialization, closeness to the customer) 
and the advantages of large companies (econo-
mies of scale, market power) may be combined in 
such a way as to gain synergy effects. Integration 
into VCs enables firms to use external knowledge, 
technology and finance, and thus to upgrade their 
activities and gain access to more profitable mar-
kets. Empirical studies show that access for SMEs 
to external markets increasingly depends on enter-
ing global production networks governed by 
TNCs.28 Although SMEs often also face problems 
due to increased dependence on the respective 
lead firm,29 TNCs play a significant and growing 
role for knowledge transfer within NIS. Despite 
the risk involved in transferring advanced tech-
nology and know-how to a less developed partner 
– it may foster the emergence of new competitors 
– it is a necessary element of TNC strategy to 
concentrate on their core competences.30 In highly 
disputed international markets competitiveness 
increasingly depends on the ability to improve the 
                                                     
27  Ibid., p. 66. 
28  Gereffi/ Korzeniewicz (1994). 
29  See Kaplinsky/ Morris (2001), p. 98. 
30  UNCTAD (2001), p. vii. 
quality and reduce the costs of upstream and 
downstream activities. Competition nowadays is 
not only a struggle between individual firms but 
also, and even more, a contest in which one lead 
firm pits the strength of its VC against the VC of a 
competing lead firm. This is why many TNCs 
engage in outsourcing and vertical networking to 
establish efficient local supplier structures, which 
they may support through the following transfer 
channels: 
1. Product technology: provision of proprietary 
product know-how; transfer of product de-
signs and technical specifications; technical 
consultations with suppliers to help them mas-
ter new technologies; feedback on product 
performance; collaboration in R&D; 
2. Process technology: provision of machinery 
and equipment; technical support on produc-
tion planning, quality management, inspection 
and testing; visits to supplier facilities to ad-
vise on layout, operation and quality; forma-
tion of cooperation clubs geared to interacting 
with suppliers on technical issues;  
3. Organizational and managerial know-how: 
assistance with inventory management and the 
use of just-in-time etc.; assistance in imple-
menting quality assurance systems; introduc-
tion to new practices (network management; 
financial, purchasing or marketing tech-
niques); assistance for employees to set up 
their own firms; 
4. Training: training courses for supplier per-
sonnel; provision of access to internal training 
programs; sending teams of experts to suppli-
ers; promotion of co-operative learning 
among suppliers; 
5. Information: informal exchange of informa-
tion on business plans and future require-
ments; provision of annual purchase orders; 
provision of market information; encouraging 
suppliers to join business associations; 
6. Financial support: provision of special or 
favorable pricing for supplier products; help 
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with supplier cash flow; longer-term assis-
tance.31 
2.2.3 Relationships between institutions 
and firms  
Neither market forces nor horizontal and vertical 
cooperation between firms are sufficient to guar-
antee high levels of innovation. Market failure 
may occur, especially in R&D, information, and 
training markets. Institutions32 are therefore 
needed to overcome market failure, provide in-
centives for innovation and establish a ‘learning 
culture’ in society as a whole. Since the provi-
sion of knowledge has a major impact on innova-
tion capabilities in the modern learning econ-
omy, knowledge-providing institutions such as 
universities, schools, training systems, research 
labs, databases, training systems etc. are very 
important elements of an NIS. In addition, insti-
tutions are needed to support the transfer of 
knowledge through telecommunication networks, 
libraries, databases, linkage programs, technol-
ogy transfer centers, etc. And last but not least, 
institutions play an important role in reducing 
uncertainty in the political, legal and economic 
environment.  
Market power within vertical cooperation may 
inhibit sufficient transfer of knowledge, since 
relevant knowledge for gaining national compe-
tence is transferred only in part within VCs. For 
obvious reasons, lead firms will provide know-
how only insofar as this raises the efficiency of 
the upstream and downstream activities of its own 
business. Lead firms will especially seek to avoid 
any leakage of strategic know-how, e.g. concern-
ing specific production technologies, market 
trends or sources and prices of inputs. If a sup-
plier, or a group of companies at a certain loca-
tion, takes the decision to engage in more com-
                                                     
31  See UNCTAD (2001), p. 140. 
32  We will mainly concentrate on formal institutions and 
refer only in part to informal institutions (sets of habits, 
routines, rules, norms and laws, which regulate the rela-
tions between people and shape human interaction). 
plex stages of the value chain and start competing 
against the established lead firm, it will usually 
face tough opposition. If policy-makers at the 
respective location wish to support any techno-
logical upgrading that goes beyond enabling local 
firms to be suppliers to TNCs, they need to help 
local companies to tap additional sources of 
knowledge. Moreover, they may adopt measures 
to define parameters and influence the respective 
value chain in the public interest.33  
Not every public intervention in a VC is helpful. 
Some institutions are overly bureaucratic, distort 
markets, and thus contribute to a suboptimal 
allocation of resources and retard necessary 
changes. To boost efficiency and innovation, the 
whole institutional setting should therefore be 
market-oriented and demand-driven, it should 
focus on delivery and on maximizing its out-
reach, and its internal organization should be 
businesslike.34 Moreover, the diversity of the 
institutional setting is important, since diversity 
supports technical, organizational and institu-
tional learning and broadens the knowledge base 
of the economy. Systems with a lower degree of 
diversity are often less able to adapt to structural 
change.35 
                                                     
33  Humphrey and Schmitz (2002, p. 12) argue that there 
may be a shift from parameter-setting by internal agents 
to parameter-setting and enforcement by external agents.  
34  See Gibson (1997), p. 4. 
35  Johnson (1992), p. 37. 
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Figure 2.3 is based on the Chain-Link Model de-
veloped by Kline and Rosenberg.36 The model 
emphasizes the multiplicity of interactions linking 
every phase of innovation within the firm, be-
tween firms, and between groups of firms and 
their wider economic, scientific and political envi-
ronment. Central elements include feedback loops 
within the firm, and external feedback loops from 
the market, feedback from other firms (especially 
the lead firm) in the chain, and inputs from the 
institutional setting. There is a recursive relation-
ship between all the different knowledge bases, 
one that can be strengthened by an engagement on 
the part of public policy. Public support should 
aim at promoting innovative entrepreneurs, bear-
ing in mind that these are the principal drivers of 
innovation in market-led economies, providing 
incentives for inter-firm cooperation in value 
chains and local clusters, and improving the con-
tribution of institutions in fields such as research, 
education and training as well as technology 
transfer.  
                                                     
36  Kline/ Rosenberg (1986). 
2.3 Technological upgrading and 
embedding in NIS 
To strengthen a nation's competitiveness, firms or 
groups of firms at certain locations or within cer-
tain sectors need to move from low-value to rela-
tively high-value activities that generate higher 
incomes while seeking to be or to remain ecologi-
cally sustainable. This process is referred to as 
upgrading. Following Humphrey and Schmitz, 37 
we distinguish four types of upgrading: 
— Product upgrading implies moving into more 
sophisticated high-end product lines within 
the same segment of a VC. Instead of produc-
ing large quantities of the same product with 
low margins, what should be aimed for is a 
shift to either products with higher margins or 
a wider range of goods. For example, a firm 
in the garment industry may want to sew ex-
pensive high-quality suits instead of simple 
garments for mass markets.  
                                                     
37  Humphrey/ Schmitz (2002), p. 19. 
Figure 2.3:  National innovation systems 
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— Process upgrading refers to the improvement 
of the efficiency of internal processes within 
one segment of the VC, i.e. how inputs are 
transformed into outputs. A firm may im-
prove its internal logistics, adopt a new ware-
housing system, acquire more versatile 
equipment or develop a better plant layout. 
All these improvements may result in lower 
costs, higher productivity and product quality, 
quicker delivery etc.  
— Intra-chain functional upgrading: Firms may 
acquire additional functions within the same 
VC, thereby increasing the overall skill con-
tent of their activities. Expansion of the range 
of activities performed is directed towards 
reaping a greater share of value added. For 
example, a firm assembling air conditioners 
may complement its main activity by adding 
packaging or designing new types of air con-
ditioners or selling its products under an own 
brand name instead of supplying foreign 
companies. Firms may in this way progress 
from simple assembly or original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM) to own design (ODM) 
or even own brand manufacturing (OBM). An 
alternative path to expanding activities within 
a given VC would be for assembly companies 
to start to source independently (so called 
“full package supply”).  
— Inter-chain functional upgrading: Here the 
old VC is abandoned, and firms become part 
of a new, more sophisticated value chain. For 
example, the same competences applied in 
producing TVs are used to produce monitors, 
and thus a firm or a whole industry may move 
into a new VC, e.g. manufacturing computer 
peripherals. 
All types of upgrading require additional knowl-
edge and depend crucially on the possibility to 
contract outside expertise from specialized firms 
or institutions. Any particular firm willing to up-
grade thus needs to intensify interactions with its 
NIS. In most cases upgraded firms not only de-
mand more specialized complementary inputs but 
also provide more sophisticated goods or services 
to other actors in their environment. During this 
process highly interactive local networks of enter-
prises and supporting institutions (“clusters”) 
emerge, sometimes with very unique attributes.  
The lack of such synergetic relationships is one of 
the main weaknesses of developing economies. 
Foreign investors here often rely on foreign 
sources, usually the parent company and its estab-
lished partners abroad, or they carry out many 
essential business functions in-house. This creates 
a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis locations 
with mature entrepreneurial and institutional net-
works. At the same time, this obstructs the process 
of incremental sophistication of the host country’s 
production structure. From this country’s perspec-
tive it is crucial to embed such isolated foreign 
companies in its incipient NIS. The notion of em-
beddedness refers to the anchoring of sectors or 
firms in certain locations. As firms are increas-
ingly integrated into local production networks 
through inter-firm relations or interactions with 
scientific institutions, they not only make more 
contributions to local development but also be-
come more closely tied to the location, thus reduc-
ing the threat of relocations to other production 
sites. 
2.4 Policies to promote NIS 
Promotion of innovation is a cross-cutting issue 
affecting almost every field of economic policy. 
The innovative capacity of an economy depends 
on many general factors, including the macroeco-
nomic environment, the regulatory context, labor 
market conditions, etc. Enhancing this capacity 
calls for integrated system management rather 
than a series of clearly defined tools,38 and it is not 
possible to clearly delimit the term innovation 
policy. But for analytical reasons we will distin-
guish between general policies and specific inno-
vation policies, even though this distinction is by 
no means clear-cut. Box 2.1 mentions the most 
important general policy fields. All such policies 
should be designed in such a way as to support 
innovative behavior, but a thorough analysis of all 
                                                     
38  See OECD (2002), p. 70. 
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these factors is obviously beyond the scope of this 
study.  
Besides these general national framework condi-
tions, governments need to take specific actions to 
strengthen innovation policies. First of all, na-
tional innovation policy requires a clear vision of 
future development trajectories and windows of 
opportunity for international specialization. Such 
a vision needs to be based on a stakeholder dia-
logue, and has to be translated into targeted and 
coherent specific programs. Among these pro-
grams, promotion of innovative entrepreneurship 
is highly important in view of the fact that the 
private sector constitutes the basis for innovative 
activities within an economy. Innovative firms not 
only create additional employment but also help 
to continuously renew the entrepreneurial struc-
ture, to improve allocative efficiency within a 
country, to build a culture of innovation, and thus 
to speed up structural change. This calls for spe-
cific programs to promote entrepreneurship in 
general and to support private sector R&D in par-
ticular. Moreover, innovation should be promoted 
through specific policies designed to promote 
entrepreneurial clusters and value chains as well 
as by means of cooperation between the private 
sector and scientific institutions. As we have ar-
gued in the previous chapter, knowledge flows 
and cooperation between the different actors of 
the NIS are important sources for technology 
learning and upgrading.  
3 The case of Thailand: An overview of 
its competitive challenges 
3.1 Thailand’s success story until 1996 
During the past four decades the performance of 
the Thai economy has been impressive. Thailand 
was one of the fastest-growing countries in the 
world. From 1985 to 1995 its real annual GNP 
grew by 8 % on average. Together with seven 
other high-performing economies, Thailand has 
proven that poor countries do have possibilities to 
Box 2.1: General policies: the role of a supportive business environment 
- To reduce uncertainty, increase economic efficiency and free up resources for high-return private investment, 
fiscal discipline should be enhanced, inflation kept low, and exchange rate management should be fine-tuned 
so as to avoid overvaluations. 
- Openness is a fundamental precondition promoting the diffusion of ideas and knowledge worldwide. Therefore, 
an open policy on international trade and investment should be maintained to reduce costs and improve in-
ternational standards. In principle, this does not preclude the deliberate use of infant industry protection, but any 
selective and protectionist measures should be temporary and be designed with great care. 
- As competition is important for knowledge transfer, competitiveness should be encouraged by means of a com-
petition policy and tax incentives conducive to knowledge transfer and innovation. 
- As financial resources are important for innovative investment, financial systems should be made more suppor-
tive of innovation. To foster innovative investment in enterprises, lending policies, cross-financing and guaran-
tees should be reviewed. . A mix of greater firm transparency and investor protection is needed. 
- Corruption and legal insecurity often restrict a smooth transfer of knowledge. Therefore, good governance and 
a sound legal system are needed to ensure an efficient and sufficient transfer. 
- In the move toward a knowledge-based economy, education policy is crucial. Education is a prerequisite for 
acquiring the necessary skills to thrive in a globalizing economy. Inquisitiveness, achievement motivation and 
problem-solving behaviors should be supported at all levels of the education system.  
- Labor mobility is an important mechanism for transmitting tacit knowledge. Labor market programs and social 
policy should therefore encourage mobility, and should be made more effective in bringing would-be workers 
into the job market, in helping workers affected by change and in ensuring that the benefits of growth are shared 
by all.  
- Promotion of an knowledge infrastructure, especially ICT conducive to knowledge transfer, is another core 
basis for a well-functioning NIS. 
Source: OECD (2001); Esser et al. (1996). 
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catch up with the developed world. Even in the 
early 1990s the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank praised Thailand for its macro-
economic management, poverty reduction, export-
push strategy, and high literacy rate.39 
Since the mid-1980s Thailand’s formerly agricul-
ture-dominated economy shifted towards manu-
facturing and the service sector. In particular, the 
manufacturing sector has grown considerably both 
in terms of growth of production and share of total 
exports. Investment-friendly policies, low labor 
costs and a relatively rich resource base, together 
with less demanding environmental standards,40 
made it possible for Thai producers to offer their 
products at internationally competitive prices.  
Growth in international trade and Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) were the driving force behind 
Thai economic development in the past decade. In 
1996, before the crisis, international trade ac-
counted for 70.5 % of GDP. Export-oriented FDI 
and other economic activities of international 
enterprises were the main drivers of economic 
growth, reflecting the ‘shallow’ nature of Thai-
land’s industrialization. In particular, the export 
sector was not only the main source of foreign-
exchange earnings, technology transfer, and in-
dustrial development, it also provided a large pro-
portion of newly created jobs. 
 
                                                     
39  World Bank (1993). 
40  Altenburg/ Reinecke/ Weihert (2002), pp. 2, 5. 
This employment creation has been a major factor 
in income generation and skills upgrading in Thai-
land. The shift of labor out of the agricultural 
sector into the urban-industrial sector has im-
proved income distribution and the level of skills 
in the labor force, and it has dramatically reduced 
the number of people living in absolute poverty. 
Although the share of the labor force working in 
agriculture remains much higher in Thailand than 
in other NIEs of the region,41 and industrialization 
had unequal social, sectoral and regional effects, 
altogether living standards and critical social indi-
cators improved substantially. 
3.2 The economic and financial crisis of 
1997 
Thailand has been faced with a deep economic 
and financial crisis since 1997. A sharp devalua-
tion of the bath, capital outflows, and severe diffi-
culties among financial institutions have led to 
regressive economic development, a massive in-
crease in the foreign debt of the public and private 
sectors, high inflation, stagnation of production 
and demand, and a surge of unemployment and 
poverty. Thailand was one of the countries worst 
affected by the Asian crisis. In 1998 GNP fell by 
10.4 %; compared to 1996, per capita GNP sank 
by 40 %. In a very short period three million peo-
ple dropped below the poverty line.42 
                                                     
41  In 2002, 34.7 % were still employed in agriculture, 
contributing 9.0 % to GDP (www.adb.org). 
42  BMZ (2002), p. 2. 
Table 3.1: Growth Rate of GDP compared to other East Asian Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) 
 1980-89 1990-99 1997-99 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Hong Kong 7.2 3.7 1.0 4.5 5.0 -5.1 3.0 10.5 0.6 
Rep. of Korea 8.2 6.3 3.0 6.7 5.0 -6.7 10.7 1.3 3.0 
Singapore 7.5 7.1 4.7 7.5 8.4 0.4 5.4 9.9 -2.0 
Taiwan 7.7 6.2 5.7 6.1 6.7 4.6 5.7 6.3 -2.2 
Thailand 7.4 5.2 -2.6 5.9 -1,7 -10.2 4.2 4.3 1.8 
Source: ADB (2000) Key Indicators for Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 2000, Volume XXXI;  
http://strategicasia.nbr.org/; www.adb.org; www.worldfactsandfigures.com/gdp_country_growth_rate.php 
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Following crisis management, which proved quite 
successful, and some reforms in the area of gov-
ernance and modernization of the economy, an-
nual economic growth rates have risen again since 
1999 to about 4 %, and per capita GNP grown 
again to US$ 2,300. The unemployment rate is 
declining and the inflation rate has stabilized at 2-
3 %. Despite this recovery, by the end of 2000 per 
capita incomes were still about 9 % lower than 
their 199643 levels, and it appears that Thailand 
will have further difficulties in returning to the 
high growth rates of the pre-crisis years. Studies 
have shown that the crisis of 1997 was not only a 
“financial” crisis. Competitiveness indicators had 
started to deteriorate years before, and reforms in 
key economic sectors – like banking, education, 
public administration – were long overdue.  
3.3 Why Thailand’s loss of competitive-
ness is structural 
The crisis of 1997 revealed fundamental structural 
weaknesses in the political-administrative and 
socio-economic sectors in Thailand. Thailand’s 
international competitiveness has been waning 
since the early 1990s. There are a number of fac-
tors that explain why Thailand is no longer gain-
ing competitiveness and market shares in ex-
ports.44 
Among the main factors is the evident mismatch 
between increases in real wages and increases in 
labor productivity. Real manufacturing wages in 
Thailand have risen by about 6.5 % a year in re-
cent years, as the labor market tightened and de-
mand for skilled labor in higher-productivity sec-
tors led to rapid wage increases that were trans-
mitted to other sectors of the economy. Since 
1990 unit labor costs in Thailand have risen more 
rapidly than both productivity in Thailand and 
unit labor costs in competing countries. Thailand 
faces severe competition in world markets from 
other Asian economies with far lower per capita 
                                                     
43  European Commission (2002), p. 11. 
44  See UNIDO (undated).  
incomes and wages. Labor-intensive exports from 
China have been booming since 1994, and Bang-
ladesh, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam all have emerged as competitors.  
Thailand’s economic boom was largely due to 
growth in factor inputs, especially capital stock. 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth accounted 
for only 12 % of total growth during the 1980-
2000 period and was mainly concentrated in agri-
culture. TFP growth in industry and services was 
even negative. On this basis, growth is not sus-
tainable once inflows of huge amounts of capital 
have dried up.45 
Low productivity is largely due to the fact that 
Thailand’s achievements in education lag well 
behind those of other NIEs at a similar stage of 
development. Like other East Asian economies, 
Thailand has achieved almost universal primary 
enrollment. But only about a third of children 
attend secondary school. This is much lower than 
in other East Asian economies. There are also 
questions about the quality of Thai education and 
its suitability to the needs of a modern economy.46 
Tertiary education is highly biased towards liberal 
arts and law, and the number of engineering and 
science graduates turned out by Thai universities 
is much lower than in competitor economies. 
Also, vocational education and training is poorly 
organized. Although a significant amount of firm-
based training does take place, this training does 
not equip the labor force with the skills needed for 
the next phase of Thailand’s development, since 
most Thai firms are involved in basic assembly 
and other lower-skill activities.47  
A comparison with other Asian countries shows 
that Thailand not only has a weak educational 
base but that it is also a regional laggard in indus-
trial technology development. This picture is con-
firmed in the public as well as the private sector. 
The Thai government has invested much less in 
technology development capabilities than other 
                                                     
45  Warr (2003). 
46  See Chantramonklasri (1994). 
47  See Intarakumnerd et al. (2003), pp. 22 ff. 
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governments in the region. Overall expenditure on 
R&D as a share of GDP in Thailand fell from 
0.21 % in 1987 to 0.12 % in 1996, whereas in 
several other countries in the region R&D expen-
diture constituted a rising proportion of GDP. 
After the crisis, expenditure on R&D rose slightly, 
accounting for 0.26 % of GDP in 1999. Yet these 
rises are still far below the level of R&D in Thai-
land’s competitor countries, even in comparable 
second-tier NIEs like Malaysia. The same trend 
holds for the private sector, where the proportion 
of total R&D performed in business enterprises 
represented around 10 % of total R&D in 1996, 
amounting to only about one-sixth of the levels in 
Singapore or Taiwan.48 
As a consequence, Thailand’s performance on 
indicators for international competitiveness have 
systematically declined, so that Thailand actually 
rates low in global competitiveness rankings (see 
Table 3.2). In the annual Global Competitiveness 
Reports produced by the World Economic Forum, 
Thailand fell from the 14th position in 1996 to the 
31st in 2002. The World Economic Forum ranking 
shows that Thailand ranks especially low in tech-
nology-related dimensions of competitiveness. 
The cross-country comparison shows that Thai-
land is lagging behind its main competitors in the 
region. Moreover, a relative comparison of the 
current Thai economy with earlier economic indi-
cators for Korea – i.e. when Korea had a level and 
structure of economic development similar to that 
of contemporary Thailand – shows that Thailand 
is lagging around 10-20 years behind the level and 
structure of technology development activity that 
Korea had reached in the early 1980s.49 
Particularly low – 41st – was the ranking of Thai-
land’s International Institute for Management 
Development (IMD) in regard to science and tech-
nology indicators. The main reasons for this nega-
tive assessment were the low budget share of R&D 
and the small number people active in R&D. In 
2000 0.8 % of GDP was allocated for R&D. As a 
rule investment in R&D in developed countries 
                                                     
48  Arnold et al. (2000), p. 49. 
49  Arnold et al. (2000), p. 48. 
accounts for 2-3 % of GDP, in NIEs the figure is 
around 1-2 % of GDP. Figures for research and 
development personnel were as low as 2 per 
10,000 population, while the corresponding fig-
ures for Thailand’s neighbors were much higher. 
The rate for Indonesia e.g. was 13 per 10,000 
population or more than 5 times higher than that 
of Thailand. The proportion of scientists and re-
searchers in developed countries is around 50-70 
per 10,000 population, while the corresponding 
ratio in NIEs is around 20-30 per 10,000 popula-
tion. The same applies for the ratio of scientists 
and engineers, which ranges from 5,183 in Japan, 
2,305 in Singapore, 1,343 in Korea to 107 per 1 
million population in Thailand.50 
Even though the contribution of the manufactur-
ing sector to GDP and exports has been constantly 
increasing, most government funding for R&D is 
allocated for the development of agricultural tech-
nologies rather than for industrial technologies. In 
1997 R&D expenditure for agricultural sciences 
was 42 %, while spending for engineering and 
applied sciences was only 6.9 % of total govern-
ment expenditure on R&D.51 
As highlighted in its Ninth Development Plan 
(2002-2006), the Thai government has recognized 
the importance of improving skills and techno-
logical capability in all economic and social sec-
tors. One specific goal for domestic markets and 
rural communities is to “increase production effi-
ciency by promoting research and utilizing local 
knowledge as well as modern technological know-
how.” For industry, the policy supports coopera-
tion in research, technology and product devel-
opment between SMEs and other public- and pri-
vate-sector organizations (including those in higher 
education). The aim is to assist Thai firms to ob-
tain technology and intellectual property from all 
sources and ensure a supply of qualified person-
nel. 
                                                     
50  See Bhumirat/ ONEC Working Group (2001), p. 1. 
51  World Bank (2002), p. 50. 
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As shown above, Thailand is a small open econ-
omy, with exports accounting for a high share of 
GDP.52 Trade performance is therefore one of the 
main indicators for its competitiveness. Exports 
have traditionally been Thailand’s main economic 
growth engine, accounting for 60-65 % of GDP 
throughout the 1990s.53 Since 1996 export growth 
in Thailand slowed markedly. While Thai exports 
grew on average by 23 % a year during the 10 
years up to 1996, growth fell to 0 % in 1996. This 
abruptness of the decline in export growth can be 
traced back to a number of short-term factors such 
as the slowdown in world trade as a whole. How-
ever, the overriding longer-term factor seems to 
have been a loss of competitiveness, with labor-
intensive exports the hardest hit. 
Manufactured products are among Thailand’s 
principal export items; they include computer 
parts, integrated circuits, garments, motor vehicles 
and parts, canned food, electrical and consumer 
electronic goods, precious stones and jewelry, 
footwear, furniture, plastics and rubber products.54 
In 2000 the Thai manufacturing sector accounted 
                                                     
52  In 2000, exports and imports accounted for 55.8 % and 
51.3 % of GDP. See: UNIDO (undated). 
53  Far Eastern Economic Review, July 11, 2002, p. 54. 
54  UNIDO (undated). 
for 85 % of export earnings and contributed 35 % 
to GDP.55 
The collapse of export growth in 1996 is made 
evident by the slowdown in growth of labor-
intensive industries. This can be traced back to the 
structural problems that Thai exporters are facing. 
The so called ‘China factor’ is exerting heavy 
pressure on Thailand’s export performance, with 
China winning market shares and eroding Thai-
land’s pricing power across low- value-added 
industries. Other factors are the declining terms of 
trade for labor-intensive products, such as apparel, 
footwear, and consumer electronics, which has led 
to slower export earnings. For example, world 
prices for manufactured exports fell about 2 % in 
1996, whereas semiconductor prices fell almost 
80 % in the same year. 
Thailand is a member of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, which 
receive a significant amount of FDI. Net inflows 
to Thailand in 1999 accounted for 0.7 % of world 
FDI flows. During 1985-1995, net inflows to 
Thailand amounted to US$ 1.4 billion, but de-
clined after the crisis.56 FDI has been spread out 
                                                     
55  European Commission (2002), p. 10. 
56  During the first seven months of 2001, for instance, 
overall approved FDI decreased by 17 % in value over 
the same period in 2000. See European Commission 
(2002), p. 12. 
Table 3.2: Rankings of competitiveness indices in 2002a 
Country Global Competitive-
ness Ranking 
Technology Index 
Rank 
Public Institutions 
Index Rank 
Macroeconomic Environ-
ment Index Rank 
Singapore  4 17  7  1 
Korea 21 18 32 10 
Malaysia 27 26 33 20 
Thailand  31 41 39 11 
Philippines 61 52 70 32 
a International rankings such as the Global Competitiveness Ranking by the World Economic Forum and the World Competi-
tiveness Yearbook by the IMD business school rest mainly on subjective business perceptions compiled from surveys and 
are therefore disputable. Nevertheless, they often match objective data and are used here as rough indicators to support the 
line of argumentat. 
Source: Global Competitiveness Ranking, World Economic Forum: http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gcr/GCR_2002_ 
2003/GCR_GCI.pdf 
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across many economic sectors, including manu-
facturing, finance, trade, construction, services 
and real estate. Among the manufacturing indus-
tries, electrical appliances, machinery and trans-
port equipment, and chemicals are among the 
major industries with substantial FDI.57 This pat-
tern shows that Thailand relies mainly on FDI to 
produce more sophisticated goods. But many of 
Thailand’s “technology-intensive” products use 
simple technology to assemble a mass of imported 
components, with a low level of added value (e.g. 
an estimated 80-90 % of computer components 
are imported).58 Most FDI is directed to Thailand 
for reasons of low wages and not for the availabil-
ity of a skilled workforce and other knowledge-
intensive inputs. Since FDI is at best inadequately 
embedded in the local entrepreneurial and institu-
tional tissue, rising labor costs for Thai workers 
are inducing mobile transnational companies to 
seek cheaper locations, notably in China and 
Vietnam. This outflow of FDI gained momentum 
after the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) en-
tered into force in 2002, when a considerable 
number of foreign companies moved to Indonesia, 
especially firms operating in the sector of electri-
cal appliances, washing machines etc. 
The case of Thailand has often been referred to as 
the ‘nutcracking effect’ or ‘sandwich position.’ 
Thailand, together with Malaysia and Indonesia, is 
one of the second-tier NIEs that have successfully 
industrialized since the 1980s. Thailand has not 
yet achieved a sufficient deepening of its indus-
trial development to catch up with the first-tier 
NIEs, i.e. Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Tai-
wan. On the other hand, low-wage countries such 
as China and Vietnam are increasingly exerting 
competitive pressure and threaten to crowd Thai-
land out of important markets.  
Thailand therefore faces serious structural com-
petitiveness problems. Recent studies point to 
particular challenges in three areas: a weak and 
underdeveloped skills base, a technological struc-
ture characterized by simple activities, and public 
                                                     
57  Meephokee (undated), p. 2. 
58  European Commission (2002), p. 10. 
institutions unable to support firms in upgrading 
their human and technological capital.59 
3.4 Assessment of the current business 
environment in Thailand 
The monetary and credit policies pursued since 
the economic crisis of 1997 have stabilized the 
Thai economy and led to moderate economic 
growth rates of around 4 % annually. Thailand 
maintains its open and liberal policies in the do-
main of trade and investment. The country contin-
ues to have strong interest in promoting its ex-
ports, and a number of policies and institutions are 
in place to enhance Thailand’s potentials in this 
field. While foreign investment is either not al-
lowed or restricted in certain sectors, the business 
environment is generally favorable for foreign 
direct investment and international trade.60  
Alongside this continuity, Thailand has initiated a 
number of economic, political and administrative 
reforms. In the economic sphere the salient char-
acteristics include a thoroughgoing reform of the 
banking system, new labor market policies, a sim-
plification and rationalization of existing tax laws 
and regulations, and a reconsideration of tax in-
centives under the Investment Promotion Act.61. 
In addition, the government has recognized the 
need for more active business promotion and 
more differentiated policies for small and medium 
enterprises. The new SME Promotion Act, the 
SME Promotion Committee, the SME Promotion 
Office and the SME Development Masterplan 
have set the framework for appropriate policy 
coordination and implementation.62  
Looking at the political and administrative sphere, 
Thailand adopted a new constitution in 1997 
which provides for greater transparency and ac-
countability in government and aims at a compre-
                                                     
59  Lall (1998), World Bank (2002). 
60  BOI (2002), pp. 21-31. 
61  World Bank (2002), p. 27; BOI (2002), pp. 7-13. 
62  BMZ (2002), p. 4, Régnier (2000). 
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hensive restructuring and decentralization of deci-
sion-making processes, ensuring participation of 
citizens and civic organizations. New laws and 
by-laws have been passed and new independent 
institutions established, e. g to promote small and 
medium industries, social security and environ-
mental protection. The Educational Act and com-
prehensive educational reforms have been adopted 
to modernize the university system in particular. 
The groundwork for rule of law has been under-
pinned by the establishment of a Constitutional 
Court and an Administrative Court.63 The gov-
ernment of Prime Minister Thaksin is now em-
barking on reforms aimed at decentralization and 
breaking up the traditional lines of activity, under 
which central government has performed all ad-
ministrative functions. Instead, local administra-
tions are being given more resources and respon-
sibilities for the delivery of public services.64  
However, Thailand still has to tackle reforms in at 
least four areas which affect the business envi-
ronment:  
Firstly, there are challenges in the economic 
sphere. Although there is a consensus that Thai-
land needs to develop knowledge-based competi-
tive advantages and deepen its industrial structure, 
no clear strategic focus is identifiable. Further-
more, government policies concerning the busi-
ness environment are still poorly coordinated. 
There are many gaps and duplications in the pol-
icy framework and in the matrix of government 
development programs. This lack of strategic 
planning and coordination has also served to rein-
force regional disparities. The manufacturing in-
dustry is concentrated in and around the metropo-
lis Bangkok, with the rest of the country mostly 
underdeveloped and poverty-stricken. Govern-
ment incentives are lacking especially for innova-
tion, with further shortcomings in evidence in the 
availability of support services in finance, consul-
tancy, and manpower. Also, Thailand’s support 
institutions and incentives are biased in favor of 
export promotion for larger enterprises and ne-
                                                     
63  BMZ (2002), p. 3. 
64  World Bank (2002), p. 29. 
glect support for local SMEs and their linkages 
with the TNC-driven export sector. 
Secondly, although Thailand’s legal and regula-
tory framework is seen as comprehensive, with-
out being overly regulatory or restrictive, one 
deficiency lies in the fact that there are still a large 
number of micro- and small-scale enterprises 
which operate without formal registration. An-
other deficiency persists in the country’s problems 
with business and consumer protection. Foreign 
companies express their concerns about the gen-
eral flouting of copyright law. Quite a number of 
firms in Thailand’s informal and (micro-) enter-
prise sector are engaged in the partial production 
and sale of replicas, such as watches, clothing, 
and electronics.65 In view of these problems, an 
Intellectual Property & International Trade Court 
was established in 1997 to try civil and criminal 
cases involving intellectual property rights viola-
tions.66 
Thirdly, the political and administrative system 
still suffers from “red tape” and corruption. Al-
though these practices are difficult to quantify or 
corroborate, several reported instances show the 
scale of the problem. The Thai press has publi-
cized some instances which describe the impor-
tance of influential contacts in winning larger 
contracts or the tedious and complicated process 
some enterprises have to undergo to obtain a cer-
tain range of special permits. International execu-
tives have assessed Thailand, along with Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Myanmar and Cambodia, as one of 
Asia’s top five most inefficient bureaucratic sys-
tems.67 As far as corruption is concerned, a 2002 
survey of Thai businesses found that 79 % had to 
resort to bribing officials to get results and that 
these bribes added roughly 20 % to start-up and 
business operating costs.68 And Transparency 
International, in its Corruption Perception Index, 
                                                     
65  BOI (2002), pp. 14-20. 
66  Dhanani/ Scholtès (2002), p. 22 
67  White (1999), p. 45. Several interview partners, especially 
from foreign firms operating in Thailand, confirmed the 
existence of bureaucratic obstacles.  
68  Jarvis (2002), p. 317. 
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also ranked Thailand 64th of 102 countries in 
2002.69 A further deficiency is that several gov-
ernment programs lack independent monitoring 
and evaluation procedures, which makes it diffi-
cult to assess their outcome and impact. The party 
system in Thailand is weakly organized and pro-
grammatically underdeveloped. Politics is highly 
dependent on persons and networks. Bribery and 
vote-buying is a well known concomitant of elec-
tions. Generally, Thailand is marked by a strong 
and complex commingling of the political, admin-
istrative and private and banking sectors.  
Fourthly, some social and cultural factors re-
strain the competitiveness of the Thai economy. 
Lack of English skills among the majority of the 
population is as an important aggravating factor in 
the business environment. Prime Minister Thak-
sin's emphasis on Thai cultural values and the 
prevalence of the Thai language may in some 
cases conflict with the needs of an outward-
looking, open nation trying to find its place in a 
globalized learning economy. The lack of accep-
tance of failure in the Thai social fabric is also 
cited as a weakness factor in the business envi-
ronment,70 one that leads to risk-averse behavior 
and limits the number of company start-ups.  
Despite these remaining problems, Thailand’s 
performance since the outbreak of the crisis has 
been impressive. Progress is highly visible in the 
country’s economic, legal, and political and ad-
ministrative sectors. And thus the overall ap-
praisal shared by analysts is that the government 
is providing for a business environment conducive 
to investment and economic growth.71 
3.5 The NIS in Thailand: an overview 
Following this brief assessment of the general 
business environment, we will now proceed to 
                                                     
69  http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/ 
2002/2002.08.28.cpi.en.html. 
70  The Brooker Group (2001), p. 7. 
71  World Bank (2002). 
give an overview of the three main levels of Thai-
land’s NIS: the internal organization of its firms, 
its inter-firm linkages, and the existing relation-
ships between support institutions and private 
companies. 
3.5.1 The internal organization of firms 
Studies on technology development in Thai firms 
conclude that their most striking feature is their 
weak technological and innovative capability. 
Accordingly, the first R&D and Innovation Sur-
vey of Thailand’s manufacturing industry carried 
out by the National Science and Technology 
Agency (NSTDA) and the Brooker Group PLC in 
2000 shows that in the preceding three years three 
of four Thai firms had not engaged in any activi-
ties aimed at improving their technological capa-
bility. Most of the 1,019 responding firms, includ-
ing the top 200 largest firms, carried out only 
simple testing and quality control, less than half of 
them had design capabilities, and only one third a 
capacity for reverse engineering.  
The survey also revealed that medium and large 
firms in the Thai manufacturing sector spent more 
than 5.5 billion baht72 on R&D in 1999, employ-
ing 5,291 research personnel consisting of re-
searchers and support staff, including technicians, 
managers and other R&D staff.73 R&D in the pri-
vate sector is much less than that found in the 
public sector, and contributes only one tenth to 
total R&D expenditure. This discrepancy is typi-
cal for developing countries. In industrialized 
countries the ratios are the reverse, i.e. most R&D 
spending is accounted for by the private sector, 
with only a small percentage remaining with pub-
lic research institutions. 
The R&D and Innovation Survey of Thailand’s 
manufacturing industry further shows that R&D 
undertaken by Thai firms is concentrated in a 
limited number of sectors, with companies in the 
                                                     
72  In February 2003, 1 euro was worth 46 Thai bahts. 
73  The Brooker Group (2001), p. 4. 
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food, beverages and tobacco industry responsible 
for 48 %.74 Internationally, this sector is not re-
garded as an industry of ‘high R&D intensity,’ 
which indicates that much of Thailand’s declared 
“R&D” may in fact be relatively standard labora-
tory activities. 
The study also showed that the number of innova-
tions – though very small – effected by firms ex-
ceeded that of firms engaging in formally organ-
ized R&D. This shows that some firms are able to 
carry out product or process innovations without 
setting up formal R&D units.75 Actually, expendi-
tures by sample firms on innovation activities 
exceeded about 1.5 times spending on R&D and 
mainly went into the acquisition of machinery and 
equipment. This reliance on off-the-shelf imported 
technology in the forms of machinery and turn-
key technology transfer from abroad or joint ven-
tures with foreign partners points to an attitude 
typical of most Thai firms: not to attribute much 
importance to the development of indigenous 
technological capabilities. This may be explained 
by the historical development of most firms, 
which, coming from a trading background, have 
paid much more attention to high turnover ratios 
in the short term than to the development of in-
digenous production technologies.76 
A closer look at different kinds of enterprises 
helps to identify key thresholds that Thai firms 
face in deepening their technological capabili-
ties:77 
— The majority of firms are SMEs in traditional 
industries which are resource-based and la-
bor-intensive. They mostly lack the human 
resources, knowledge, infrastructure and fi-
nancial resources available to larger enter-
prises to upgrade their process and product 
                                                     
74  World Bank (2002), p. 50. 
75  Intarakumnerd/ Chairatana/ Tangchitpiboon (2002), p. 
1448. 
76  Intarakumnerd et al. (2003), p. 11; Thongpakde/ Puppa-
havesa/ Pussarangsri (1994), p. 129. 
77  Arnold et al. (2000), p. 57; Intarakumnerd et al. (2003), 
World Bank (2002), p. 51. 
technologies. For these firms the key issue is 
building more basic operational capabilities, 
together with the craft and technician capa-
bilities needed for efficient acquisition, as-
similation and incremental upgrading of fairly 
standard technology. 
— Only a small number of SMEs have attained 
sufficient capabilities to move into design and 
engineering. 
— Many large domestic firms, some higher-
technology SMEs and most large TNC sub-
sidiaries still have to develop their design and 
engineering capabilities as a basis for em-
barking on significant technology develop-
ment activities.  
— For a minority of firms that have already built 
design and engineering capabilities, the rele-
vant threshold is now to continue and expand 
the building of R&D capabilities and activi-
ties.  
3.5.2 Inter-firm linkages 
In Chapter 3.2.2 we argue that from an innovation 
system perspective, inter-firm collaboration is by 
far the most important channel of knowledge shar-
ing and exchange. In Thailand, inter-firm linkages 
are generally weak and fragmented. A report on 
Science and Technology (S&T) Development for 
Industrial Competitiveness in Thailand states that 
“... the industrial sector as a whole has not devel-
oped into a coherent production structure, but has 
become an agglomeration of largely independent 
‘islands’ of manufacturing companies with no 
strong linkages between them or to other sectors 
of production.”78 
In OECD countries, most innovative activities 
emerge from interaction between firms that are 
linked as suppliers and customers at different 
stages along value chains. But the R&D/Innova-
tion Survey shows that such technological links 
between producers and users and between produc-
                                                     
78  Chantramonklasri (1994), p. 54. 
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ers and suppliers in Thailand have barely devel-
oped. This is confirmed by Arnold et al. (2002), 
who describe customer-supplier links in Thailand 
as weak, with intra-economy value chains often 
short and fragmented. These deficient customer-
supplier links, together with the limited innovative 
capacities within firms described above, preclude 
any significant innovation-centered interaction. A 
recent analysis of the Thai automotive industry 
identified a lack of collaborative mechanisms 
within the supply chain of manufacturing TNCs. It 
showed that communication within the supply 
chain was largely informal, making little use of 
ICT-based systems.79 
The importance of FDI for technology transfer to 
developing countries has been stressed in numer-
ous publications. As stated above, Thailand is one 
of the major recipients of FDI in the region, with 
an inflow of US$ 6 billion in 1999.80 Yet FDI in 
Thailand is concentrated in low-skill activities. 
TNCs have invested very little in R&D, and they 
have not been active in developing subcontractors 
or giving technical assistance to local suppliers. 
Nonetheless, the Thailand Industrial Survey re-
veals that foreign firms are about 50 % more pro-
ductive than domestically owned firms. The 
higher revenue from labor and capital of foreign 
firms is assumed to result from their superior 
technology and management skills.81 Therefore, 
even in relatively standard operations such as raw 
materials processing, assembly and testing, or 
wholesaling, foreign companies may be show-
cases for technological upgrading.  
Thailand is not properly exploiting this source of 
technical and managerial knowledge. It is com-
monly stated that technological spillovers from 
TNCs to the host economy are low. Studies in 
different sectors found that transfer of technology 
tended to be limited to the operational level.82 
TNCs have trained their workforces in such a way 
                                                     
79  World Bank (2002), p. 57. 
80  Mirza/ Giroud/ Köster (undated), p. 5. 
81  Dollar/ Hallward-Driemeier (1998), p. 23. 
82  Intarakumnerd/ Chairatana/ Tangchitpiboon (2002), p. 
1451. 
as to ensure they can efficiently produce goods 
without requiring technology transfer at higher 
levels such as design and engineering. But more 
detailed studies show that there are differences in 
technology transfer policies between firms. Some 
companies are willing to transfer certain types of 
knowledge.83 This willingness mainly depends on 
the parent company’s overall period of experience 
in the host country, the international orientation of 
the parent firm, and its reliance on indigenous 
firms.  
The weakness of linkages between large investors 
and local firms reflects the weak absorptive 
capacity of Thai firms as well as deficiencies of 
the Thai economy in terms of institutions, 
universities and other support infrastructure. 
Thailand lacks supplier development and 
technology transfer policies. This compares 
unfavorably with Singapore, where links between 
TNCs and local firms have deliberately been 
supported and exploited to strengthen domestic 
technological capabilities.  
Horizontal co-operation between firms operating 
at the same stage of the value chain is likewise 
marginal. Cooperative consortiums between firms 
– e.g. in Japan or Taiwan – to investigate particu-
lar technologies or jointly develop new products 
are rare in Thailand. The Innovation Survey found 
that most Thai firms do not consider their com-
petitors as a source for learning and note that the 
flow of knowledge between firms in the same and 
related industries remains very limited.  
3.5.3 Relationships between institutions 
and firms 
As shown in Table 3.2, Thailand is ranked low 
with regard to the performance of its public insti-
tutions. Compared to other countries, Thai institu-
tions and public programs have lacked effective-
ness, particularly in helping firms to upgrade their 
skills development, training, and technology ca-
pabilities, and, generally, in fostering the devel-
opment of a knowledge economy. 
                                                     
83  Mirza/ Giroud/ Köster (undated) , p. 43. 
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Overall, the institutional system does not demon-
strate any clear vision on the development of a 
knowledge economy. Accordingly, it is character-
ized by a lack of targeting and coordination. Most 
of institutions are rather bureaucratic and strongly 
supply-driven, and their services are often un-
known to or not well regarded by the private sec-
tor.84  
The activities of public RTOs which have direct 
responsibility for developing the scientific and 
technological capability of the Thai economy 
mainly focus on R&D, neglecting support for 
lower-level capabilities, e.g. for technology as-
similation and adaptation, design and engineering, 
the technological thresholds faced by most Thai 
firms. Additionally, RTOs not only focus on the 
inappropriate support levels, they are also de-
linked from the private sector, since they pursue a 
linear concept of innovation by delivering techno-
logical solutions to industry instead of promoting 
the development of indigenous technological ca-
pabilities within firms. 
Furthermore, public support institutions display 
several overlaps with no coordination among 
them, and there is no clear-cut division of labor 
between policy formulation, funding, and imple-
mentation. Several institutions assume similar 
duties, such as providing technical support ser-
vices, carrying out applied technology develop-
ment and transfer, and undertaking strategic or 
basic research, and funding R&D. This structural 
feature of public institutions reflects the practice 
of the Thai government over the last 40-50 years 
of setting up new institutions without abolishing 
or reorganizing the existing ones.85  
There are 24 public universities and 50 private 
universities in Thailand, which together have the 
capacity to educate 1.1 million students. Thai 
universities do not produce enough sufficiently 
qualified science and engineering graduates, and 
the number of Ph.D. and master degree graduates 
in science and engineering is very low. This is 
                                                     
84  World Bank (2002), p. 57. 
85  Arnold et al. (2000), p. 140. 
reflected in the low overall ranking of Thai uni-
versities and Thai institutions specializing in sci-
ence and technology compared to counterparts in 
the Asia Pacific region. In Asia Week Magazine 
in 2000, e.g., Thailand’s universities were rated in 
25th place among the universities in Asia. 
Generally, the research culture and capabilities in 
Thailand are weak. Thai scientists publish little in 
internationally recognized journals. According to 
the Science Citation Index, the number of publica-
tions by Thai researchers is three times lower than 
that of Singaporean researchers. One further as-
pect is that the little research undertaken seldom 
has industrial relevance and basic research is 
given higher priority.86 
4 Thai policies for promoting NIS 
As described in Chapter 3.4, the general frame-
work conditions in Thailand on the whole are 
judged to be conducive to business activities. In 
this chapter we concentrate on specific innovation 
policies directly related to the Thai NIS. Based on 
desk research during the first phase of our re-
search project, and in accordance with the general 
diagnosis of Thailand’s NIS presented on the pre-
vious pages, we have identified four core dimen-
sions of innovation policy which we consider as 
especially important in the Thai context because 
they focus on the main bottlenecks of the Thai 
NIS. These are (see Figure 4.1): 
                                                     
86  See Intarakumnerd et al. (2003). 
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— The process of policy formulation, imple-
mentation, monitoring and evaluation as 
such. There does not appear to be a generally 
shared vision about Thailand’s future role and 
patterns of specialization in the world econ-
omy, and technological efforts thus lack stra-
tegic orientation. The Thai government lacks 
a “focal point” responsible for delineating a 
coherent policy strategy or coordinating the 
government’s response to the technological 
and policy needs of the Thai NIS. Further-
more, implementation as well as monitoring 
and evaluation of programs and projects does 
not live up to modern standards.  
— Inter-firm linkages. As described above, the 
Thai economy is characterized by a dualistic 
structure, with mainly foreign large corpora-
tions as technology owners and low levels of 
technological capability among most Thai 
firms. Therefore, fostering inter-firm net-
works is an urgent policy task in Thailand. 
Incentive systems and programs are needed to 
augment technology transfer in favor of Thai 
firms, to develop innovative supply chain re-
lationships and to embed footloose foreign 
investors in national production systems.  
 
— Industry-science relations. Thailand exhib-
its a diversified infrastructure of research and 
technology organizations and holds strong 
potentials for industry-science relations. 
However, at present scientific institutions 
rarely collaborate with industry, and a cul-
tural gap seems to separate the two “subsys-
tems” of research and production. The chal-
lenge is to bridge this gap, bringing actors 
from both “subsystems” together, developing 
common approaches to relevant problems and 
creating incentives for cooperation. 
— Formation of innovative entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs are important actors who pro-
vide significant inputs to and advance innova-
tion within NIS. In Thailand the indigenous 
innovative capacity of firms is low and there 
is an obvious lack of innovative business start- 
ups. Consequently, government action geared 
to entrepreneurship development should be 
refocused in that direction. 
Other specific innovation policies, such as educa-
tion and human resource policies in general or the 
development of technical and engineering skills in 
particular, as well as integrated policies designed 
to strengthen the overall system of metrology,  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Policies to promote NIS in the Thai context 
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standards, testing, and quality assurance (MSTQ) 
are also very important to increase Thailand’s 
competitiveness in knowledge-intensive fields. It 
would go beyond the scope of this study, how-
ever, to analyze all aspects of these rather broad 
issue areas. In the following chapters we will 
therefore only deal with selected aspects of these 
policies. For example, we will briefly address 
current initiatives for training and education in 
Chapters 4.4 and 5.1. The importance of MSTQ 
policies is taken up in Chapter 5.2. 
4.1 Policy formulation, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation  
Both public and private effort requires direction. 
Strategic planning based on well-designed sur-
veys, benchmarking studies and a continuous 
stakeholder dialogue makes it possible to identify 
economic strengths and weaknesses and pursue 
pro-active rather than re-active policies. Imple-
mentation of the policies identified should be 
cost-effective, and service delivery should be or-
ganized in a businesslike manner. This calls for 
the establishment of a clear performance meas-
urement framework permitting  the results of 
evaluations to flow into the allocation of future 
budget funds.  
These requirements become especially important 
in times of fast-changing markets and growing 
competition as well as in the context of the com-
plex shift of the economy from a labor-intensive 
towards a knowledge-based economy. Already 
before the 1997 crisis, there were indications of a 
loss of competitiveness in Thailand. Yet earlier 
governments did not take much action to specifi-
cally develop knowledge-based competitive ad-
vantages. Industrial policies failed to give high 
priority to the development of indigenous techno-
logical capabilities. Unlike some other Southeast 
Asian NIEs, here there was no explicit and pro-
active link between promoting FDI and upgrading 
local technological capabilities.87 
                                                     
87  Intarakumnerd/ Chairatana/ Tangchitpiboon (2002), p. 
1450. 
Since the crisis governments have been more 
aware of the need to create competitive advan-
tages. They are now more sensitive to private-
sector needs and pay considerable attention to 
reform of government institutions, including the 
planning system, program implementation, the 
budgeting process, the system of higher education, 
etc. S&T policy also appear to rank higher on the 
political agenda; e.g., the government launched a 
comprehensive Information Technology (IT) 2010 
strategy, which led to the establishment of a new 
IT ministry. Nevertheless, there are still major 
shortcomings in the way policy is formulated, 
implemented and evaluated. 
4.1.1 Policy formulation 
Traditionally in Thailand the process of policy 
formulation has not included visionary approaches 
involving foresight activities and participation of 
various stakeholders, and horizontal cooperation 
between ministries has been low. Despite some 
reform trends, some characteristics of this tradi-
tional approach to policy formulation still remain. 
Other characteristics, like a dual structure of pol-
icy formulation, with top-down political goal-
setting interfering with participatory long-term 
strategic planning within the ministerial structure, 
have even been aggravated by new reform drives. 
In the following, these characteristics and reforms 
are discussed in more detail. 
Vision. International experiences suggest that 
systematic foresight and benchmarking activities 
are important tools for achieving a strategic vision 
of future technology and market trends, and thus 
of competitive advantages (see Box 4.1). Al-
though Thailand has not launched a comprehen-
sive national foresight exercise yet, it has hosted 
the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Center for Technology Foresight for the past 5 
years and has conducted several major foresight 
exercises at three different levels, which is a good 
sign that the process of policy formulation is shift-
ing towards a strategic orientation:  
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— At the national level, the National Science 
and Technology Agency (NSTDA), a RTO 
under the Ministry of Science and Technol-
ogy (MoST), in 1995 commissioned Chiang 
Mai University to conduct a Delphi survey of 
“Future Key Technologies for Thailand.” An-
ther major project by ministerial order on 
“Science and Technology in the Year 2020” 
was conducted in 1999-2000. It aimed at cre-
ating awareness of the importance of S&T 
and at linking S&T to the social and eco-
nomic development of the country. 
— At the sectoral level, three major projects 
have been carried out: In 1998 foresight exer-
cises were extended to integrate social as-
pects as well. The first project in that direc-
tion was on “Foresighting Thai Agriculture” 
to reposition agriculture after the economic 
crisis of 1997. In 2000 the foresight project 
on “IT for Education” was conducted during 
                                                     
88  Martin (2001), p. 5. 
the drafting period of the Master Plan for ICT 
in Education. The “IT for SMEs” project was 
initiated in 1999 by the Ministry of Industry, 
when the country was desperate for economic 
recovery. A two-round Delphi survey was 
used as the key foresight technique. 
— In addition, three public organizations89 have 
used foresight tools for their strategic reposi-
tioning.90  
Participation. Another change within the national 
policy planning process is a move towards greater 
participation: Traditionally, national plans in 
                                                     
89  Facing the uncertainties of privatization, the Public 
Warehouse Organization, a state enterprise, used sce-
nario analysis to develop a long-term strategic plan. The 
National Metrology Institute of Thailand, an autonomous 
public agency, took on foresight to clarify goals, and the 
Technology Promotion Association (Thailand-Japan), a 
not-for-profit private organization for technology trans-
fer to Thai industry, used scenario writing to rethink its 
vision and strategy. 
90  Sripaipan et al. (undated), p. 6. 
Box 4.1: Foresight tools 
“Foresight is the process involved in systematically attempting to look into the longer-term future of science, tech-
nology, the economy, the environment and society with the aim of identifying the emerging generic technologies 
and the underpinning areas of strategic research likely to yield the greatest economic and social benefits.”88 It seeks 
to identify long-term trends and thus to guide decision-making. Some foresight exercises focus on trends in con-
sumer needs, others attempt to predict what the key technologies of tomorrow will be. The following tools e.g. can 
be used: 
In Delphi Surveys groups of experts are consulted on a range of possible future developments in their respective 
fields. Three main characteristics can be identified: anonymity (no physical contact between participants), iteration 
(several rounds of consultation), controlled feedback in the form of statistical presentation of the group responses. 
Scenario analysis presents alternative images of the future bearing on highly interactive, intense and imaginative 
processes. This is a tool for ordering perceptions about unpredictable future environments. 
Environmental scanning searches the world systematically and highlights the new and unexpected, as well the ma-
jor and minor. It can reduce the randomness of information and provide early warnings for managers on changing 
external conditions. 
Normative foresight tools, which are related to, are based on, or prescribe norms. One common tool is e.g. rele-
vance trees, which systematically identify requirements for reaching specific goals. 
Systematic benchmarking is another important instrument for formulating a national vision, as it offers the chance 
to compare the relative efficiency of a whole economy or of certain parts of an economy, e.g. a company, a sector, a 
policy, or an NIS. This can furthermore help to relate differences in performance to observable characteristics. To 
utilize the benchmarking instrument, it would be important to set up several dimensions of comparison (institutional 
arrangements, natures and relative importance of the channels of interaction, incentive structures) as well as quanti-
tative indicators for performance measurement and comparison.  
Source: Based on Johnston (2003) 
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Thailand were drafted by bureaucrats and in-
volved only a few representatives of the private 
sector. Yet, starting with the 8th National Eco-
nomic and Social Development Plan (1998-2002), 
a wider spectrum of individuals and institutions 
were invited to participate in the planning process. 
In the preparation of the 9th Plan (2002-2006), this 
model was expanded: hundreds of workshops 
were organized covering all provinces and involv-
ing more than 30,000 persons.91 
These national plans constitute the basis for many 
specific master plans drafted by line ministries, 
such as the national S&T Plan conducted by the 
MoST. The planning process within this ministe-
rial structure is relatively time-consuming, since it 
involves several feedback loops and workshops on 
different subjects, often with several hundred par-
ticipants from the private sector, science and poli-
tics (see Box 4.2 on S&T policy formulation). But 
although the private sector is engaged in the plan-
ning process, several interview partners noted that 
its influence on real decision-making is rather 
limited. A majority of private-sector stakeholders 
dismiss the ministerial planning procedure as ir-
relevant, consider workshops as too time-con-
suming, and not keyed to their needs. The plan-
ning procedure lacks credibility, because too little 
information about the private sector is collected in 
advance. Therefore, few individual companies 
take part, leaving the voice of the private sector to 
be expressed by representatives of associations 
that often lack a clear devotion to the actual prob-
lems of their branch of industry. 
Horizontal coordination. One important factor in 
addition to participation of the private sector is 
coordination between ministries. This is particu-
larly true for cross-cutting issues such as S&T 
policy. One approach to policy coherence is the 
use of coordinating bodies equipped with a clear 
mandate for managing and overseeing the policy 
                                                     
91  See Sripaipan et al. (undated), p. 2; the author concludes 
that “‘participation’ has become a buzzword and partly 
intended to provide legitimacy to every major planning 
activity of the state, such as the new Constitution, and 
new Health Act.” 
process. Cross-cutting bodies of the policy proc-
ess can be grouped as following: 
— Standing committees, agencies and councils 
located at the ministerial level with explicit 
cross-cutting roles; 
— Special purpose review bodies, committees of 
enquiry and task forces set up on a temporary 
basis to examine issues with multi-ministry 
relevance; 
— Routine organizational arrangements in the 
form of cabinet subcommittees involving the 
more S&T-intensive ministries.92  
Yet coordination between ministries in Thailand is 
traditionally weak, a fact which results in a verti-
cal “silo” structure of ministries with limited hori-
zontal interaction. Despite the proliferation of 
committees in the last years,93 the bodies often 
lack a clear mandate. Although a few cross-
cutting projects are undertaken jointly by different 
ministries, there is still little coordinated planning. 
As seen in the example of S&T policy (see Box 
4.2), the establishment of the National Science 
and Technology Committee (NSTC) might prove 
to be a good possibility to encourage dialogue 
between the different “silos” and their project 
coordination activities. In addition, the 10 differ-
ent mega-projects94 identified in the new strategic 
National S&T Plan (2002-2006) are expected to 
increase cooperation, because the projects are to 
be jointly implemented by various ministries un-
der the coordination of MoST. 
The power of the line ministries to take decisions 
on sectoral policies is influenced by two institu-
tions with all-encompassing competences: The 
National and Social Development Board (NESDB) 
is responsible for screening ministerial policy 
proposals to make sure that they are in line with 
the national 5-year plans. The even more powerful 
                                                     
92  The Brooker Group (2002b), p. 56. 
93  Bringing together representatives from the relevant 
ministry, the private sector and specialists. 
94  Such as the construction of Bangkok’s new international 
airport. The final list of “mega-projects” has not yet been 
approved by the cabinet. 
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Budget Bureau decides on final budget allocation. 
Actual budget allocation thus largely depends on 
the ability of ministries to organize political sup-
port and defend their budgets in parliament.95  
Dual structure of policy formulation. In addi-
tion, ad hoc political decisions taken at high po-
litical levels interfere with the planning proce-
dures and targets set by the ministries. Based upon 
election platforms or party visions, new parties in 
power decide on their own priorities, which are 
not necessarily in line with medium- and long-
term strategic planning within ministries, leaving 
open questions about policy coherence and long-
term commitment to programs that have been 
adopted. In some cases politicians come up with 
projects which are more focused on short-term 
effects and political visibility than on financial 
sustainability, long-term improvement and project 
                                                     
95  The Brooker Group (2002b), p. 19 ff. 
outcome. They may also cut across the responsi-
bility of line ministries. 
Prime Minister (PM) Thaksin set up the National 
Competitiveness Committee (NCC)97 (chaired by 
                                                     
96  NSTC is chaired by the Prime Minister and involves 
different ministries (including Commerce, Industry, De-
fense, S&T, Environment), representatives from the 
main private-sector associations and ten independent ex-
perts. 
97  The NCC has 13 members, including the PM and the 
Deputy PM, the President of NESDB, 2 businesspeople 
(President CP Group and Managing Director of Siam 
Cement), one acknowledged academic, and one repre-
sentative each of FTI, Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Banking Association.). The NCC has funds of 16 bio. 
bahts for ad hoc programs which are not considered in 
the ordinary fiscal budget. This budget has already been 
used to conduct activities like setting up the one-stop-
service for export certification and two cluster studies by 
Michael Porter (shrimps and tourism). (Interview with 
Panithan Yamvinij, Director of Competitiveness Devel-
opment Office, NESDB, 13 March 03). 
Box 4.2: The S&T policy formulation process in Thailand 
A new interim National Science and Technology Committee (NSTC)96 was set up in 2001 to review national 
S&T policy and to report to the cabinet. Its establishment shows the importance which the new government as-
signs to innovation and technology policy. The NSTC sub-committee, with key persons from the private sector 
(such as CEOs of large Thai firms and executives of industrial associations) as members, is responsible for setting 
up the national S&T plan (2002-2006). The secretary (MoST, NESDB, NSTDA) helps in drafting the plan 
through SWOT-analysis. The process of policy formulation is carried out under MoST (NSTDA) in a participa-
tory and long-term planning process with several feedback-loops: three workshops involving ca. 100-150 gov-
ernment and private-sector participants were held to define the vision, mission and objectives, to identify projects 
and programs and to work on implementation, evaluation criteria and monitoring of the plan. The results of the 
workshop are fed back to the sub committee. 
Yet, since there are many different ministries and agencies involved in S&T policy – despite the NSTC – S&T 
policy is still fragmented. Several vertically integrated “silos” of S&T policy formulation, implementation and 
performance exist within the ministerial structures, but these appear to operate largely independently of each 
other. 
To streamline S&T policy, a new “National S&T Act” (which still needs to be approved by the parliament) has 
been launched; it involves a clear ”top-down” perspective on the policy process. The NSTC, chaired by the PM 
and responsible for R&D, S&T manpower, S&T infrastructure, and technology transfer, will then be transformed 
into a central body with sufficient power and influence to exercise effective oversight of the development of S&T 
and co-ordination of all government agencies responsible for increasing the country’s competitiveness in S&T. 
Every year the NSTC will provide an assessment of the size of the S&T budget, decide on its framework and give 
advice to the cabinet. Although the Budget Bureau will finally allocate the funds, the NESDB and the Budget Bu-
reau will follow the advice of NSTC, since it will report to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). Thus one single 
agency will be created that is responsible for policy formulation, and this will leave the responsibility for imple-
mentation and monitoring with the line ministries and agencies involved in S&T (although they are also ”in-
volved” in the formulation of policies via their representation in the NSTC). 
Source: Interview with Patarapong Intarakumnerd, policy researcher at NSTDA (21 February 2003) and The 
Brooker Group (2002b). 
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himself) as the main planning and decision-
making instrument for coordinating and control-
ling different ministries and agencies. The NCC 
defines national priorities, some rather general 
(Thailand’s position vis-à-vis global governance, 
building an entrepreneurial society, etc.), others 
more specific:  
— Sector-specific cluster definitions like: De-
troit of Asia (hub for car manufacturing, esp. 
pick-ups), Kitchen of the World (Thai cuisine, 
food processing), Tropical Fashion of Asia 
(textiles, leather, gems and jewelry industry 
with high “design content”), Software (esp. 
multimedia, animation), Tourism.  
— Other cross-cutting-initiatives, like the goal 
of creating 50,000 new enterprises within the 
next two years (see Chapter 4.4 for more de-
tails), or the “One Tambon one product” 
(OTOP) initiative (see Chapter 4.2 for more 
details).  
As regards the former, apart from the tourism 
cluster, all the others are mentioned in the national 
S&T plan, reflecting NESDB's integrative role in 
the process of policy formulation; it is on the one 
hand responsible for screening ministerial master 
plans and on the other hand serves as the secre-
tariat of the NCC. The latter seems not to be em-
bedded in the strategic policy formulation process 
of ministries, since the targets formulated are ei-
ther not realistic or not in line with the strategic 
goals and projects of the ministerial policy level. 
Thus visions created within the NCC seem to be 
mainly based on the personal preferences of some 
advisors of the PM. Looking at these so called 
“pet projects,”98 the policy formulation process 
seems to be rather top-down and ad hoc than to 
systematically involve the relevant stakeholders: 
Some interview partners questioned the broad-
based private-sector influence on the PM, al-
though he sets up meetings with the private sector 
every Friday afternoon to discuss special projects. 
The private sector is mainly involved in political 
                                                     
98  We use the term „pet projects“ to describe politically 
motivated projects which were not necessarily based on a 
long-term, systematic and participatory planning process 
involving several stakeholders.  
decision-making via individuals with access to 
high-ranking politicians. The fact that other com-
mittees besides the NCC, e.g. the NSTC, are also 
chaired by the PM merely serves to highlight the 
centralization of decision-making. 
All in all, there appears to be a “dual track” of 
decision making, with the long-term ministerial 
policy formulation process on the one side and 
high level political policy decisions on the other, 
an arrangement which sometimes interferes with 
the targets and procedures of ministerial planning, 
or even competes with it for funding. Yet starting 
in October 2003 a new system of budget integra-
tion will be launched which may limit the influ-
ence of the Budget Bureau on budget allocation 
and strengthen the integrative role of the NESDB. 
Traditionally, budgets have first been allocated to 
the line ministries, which then allocate their re-
spective budgets to specific programs, a procedure 
depending in large measure on the decisions taken 
by the Budget Bureau. Now NESDB has the au-
thority to supervise overall budget allocation and 
to check whether it is in line with the „competi-
tiveness drive“ established by NCC. The NESDB 
will then supervise the allocation and spending of 
budgets according to priorities set by NCC/ 
NESDB. This new system might prove to be a 
good chance to better integrate the two policy 
tracks, but many problems still remain unsolved 
regarding the future demarcation of competences 
as well as implementation (especially concerning 
projects decided on at the highest political level). 
Given the close relationship between NESDB and 
the NCC, and thus also the Prime Minister’s Of-
fice (PMO), and given the establishment of the 
NSTC (see Box 4.2), which is also chaired by the 
PMO, the “political” policy formulation track 
could gain competence and the role of the line 
ministries might be reduced to simply implement-
ing strategies derived at that level.  
4.1.2 Policy implementation 
Although there are signs of change, implementa-
tion of policies in Thailand is still marked by the 
following features:  
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— The responsibilities for policy formulation, 
funding and program implementation are not 
clearly separated;  
— some implementing agencies are not cus-
tomer-oriented, do not operate in a business-
like manner, and their programs are not cost-
effective; and  
— budget allocation is not sufficiently linked to 
performance. 
Policy responsibilities. International best prac-
tices indicate the recommendability of clear as-
signments of responsibilities to ensure the smooth 
implementation of policies. A clear organizational 
and administrative line needs to be drawn between 
the different levels of policy responsibilities, es-
pecially between policy formulation, funding and 
the implementation of programs and projects. This 
separation serves two functions: First, it provides 
a clearer basis for the delegation of responsibili-
ties and accountability and separates the details of 
program management from the broad guidance 
provided by ministerial policies. Second, it opens 
up the possibility of developing a more flexible 
organizational structure at the level of policy im-
plementation by creating better possibilities for 
one single agency to implement projects stem-
ming from different ministries.99 
Yet in Thailand there is no clear division of respon-
sibilities. In many cases the three functions of pol-
icy formulation, disbursement of funding, and de-
livery of services are taken on by the ministerial 
level, either by the ministries themselves or by their 
subagencies. MoST for example delegates imple-
mentation responsibility to NSTDA, which also 
manages and executes projects in the three large 
R&D Centers, namely the National Electronics and 
Computer Technology Center (NECTEC), the Na-
tional Metal and Material Technology Center 
(MTEC) and the National Center for Genetic Engi-
neering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC). Since minis-
terial subagencies such as NSTDA are also engaged 
in policy formulation (e.g. NSTDA’s involvement 
in the formulation of the S&T Plan, see Box 4.2), 
                                                     
99  The Brooker Group (2002b), p. 27. 
the different levels of policy responsibility tend to 
overlap, leaving questions about accountability and 
flexibility at the implementation level. 
Service delivery. Most Thai government pro-
grams are still mainly supply–driven, i.e. driven 
by bureaucratic decisions, a fact which results 
from weak private-sector involvement in program 
planning as well as from incentive structures 
within implementing agencies which serve neither 
to create a service mentality nor to enhance net-
working with industry. This supply orientation of 
programs, in part combined with a lack of human 
and financial resources, results in involvement of 
only a small number of corporate customers, and 
thus in low program outreach and impact. Even 
the most prominent SME programs, such as In-
vigorating Thai Business (ITB) or the Industrial 
Assistance Program (ITAP), are only able to reach 
a very small percentage of their potential target 
group. The same applies, for instance, for lab ser-
vices (e.g. provided by the Electrical and Elec-
tronics Institute/ EEI)) or the few existing busi-
ness incubators.  
Moreover, programs and implementing agencies 
are almost never financially sustainable, which 
means that programs suddenly expire when the 
agencies run out of funds. This is partly due to the 
“public-goods” character of certain services (i.e. 
firms are not willing to pay for services if they 
cannot fully appropriate the benefits and recover 
their investment, e.g. in R&D, training or envi-
ronmental protection); but it is also due to the fact 
that public agencies are not obliged to recover a 
significant part of their operating costs. Many 
programs subsidize 90 or even 100 % of service 
costs. This practice undermines the willingness of 
customers to pay for services and may crowd out 
those service providers who seek to deliver their 
services on a cost-covering basis.  
For some public agencies, changes are on the way 
to improving service delivery, but a major reengi-
neering of the public and semi-public implement-
ing agencies will be needed to significantly in-
crease efficiency, impact and outreach. Interna-
tional discussion on business development ser-
vices suggests that programs implemented by 
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public agencies should be designed in a business-
like manner, be demand-led and based on prior 
market surveys, the aim being to prevent any 
crowding out of private service providers. Sub-
stantial fees should always be charged to make 
sure that the beneficiaries are really interested in 
and esteem the service provided, but also because 
cost-effectiveness is important in times of grow-
ing public budget constraints (see Box 4.3). Inter-
national experience also suggests that the estab-
lishment of a system of competitive bidding, 
which creates competition among public, semi-
public and private service providers, increases 
efficiency, and thus leads to improved perform-
ance.  
Link between performance and budgeting. One 
general shortcoming of policy implementation in 
Thailand is the missing link between performance 
and budgeting. At present there are only few per-
formance indicators in place to measure the output 
and outcome of projects and to feed the results 
back into the next round of budgeting. Only some 
agencies, like the Thailand Institute of Scientific 
and Technological Research (TISTR), have al-
ready started to establish clear performance indi-
cators to set incentives for industry-related pro-
jects and to improve performance. This shortcom-
ing might be overcome by the newly established 
system of performance-based budgeting, which 
was decided on by the government in 2002. Every 
ministry has to clearly define a set of Key Per-
formance Indicators (KPI), which are tied to the 
allocation of positions and funds. The links be-
tween planning, budgeting and performance will 
be strengthened in this way. These reforms show 
the government's willingness to achieve more 
efficient and sustainable outputs, but the success 
of the new system will depend on its implementa-
tion and the quality and independence of evalua-
tion bodies. Most of our interview partners were 
quite enthusiastic about the new system, but all 
complained about the difficulties involved in es-
tablishing it. Problems arise from the difficulty in 
defining relevant, guidance-oriented, and measur-
able performance indicators as well as in training 
sufficient and qualified evaluation staff. In addi-
tion, the actual influence of the new system on 
decisions taken at high political levels (e.g. the so-
called “pet projects”) may be quite low.  
4.1.3 Monitoring and evaluation  
Monitoring and evaluation of public policies is 
important for improving the allocation of scarce 
public funds and the accountability and transpar-
ency of policies. In addition, new developments in 
S&T and innovation policy, which increasingly 
Box 4.3: Principles for efficient public service delivery to the private sector 
- Check first whether there are any private providers serving the market. Avoid crowding out private competitors; 
- Check carefully whether government intervention is really justified. Is there market failure, and why? 
- Co-financing by the user is compulsory, otherwise the beneficiary may not esteem the service; 
- Define an exit strategy: When and how can the break-even point be reached? Who should provide the service in 
the future? 
- If self-sustainability is impossible, ensure long-term funding; 
- Establish a direct link between performance and resource allocation; 
- Ensure independent monitoring and evaluation of performance; 
- Establish separate accountability for each service in order to monitor cost efficiency and demand etc.; 
- Separate funding from the delivery of services; 
- Promote competition between service providers. This creates pressure to improve performance; 
- Continue to monitor the respective service market in order to see whether government intervention is still 
needed. 
Source: Stamm/ Altenburg (2003) 
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focus on technology diffusion, organizational 
changes and innovative behavior, have entailed 
new requirements for evaluation. Thus, even 
though there is no optimal institutional design for 
evaluation that is transferable across countries, 
several international experiences show that some 
principles are widely accepted (see Box 4.4).  
Although there already are evaluation groups at 
several policy levels in Thailand, monitoring and 
evaluation still appear to play a fairly limited role 
in the policy process. Evaluation still appears to 
be an irregular procedure, with widely varying 
evaluation approaches and variable degrees of 
transparency. E.g. sectoral institutions like the 
National Food Institute (NFI) or the EEI are moni-
tored and supervised by different line ministries, 
and each ministry defines its own criteria. In addi-
tion, in several cases only a small number of proj-
ects are included in an evaluation sample.100 There 
is, in other words, no widely adopted portfolio 
approach in place.  
Plans often do not include clear performance indi-
cators, or indicators are not defined in such in a 
way as to increase the industry orientation of S&T 
programs: the main indicators for RTOs, e.g., 
refer to the number and quality of published pa-
                                                     
100  In the case of MoST, only 18 pilot projects of 156 are 
selected for evaluation. Yet, in the future, the methology 
chosen and proved for these projects could be extended 
to the other projects. 
pers, patent applications, prototype development 
etc., while acquisition of research contracts from 
industry is not taken into account.101 Only some 
agencies have already started to set up clear per-
formance indicators to increase industry orienta-
tion, but also to better influence future budgeting 
and salaries: e.g. TISTR set up a system of evalu-
ation criteria which is closely linked to a bonus 
system. If its staff attains a higher rank in a given 
year, they receive up to two months' salary as a 
bonus. Performance requirements increase year by 
year. The above-mentioned new system of “per-
formance-based budgeting” might also boost this 
trend. 
Due to the non-inclusion of evaluation targets and 
indicators in policy planning, there is often no 
systematic process in place running upwards 
through different levels from projects through 
programs to broad strategies.102 Evaluation does 
not include convergence between systematic ex 
post evaluation and continued monitoring. One 
example is the evaluation of the ITB program, 
which is only monitored on an ad hoc basis, with-
                                                     
101  For example, evaluation at MTEC is mainly done in-
house and is based on number of published papers, re-
search projects completed, patent applications, proto-
type development as well as on technology transfer to 
companies. There is no incentive structure yet for ac-
quiring contract research.  
102  See The Brooker Group (2002b), p. 27. 
Box 4.4: Lessons from international evaluation experiences 
- Evaluation should be designed together with the respective program or policy to be evaluated; 
- It is necessary to formally oblige those responsible for policy-making to react to the results of evaluation; 
- Evaluation ought to be “user-oriented,” which means that it should address the needs of evaluation “clients”; 
- Evaluation should target not only incremental changes but also fundamental shifts in S&T policy, which implies 
broader information gathering and processing; 
- Evaluation should adopt a portfolio approach rather than focus on individual projects; 
- Performance indicators should be widely used,  
- There should be convergence between ex post evaluation and continuous monitoring; 
- Evaluation should be conducted on a programmed and proper resource basis, guaranteeing and providing for in-
dependent evaluation bodies and a feedback of results into the policy–making process. 
Source: Papaconstantinou / Polt (1998), p.13. 
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out any systematic evaluation approaches. The 
same applies for other organizations, like e.g. the 
newly established Software Park, where evalua-
tion and development of projects is done more by 
trial and error than by seeking to adapt and adjust 
to international best practices. Pet political pro-
jects are not evaluated systematically, and the 
focus is more on monitoring than on feeding 
evaluation results back into the further policy 
formulation process. There may be some recom-
mendations for future programs, but no follow-up 
is provided for. 
The independence of evaluation bodies also needs 
to be questioned. Evaluation is either done in-
house or not conducted by independent agencies. 
Often university professors are hired, but their 
independence was questioned in some of our in-
terviews because their personal income may be 
highly dependent on their access to additional 
government contracts. To support more independ-
ent evaluations, MoST is thinking about establish-
ing an evaluation committee (members: NESDB, 
Budget Bureau, MoST, universities, private sec-
tor) to select projects and supervise the evaluation 
of S&T projects. Yet efficient and qualified 
evaluation is also hampered by insufficiently 
trained evaluation staff. In addition, criticism of 
people and actions is not well regarded in Thai 
culture. Therefore, evaluation reports in effect 
often paint a rosy picture of the real situation of 
the organization concerned.  
4.2 Promoting inter-firm linkages 
In the following paragraphs we will discuss the 
importance of both horizontal (i.e. involving one 
stage of the value chain) and vertical (i.e. involv-
ing different stages) inter-firm linkages, and we 
will argue that vertical linkages, especially with 
foreign direct investors, are often the most impor-
tant source of technological, organizational and 
market knowledge in developing countries. As 
Dunning states, "the findings of a large number of 
studies over the past 30 years are virtually unani-
mous that the presence of foreign-owned firms has 
helped raise the standards and productivity of many 
domestic suppliers, and that this has often had 
beneficial spillover effects on the rest of their op-
erations."103 For example, access to more profit-
able markets and information increasingly de-
pends on access to global production networks 
governed by TNCs or local lead firms. In some 
cases, these technology drivers are global buyers 
without direct investment.104  
Under certain market conditions the benefits of 
linkages are so clear to enterprises that no policy 
is needed to encourage firms to develop them. But 
markets often fail to develop a desirable level of 
inter-firm cooperation, for example when it is 
cheaper for a company to import the intermediate 
goods or services it requires. In such cases, what 
is cost-effective for the individual firm may result 
in competitive disadvantages for the location as a 
whole, because it fails to exploit the benefits of 
specialization and technological learning. Accord-
ing to this argument, there is a need for govern-
ments to encourage and support the creation and 
deepening of linkages.105  
However, promotion of inter-firm relations is not 
a priority concern in Thailand. Neither the gov-
ernment nor the main industry associations, the 
Thai Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of 
Thai Industries, plays a strong role in promoting 
inter-firm linkages. And what is more, the few 
existing instruments focus on horizontal rather 
than vertical linkages. Considering the fact that 
the Thai economy is characterized by a marked 
dualistic structure and a considerable productivity 
gap between foreign enclaves and the local busi-
ness community, this is probably not the right 
focus. 
                                                     
103 Dunning (1992), p. 456. 
104  Knorringa/ Schmitz (2000). 
105  UNCTAD (2001), p. 163. 
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4.2.1 Government commitment to 
promoting horizontal inter-firm 
linkages 
Promotion of clusters is a distinctive feature of 
Thailand’s current economic policy. “Cluster” has 
become a buzzword in government programs, 
political speeches and newspaper articles. Some 
of the most prominent government policies explic-
itly pursue a cluster approach: 
1. The PMO has identified five priority sectors 
which it calls “clusters” (automotive, food 
processing, textiles, software, and tourism). 
2. The NCC has hired Michael Porter, the most 
famous exponent of the cluster approach, to 
conduct studies on the tourism and shrimp-
farming clusters.  
3. NSTDA and its three research institutes 
(NECTEC, BIOTEC and MTEC) have been 
moved to a new location north of Bangkok. 
Together with the neighboring Asian Institute 
of Technology and Thammasat University, 
the new location now concentrates a large 
proportion of Thailand’s industry-related re-
search facilities. The Science Park, located in 
the same premises, is expected to attract pri-
vate-sector R&D facilities seeking synergies 
with the nearby research institutes. Further-
more, five major industrial estates are located 
near this new research hub. It is expected that 
this spatial proximity may enhance industry-
science relations, thus giving rise to a “North 
Bangkok Innovation Cluster,” a term coined 
by NSTDA for the overall agglomeration. 
4. Under the OTOP-Program, the Thai govern-
ment is pursuing the same horizontal cluster 
approach, providing ample funding for coop-
eration among SMEs at the local level.  
While the first two initiatives seek to exploit the 
benefits of intra-sectoral synergies at a nation-
wide level, the other two focus on increased spa-
tial synergies, with a less prominent sector focus. 
Yet none of these cluster initiatives explicitly 
seeks to enhance vertical linkages, e.g. between 
large corporations, retail chains or global buyers 
and their local SME suppliers.106  
4.2.2 Current activities aimed at 
strengthening vertical inter-firm 
linkages  
The Thai government does not give due attention 
to fostering vertical linkages, esp. to "embedding" 
the TNC sector in the local production structure as 
a means of avoiding the dislocation of footloose 
industries. This is in sharp contrast to other Asian 
NIEs, which place priority on the enhancement of 
TNC-SME linkages, e.g. Korea or Singapore. 
Thai policies concentrate on general support of 
SMEs to relieve urban unemployment and rural 
poverty. Programs aimed at strengthening vertical 
linkages must target a much more narrow set of 
companies to increase industrial efficiency.107 
Specific programs aimed at improving the per-
formance of SMEs to make them more attractive 
as suppliers to large firms are largely lacking. 
In many important sectors, supplier structures in 
Thailand have developed as a result of local-
content requirements (LCR), which were the most 
frequently used measure for establishing supplier 
relations in Thailand, although they have recently 
been phased out.108 Foreign investors were 
obliged to increase the amount of domestic value 
added and content of their products by using na-
tional inputs. The Thai government used to use 
local-content requirements, especially in the 
automotive, machinery, and electrical industries. 
                                                     
106  For example, the cluster initiative for the food process-
ing industry, labeled "Thailand: Kitchen of the World", 
mainly considers export promotion; the initiative for the 
automotive sector ("Detroit of Asia"), emphasizes in-
vestment promotion for mainly Japanese automotive 
companies, and OTOP places emphasis on linking local 
SMEs and improving their marketing.  
107  Battat/ Frank/ Shen (1996), p. 21. 
108  Local-content requirements are one of the trade-related 
investment measures (TRIMs) that were banned after 
the end of the GATT Uruguay Round and had to be 
dismantled. Thailand stopped using local-content rules 
in the beginning of 2000. 
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LCR created opportunities for domestic firms and 
established new industries, especially in the auto 
parts sector. Some of the industries that started out 
by supplying parts to domestic producers later 
became exporters. These include the battery and 
radiator subsectors.109 Overall, however, little 
significant industrial deepening and embedding 
has taken place and many of the above-mentioned 
sectors are still dependent on imports and display 
weak local linkages. The suppliers developed under 
LCR now have to cope with the challenge of in-
creasing competition, which calls for other pro-
motional measures in line with the regulations of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
As far as public-sector initiatives are concerned, 
few internationally recognized measures are in 
place, and the existing programs are poorly 
funded. Basically, three entities are concerned 
with supplier development:  
— The Board of Investment's (BOI) Unit for 
Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD);  
— the Bureau of Supporting Industry Develop-
ment (BSID) under the Department of Indus-
trial Promotion (DIP);  
— the Supplier Development Program (SDP), 
also under DIP.  
Of these programs, only BUILD has gained a 
certain reputation. The other two were unknown 
to or dismissed as ineffective by almost all our 
interview partners, both in the private and the 
government sector. BUILD has been established 
to provide a wider range of investment-related 
services. BUILD functions as a "middleman" to 
forge links between customers and suppliers. The 
objectives of the program are to use technology 
transfer to reduce the import of parts and compo-
nents, linking Thai suppliers with large companies 
and strengthening part makers in Thailand. 
BUILD promotes industrial linkages and stimu-
lates domestic subcontracting of parts and compo-
nents. The unit analyzes parts and components 
needed by both Thai and foreign assemblers plan-
ning to start production in Thailand. BUILD then 
                                                     
109  Thongpakde/ Puppahavesa/ Pussarangsri (1994), p. 139. 
surveys existing supplier industries in order to 
identify companies that are capable of producing 
competitively. The program also collaborates with 
other government agencies and private firms to 
help these potential suppliers to upgrade.  
BUILD consists of five programs:  
1. The Vendors Meet Customers Program was 
established to promote industrial linkages and 
stimulate domestic subcontracting of parts and 
components. Visits of manufacturers to facto-
ries are organized under this program; 
2. The Expansion Abroad Program is designed 
to expand marketing channels and enhance 
high-technology capabilities. As under the 
VCM, companies are invited to visit multina-
tionals;  
3. The main role of the monthly Parts & Com-
ponents Marketplace is to match customers 
and suppliers. Every month, BUILD invites 
10-20 large companies and 200-300 potential 
qualified suppliers from a computerized data-
base of supporting industries that includes 
about 800 companies believed to be capable 
of producing parts for parent firms. The mar-
ketplace consists of a morning seminar on dif-
ferent issues, e.g. increasing efficiency, a 
presentation by the potential customers on 
their supply demands, an exhibition of the 
parts needed, open discussions and opportuni-
ties for informal meetings.  
4. Subcontracting Seminars provides SMEs 
with information on how to overcome diffi-
culties in supplying large companies; 
5. The ASEAN Supporting Industry Data-
base110 includes all important industries in the 
fields of mould-and-die, electronics, auto-
motive, and chemistry in Asia and aims at fa-
cilitating matching in the ASEAN region. 
                                                     
110  See: http://www.asidnet.org. 
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With these activities, BUILD plays an important 
role as an information provider, facilitator and 
intermediary for vertical inter-firm linkages. 
Companies have reported increases of domestic 
content amounting in value terms to 10 to 20 % 
once they had become involved in BUILD pro-
jects.111 Yet the impact of the BUILD programs is 
rather limited because of the small size of the 
BUILD bureau, which has only 10 employees and 
a very small budget, one, in addition, that was cut 
radically following the financial crisis. In 2002 
BUILD had a budget of approximately 27 million 
bahts compared to the OTOP budget, which 
amounts to 800 million bahts. Considering the 
crucial role of vertical knowledge flows, there is a 
considerable mismatch between the substantial 
funds allocated to traditional SME programs (such 
as OTOP and ITB) and the poor funding of sup-
plier development programs. Another shortcom-
ing of the BUILD programs relates to its limited 
range of activities.  
As a result of a perceived lack of attention from 
the government, some supplier development ini-
tiatives have been launched by industry associa-
tions and individual firms – though with very 
limited outreach so far. Firstly, several SMEs 
have decided to set up the Subcontracting Promo-
tion Club (SPC).112 This private-sector initiative 
aims at horizontal networking among Thai SMEs 
in the electronics, plastics, metal and polymer 
industries to enhance their capabilities to meet 
customer, i.e. TNC, demands. However, due to 
technological and marketing deficiencies, supplier 
relations are quite limited, and the activities of the 
SPC are currently not conducted in close coopera-
tion with TNCs.113 Instead, the main thrust of  
 
 
                                                     
111  Interview with Dr. Wisan Tanthawichian, BOI/BUILD, 
March 10, 2003. 
112  The club was started with initial support of the Board of 
Investment (BOI) Unit for Industrial Linkage Develop-
ment (BUILD) program.  
113  Interview with Mr. Pattanasak (Vice-President) and Mr. 
Lersak Nuangjhamnong from the Subcontracting Pro-
motion Club (SPC), on April 24, 2003 and April 30, 
2003. 
SPC's cooperation is directed at information-
sharing, resource-pooling, logistics and marketing 
improvements. This horizontal networking is al-
most revolutionary within Thai business circles in 
view of the fact that, historically, distrust and 
reluctance to share anything have been widely 
prevalent in the country.  
Secondly, in the hard disk drive industry, the In-
ternational Disk Drive Equipment and Materials 
Association (IDEMA) is seeking to link TNCs 
with local suppliers and universities, but with 
relatively few tangible results thus far (see Box 
4.5). 
Thirdly, the Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturing Asso-
ciation (TAPMA), in cooperation with the Thai 
Automotive Institute (TAI), has succeeded in cre-
ating some linkages in the automotive sector. 
Toyota Thailand has played an active role in this 
process. Toyota has successfully developed long-
term relationships with local suppliers that benefit 
the local industry (see Box 4.6). 
4.2.3 What remains to be done? 
Modern supplier development programs have 
shifted their focus towards voluntary promotional 
measures aimed at strengthening vertical co-
operation, mainly through awareness-building, by 
organizing databases and fairs to match supply 
and demand, strengthening potential local suppli-
ers, and encouraging large customer companies to 
increase their technology transfer.  
BUILD's activities are mainly limited to aware-
ness-building and matching between SMEs and 
large customers. Figure 4.2 shows that at present 
there are no measures going beyond these initial 
two steps.  
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International experience from programs designed 
to strengthen inter-firm linkages suggests that on 
its own none of the policy instruments named 
above can provide a solution. What is important is 
a holistic approach that integrates all the compo-
nents and actors shown in Figure 4.2. Establish-
ment of durable supplier relations calls for a long-
term commitment to increasing the competitive-
ness of potential suppliers that goes far beyond the 
initial phase of matching, and includes techno-
logical and financial support to reengineer these 
companies.  
Box 4.5 The International Disk Drive Equipment and Materials Association (IDEMA) 
The International Disk Drive Equipment and Materials Association (IDEMA) was founded in 1986 with the mission 
"to promote the international computer storage products industry by establishing communications channels for all 
its participants, thereby facilitating cooperation, progress, and growth." 
IDEMA operates worldwide and has more than 800 members. IDEMA Thailand includes the following leading 
companies: Seagate, Read-Rite, Fujitsu, KR Precision, Magnecomp, and EngTek. Representatives from BOI, AIT, 
NECTEC, and The Brooker Group are also on the Management Committee. 
IDEMA Thailand aims at raising awareness about the significant contribution of the disk drive industry for Thai-
land’s economy. To maintain and enhance the competitiveness of the hard disc industry IDEMA, takes part in initia-
tives to strengthen a multidisciplinary supporting industry. One element used to strengthen efficiency is creation of 
a technology roadmap for the supply industry. The association provides training and  information to help members 
keep up with technology development, which is especially important because technological advances in the industry 
are dynamic. Activities are carried out in close collaboration between industry, the academic sphere, and policy-
makers. Its activities consist of promoting business networking, facilitating information-sharing through education 
programs and technical symposiums/conferences, market updates and advance technology seminars; and a platform 
to address issues of relevance to the HDD industry. To meet the educational needs of IDEMA members, the Asian 
Institute of Technology (AIT) and IDEMA jointly offer a Certificate of Competence in Storage Technologya 
(CCST) which is recognized by both institutions. In 2000 the program trained around 500 industry professionals. 
IDEMA participates in a committee to strengthen open communications and collaboration between government, 
private-sector and other institutions. Some other members include BOI, MOI, the industry, and universities. IDEMA 
formulates a joint vision for the disk industry from a private-sector perspective and can therefore place priority con-
cerns on the political agenda. 
a Storage Technology essentially includes all elements of the technology that is embodied in the products of the HDD 
industry. 
Source: IDEMA Backgrounder, prepared for the Press Conference at NECTEC, November 15, 1999, and 
http://www.idema.org. 
Box 4.6: Toyota’s Reinforcement Program for Current Suppliers in Thailand 
The Reinforcement Program for Current Suppliers aims at increasing the international competitiveness of estab-
lished suppliers. Toyota has a policy of developing long-term relationships and assisting its suppliers. The enforce-
ment program comprises two components: the Toyota Target Value System and the Suppliers Support Program.  
Under the Target Value System, Toyota and the supplier agree on a number of long-term issues and objectives to 
strengthen the supplier’s competitiveness. The objectives are scaled down to annual targets to achieve a continuing 
circle of improvement. Toyota provides expertise to analyze problems, designs individual support measures and 
donates awards.  
In its Suppliers Support Program, Toyota assists potential suppliers in the preparatory process of building and 
maintaining a strong position regarding quality, cost, delivery, engineering, technology and management. Toyota 
gives particular attention to R&D, encouragement of an enterprise culture of creativity, continuous learning and 
improvement, and strengthening information management.  
Source:  Muramatsu (2000), pp. 67-72. 
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By comparison, in Singapore, where the govern-
ment has been very successful in emphasizing a 
comprehensive support scheme, more than 60 
programs are being implemented at all different 
support levels. Using a multiagency network ap-
proach, the programs are coordinated by the Sin-
gapore Economic Development Board (EDB), 
which works closely with private-sector organiza-
tions, including financial institutions, chambers, 
associations and tertiary institutions.114 Singa-
pore’s Local Industry Upgrading Program (LIUP) 
can also serve as a good example of how an inte-
grated and holistic support program for inter-firm 
linkages can be designed (see Box 4.7). 
One factor of special importance for Thailand is to 
strengthen the competitiveness of potential do-
mestic suppliers. The main problem of vertical 
linkages lies in the insufficient resources, equip-
ment, materials and professional management 
skills available to SMEs to meet the requirements 
                                                     
114  Battat/ Frank/ Shen (1996), p. 25. 
of modern, internationally competitive value 
chains. The decision to source locally in a host 
country mainly depends on the cost, quality, reli-
ability and flexibility of local suppliers. Since 
these attributes are often not as well developed in 
Thailand as among competing suppliers abroad, 
the government should focus on strengthening 
these factors. While large customer firms may 
help their SME partners in developing specific 
production technologies, government policies 
should concentrate on complementary aspects of 
innovation which are not provided by the cus-
tomer firms, e.g. to upgrade the design and devel-
opment capabilities of SMEs.115 Public policy can 
provide for innovative methods of learning (like 
benchmarking initiatives to adopt best practices in 
management, innovation audits or visiting pro-
grams), target the process competence and inno-
vation culture of firms and help to reduce infor- 
 
 
                                                     
115  UNCTAD (2001), p. 173. 
Figure 4.2: Promotion levels of inter-firm linkages 
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mation deficits at the firm level, e.g. by sub-
sidizing ICT and electronic supply chain man-
agement. In addition, the Thai government should 
support SMEs in meeting the technological stan-
dards required by international customers. 
Another crucial success factor is engagement of 
important customers in the design and implemen-
tation of support programs. Thai programs are 
mainly government-driven, and do not take suffi-
cient steps to ensure private-sector involvement. 
Therefore it is important to create incentives for 
large companies to increase their involvement in 
and commitment to supplier development. In gen-
eral terms, only very few large companies in Thai-
land are very actively committed to developing 
local SME suppliers. Toyota and Siam Cement are 
two positive exceptions to this rule. To encourage 
TNCs to increase their spillovers to the local 
economy, the Thai government might subsidize 
the cost of technicians seconded to SMEs by 
TNCs or research institutes. Besides that, fiscal 
and financial incentives for investors can be 
linked to the measure of technology transfer they 
provide. Incentives may also be offered for R&D 
cooperation with other firms. Because large firms 
are usually keen to improve their public image 
within the domestic market to spur sales, govern-
ments can use a form of moral persuasion to con-
vince large firms to engage in cooperation pro-
jects with local companies and advertise examples 
of firms contributing to national development. 
Financial instruments such as credit guarantees, 
low-interest funds, tax credits for providers of 
long-term funding, co-financing of supplier de-
velopment programs, are further alternative ap-
proaches for encouraging TNCs to increase tech-
nological spillovers.116  
In OECD countries promotion of inter-firm link-
ages is usually not only a concern of the public 
sector but is increasingly implemented by busi-
ness associations and private non-profit agencies 
with a business orientation. For example, cham-
bers of commerce and business associations often 
organize subcontracting databases and fairs, or 
help to raise awareness about the pros and cons of 
industrial subcontracting and value chains. Since 
firms usually have more confidence in chambers 
                                                     
116  Altenburg (1997), p. 30. 
Box 4.7: Singapore’s Local Industry Upgrading Program (LIUP) 
Singapore’s Local Industry Upgrading Program (LIUP) was established in 1986 to promote upgrading, strengthening, 
and expanding of local suppliers to foreign-invest firms, using foreign investors as a source of technology transfer. 
Inter-firm-linkages are enhanced through close cooperation between local suppliers and TNCs. The participating 
TNCs transfer technical, operational and managerial skills to their local suppliers. In return, local suppliers are en-
abled to provide good-quality, reliable goods and services at a competitive price. EDB complements private-sector 
activities by providing technical and financial support.  
An experienced international engineer works for 2 or 3 years as a LIUP manager, who selects local suppliers for fo-
cused assistance. All actors involved agree on a set of focused and broad-based assistance programs, which include 
courses and workshops to address general technical, managerial, or operational issues. 
The assistance programs consist of three phases: raising the overall operational efficiency of local firms; introducing 
new products to be supplied to TNCs and new processes to be used in the production of goods; and joint local firm-
TNC R&D for new products and processes.  
By 1994 the program had established 32 partnerships involving 180 domestic suppliers. Studies have found that LIUP 
had an impressive impact on suppliers, particularly in the beginning of the partnership. The productivity of suppliers 
rose by an average of 17 %, while value added per worker went up to 13.7 %.  
LIUP uses a market-oriented approach that is intended to remedy market imperfections, while the government func-
tions as broker, matchmaker, and facilitator. In contrast to LCR, this approach allows for freedom of decision for both 
local suppliers and TNCs. The program targets export-oriented industrial sectors and firms that have a good perspec-
tive for upgrading. It is not a broad SME program but builds upon strengths and participants that are most likely to 
succeed. The buyer firms play a key role in the transfer of technology and management know-how and show long 
term commitment.  
Source:  Battat / Frank / Shen (1996), pp. 28-35. 
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and associations than in public institutions,117 the 
former are often better suited as coordinating bod-
ies. However, they too often need to improve their 
service orientation. 
Finally, it is important to involve other actors, 
such as specialized sector-specific institutions 
(e.g. EEI, TAI, NFI), with a view to making use 
of their well-established industry contacts and 
support services for technological upgrading. A 
joint effort between government, companies, and 
private-sector associations is needed to create 
ownership and synergies. 
4.3 Promoting links between science and 
industry 
The performance of an innovation system, and 
thus national competitiveness, nowadays requires 
intensive industry-science relations (ISR). Firms 
increasingly rely on inputs from scientific institu-
tions, firstly because international competitiveness 
presupposes access to different kinds of knowl-
edge and technology that cannot be provided by a 
single firm; secondly, drawing on external knowl-
edge resources may speed up innovation, time 
being an increasingly important factor for com-
petitiveness due to ever shorter product cycles; 
thirdly, efficiency and quality are improved by 
specialization and sharing of costs between firms 
and scientific institutions;118 fourthly, publicly 
funded education provides skilled graduates. From 
the point of view of scientific institutions, the 
reasons for taking up industry relations are also 
manifold: academic institutions want to ensure 
good employment prospects for their students, 
keep curricula up to date, obtain financial support 
and tap private-sector know-how for joint re-
search.  
                                                     
117  For Mexico see, for example, Altenburg et al. (1998), 
p. 82. 
118  See Reinhard (2001), p. 32. 
4.3.1 Weak industry science relations: 
heritage of the past 
In the past, Thai policy neglected the importance 
of strengthening R&D and ISR. As argued above, 
Thailand’s economic development has been based 
on low-skill activities such as simple assembly 
and commodity exports. Even those exports that 
are statistically classified as “technology-inten-
sive” (e.g. electronics and automotive products) 
are mainly based on relatively simple assembly of 
imported components, with a low level of value 
added.119 Design, engineering and technology 
development capabilities were not given priority.  
One consequence was the emergence of a univer-
sity system that is largely delinked from industry: 
Thai universities have relatively poor research 
capabilities and most of their research has little 
industrial relevance; there is hardly any coopera-
tion between universities and enterprises;120 teach-
ing personnel lacks industry experience, a fact 
which is also reflected in a lack of cooperative 
education and industry internships, in university 
curricula that are not sufficiently industry-
oriented, the very low number of new industrial 
enterprises created by university staff, etc. The 
few linkages between individual researchers and 
companies that do exist are often based on per-
sonal relationships, and are mainly limited to 
short-term training or ad hoc use of consulting.121  
4.3.2 Early reform in the 1990s 
Beginning in the early 1980s, Thai five-year plans 
accorded consideration to the importance of sci-
ence and technology, and included separate ‘sci-
ence and technology’ chapters in planning docu-
ments. Yet as late as the 1990s Thailand empha-
sized the need to build links between industry and 
science and took relevant steps in this direction. In 
                                                     
119  UNIDO (undated). 
120  Intarakumnerd/ Chairatana/ Tangchitpiboon (2002), p. 
1451.  
121  Own interviews. 
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that period, several public institutes were estab-
lished to support science, to enhance technologi-
cal labor skills and to stimulate technological de-
velopment and R&D. The first important step 
toward reform was the foundation of NSTDA in 
1991 as an autonomous organization operating 
under the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST, formerly MOSTE). NSTDA both sup-
ports and implements R&D and offers a broad 
range of services to both the public and private 
sector. The agency took over the three existing 
National Research Centers, namely BIOTEC, 
NECTEC, MTEC.  
In the late 1990s, in the wake of the Industrial 
Restructuring Plan, the Thai government set up 
several specialized semi-public technology insti-
tutes in key industrial areas; these include the 
NFI, the TAI, the EEI, the TPI, and the TGI.122 
The government also created different organiza-
tions for funding research and technology devel-
opment activities. The National Research Council 
of Thailand (NRCT) acts, alongside its broader 
policy role, as a funding body for research. The 
Thailand Research Fund (TRF) was established in 
1992 for the sole purpose of funding research and 
strengthening the country’s research capabili-
ties.123  
4.3.3 Enhanced reform drive after the 
crisis 
Following the financial crisis there was a new 
drive to revise science and technology policy. The 
Ninth Development Plan (2002–2006) acknowl-
edges the importance of promoting collaboration 
between the public and private institutes and in-
dustries. The plan stresses the importance of sev-
eral measures designed to improve industry-
science relations, e.g. promoting incubators, en-
hancing the capability of public research insti-
tutes, facilitating career and employment opportu-
nities for researchers, strengthening the flexibility 
                                                     
122 Dhanani/ Scholtès (2002), p. 23. 
123 The Brooker Group (2002b), p. 23. 
of institutes in conducting research, development 
and transfer of technology, establishing science 
and technology networks, revising Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) mechanisms, and improv-
ing science and technology services.  
Several important reforms have been embarked 
upon to modernize the most important scientific 
institutions:  
— As outlined in Chapter 4.1.1, an interim 
NSTC has been created to advise the Cabinet 
on general strategy and policy orientation – 
for example, in the form of an Action Plan for 
S&T.124 
— In 2002 Thai universities achieved a greater 
measure of management autonomy. Yet at the 
same time they are required to enhance their 
industry orientation, e.g. to generate more in-
come from the business sector, and to mod-
ernize educational curricula and teaching 
methods in line with industry and labor mar-
ket demands. Universities are obliged to in-
clude joint research projects with industry as 
one indicator for good performance of uni-
versity teachers. As a result of this restructur-
ing process, some links between universities 
and industry, e.g. collaborative R&D, training 
activities and industry sponsorships, have al-
ready evolved. See Box 4.8 for one successful 
example of such enhanced cooperation. 
— Efforts are underway to reinforce the role of 
NSTDA and the research institutes under its 
umbrella as the leading actors involved in 
providing technological solutions for the pri-
vate sector. NSTDA is now equipped with an 
excellent infrastructure, and the newly estab-
lished Science Park will house NSTDA head-
quarters with full NSTDA services and more 
than 20 buildings which will include research 
buildings, incubators, multi-tenant buildings, 
a greenhouse, training and testing centers, pi-
lot plants and apartment buildings.125  
                                                     
124  Arnold et al. (2000), p. 32. 
125  Interview with Prof. Dr. Chachanat Thebtaranonth. See 
also Thailand Science Park at http://www.atpac.rg/ 
park.htm. 
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— The semi-public-sector institutes need to 
undergo a profound restructuring process in 
order to increase their industry orientation. 
They are scheduled to become financially 
self-sustainable after five years of operating 
time have elapsed, i.e. most of them by the 
end of 2003. Every institute is expected to 
generate sufficient income by selling its ser-
vices to cover its own operating costs, while 
continuing to provide public services. 
For all three types of research institutions – uni-
versities, NSTDA institutes and semi-public insti-
tutes – two fundamental changes are being intro-
duced by the current government: a clearer focus 
on demand orientation and the establishment of 
formal evaluation plans and procedures, with fu-
ture budgets linked closely to the achievement of 
performance targets. Besides these changes, the 
quality of scientific personnel is constantly in-
creasing due to a new generation of young Ph.D. 
Box 4.8: Industry linkages at the King Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi (KMUTT) and its 
Institute of Field Robotics (FIBO) 
One successful example of cooperation between industry and science is the Institute of Field Robotics (FIBO) that 
was established in 1995 at the King Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi (KMUTT). FIBO performs indus-
try related R&D in the field of robotics and automation technology. The institute conducts fundamental and applied 
research as well as industrial activities.  
KMUTT is the second Thai University to become a corporate university with close industry links to industry. The 
internal incentive system is designed to make the university more attractive for researchers and to enhance industry-
science linkages. Salaries at KMUTT are 1.6 times higher than those of public universities, and salaries increase 
yearly between 3-6 %, based on performance. An independent evaluation and monitoring system has been introduced, 
with performance measures linked to teaching assessments by students, publications, joint research with industry, and 
research activities that serve society as a whole, e.g. helping farmers to develop cultivation methods. KMUTT has 
more flexibility in managing its funds than the public universities in general, which allows it to adjust more flexibly 
to industry needs. Still KMUTT remains reliant on government funding, since only 10 % of its budget comes from 
the private sector.  
FIBO is known as the most successful institute at KMUTT as regards cooperation with the private sector. The insti-
tute's demand orientation is reflected in its motto: “We don’t design problems, problems design FIBO.” Conse-
quently, 80 % of FIBO's funding comes from industry and only 20 % from the government. Currently 24 joint univer-
sity – industry projects are ongoing. For example, FIBO has received funding of US$ 100,000 from the TNC Read 
Rite to solve a technical problem. The project is of mutual benefit because Read Rite expects to save up to US$ 3 
mio. in operating costs. Therefore the company not only provides funds to FIBO, it has also promised to hire several 
of its graduates. Another example is a collaboration between the manufacturing company Srithaitana Auto parts and 
FIBO to aimed at solving problems with the maintenance of old robots as well as other technical issues. In addition, 
training courses for workers and engineers are supplied by FIBO staff, and students are involved in the day-to-day 
work of the project.  
KMUTT's internal governance structure stipulates that the income of a joint research project is to be split up between 
FIBO, which can utilize 50 % for purchasing facilities etc., the individual researchers and students involved, who can 
top up their salary by 30%, and the university, which receives 20 %.  
FIBO students are required to do internships, work under one of its industry projects, and sometimes to carry out re-
search for their thesis in companies the aim being to ensure that they learn R&D through real problems facing the 
industry. FIBO has a curriculum committee that invites scientist experts and representatives of the industry. FIBO 
seeks to enhance the creation of spin-offs, although thus far only one robotic manufacturer has started up operations 
based on an idea from a research project.  
Our interview partners reported that it is quite difficult to change the university in such a way as to enable it to re-
spond to the needs of industry. For instance, Thai professors have never experienced evaluations and have never been 
required to carry out joint research to be promoted. 
Source: Interview with Dr. Djitt Laowattana (Director) and Dr. Thavida Maneewarn (Research Scientist), FIBO/ KMUTT, on 22 
March 2003.  
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and master’s graduates who had been granted 
government fellowships to study abroad and are 
now coming back to Thailand to work in public 
institutions.126 This new generation is highly 
qualified and motivated to cooperate with indus-
try, but it often lacks industry experience.  
In addition to the efforts undertaken to strengthen 
the capability of research institutes and universi-
ties, an increasing number of financial incentives 
have been created to enhance the technological 
capability of Thai firms. A recent World Bank 
study identified 47 separate schemes under the 
responsibility of the PMO, the Ministry of Fi-
nance, the MoST, the MoI, and the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Welfare. Besides these there is a 
group of promotion schemes with independent 
status, e.g. under the TRF. 
4.3.4 What remains to be done? 
Although the Thai government has taken some 
important reform steps in the right direction, sev-
eral deficiencies can be identified in the university 
system, the three NSTDA institutes and the semi-
public-sector institutions. Basically five issues 
need to be tackled: 
1. To bridge the different cultures of the public 
and private sectors, support interaction and 
enhance market-orientation of public service 
providers; 
2. To switch from a practice of government-
driven innovation to an interactive and cumu-
lative approach, with strong private-sector in-
volvement; 
3. To distinguish between public goods and pri-
vate tasks and adapt funding and incentive 
systems accordingly; 
                                                     
126  Of an estimated 3000 students who have been granted 
scholarships until now, more than 2300 returned to 
work at universities, government institutes or semi-
public institutes (Interview with Dr. Djitt Laowattana, 
Director, FIBO/ KMUTT, on March 22, 2003). 
4. To implement systematic monitoring and 
evaluation processes; and 
5. To pay more attention to Intellectual Property 
Rights. 
1. One very basic challenge is to bring the differ-
ent cultures of academia, public-sector employ-
ees and entrepreneurs closer together. Whereas 
universities and public-sector institutions often 
lack a service orientation and an understanding of 
the private sector’s needs, the private sector ne-
glects innovative efforts and has no tradition of 
making use of public research.127 Most knowl-
edge-creating institutions and programs in Thai-
land are still not sufficiently market-oriented and 
do not operate in a businesslike manner. This is 
reflected in the inability of these institutions to 
win research contracts and to generate substantial 
income from service delivery. Most institutions do 
not systematically assess demand for technologi-
cal solutions and have not established specialized 
divisions for the commercialization of research 
results. Many support programs such as the Miya-
zawa Initiative, the NSTDA-administered ITAP, 
and the ITB program under DIP are not well-
regarded by the private sector, which sees them as 
overly bureaucratic and lacking sufficiently com-
petent advisors. As a result firms are not willing to 
contribute a substantial share of the costs of these 
services (see Chapter 4.1).  
Bridging the different cultures, establishing incen-
tives for cooperation and creating spaces for pub-
lic-private interaction are therefore important 
tasks. As described above, public awareness for 
these issues has recently increased and some re-
forms are on their way, but implementation is still 
far from being satisfactory.  
— One problematic aspect is that personnel 
working in industry-related institutions is 
rarely recruited from industry and lacks pri-
vate-sector experience. In other countries, e.g. 
in Germany, technical universities require 
new professors to have a minimum of five 
years of industry experience.  
                                                     
127  The Brooker Group (2001). 
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— Low rates of labor mobility among scientists 
and researchers are a major obstacle to im-
provement of industry-science relations. To 
increase the understanding of business de-
mands, it is important to support the ex-
change of researchers between institutes and 
industry. Exposure of public researchers to 
industry, or working experiences and training 
of industry researchers in a public research 
environment, can be promoted and should be 
recognized for personal career schemes. 
Regulations governing temporary mobility, 
regarding remunerative secondary employ-
ment for scientists, and affecting academic 
entrepreneurship should be carefully scruti-
nized. As mobility also has a global dimen-
sion, international cooperations should be 
strengthened.  
- As a consequence of weak industry contacts 
on the part of scientists, there are very few 
spin-off business start-ups launched by aca-
demic staff and fresh graduates. As will be 
described in Chapter 4.4, enterprise creation is 
not sufficiently supported at universities and 
research institutions. There are only very few 
incubators in place, and they host an insignifi-
cant number of start-ups. Spin-offs can be 
seen as a central means of commercializing 
knowledge generated by public research. 
Spin-offs are firms founded either by public-
sector researchers, start-ups which have li-
censed public-sector technologies, or firms in 
which a public institution has an equity in-
vestment.  
— Cooperative education is not sufficiently es-
tablished. The concept of internships is not 
integrated in university studies, and the cur-
ricula of engineering and technical studies are 
not systematically adapted to industry needs. 
A first improvement measure would be to in-
volve industry associations in curricula de-
velopment. Although there are initiatives in 
this area, such as the cooperative curricula 
formulation in the hard disk drive industry, 
many companies still complain that technical 
and engineering studies are still too academi-
cally oriented and that they do not provide 
students with sufficient capabilities to put 
their knowledge into practice. Graduate pro-
grams should emphasize interdisciplinarity 
and joint education with private firms, e.g. 
with students working in R&D in enterprises, 
student internship programs, or cooperation 
for teaching/ training. 
— Both the public and private sector have failed 
to take note of the benefits of joint research. 
Incentives at universities and other institu-
tions should be set to give greater weight to 
joint research and technology transfer.  
2. As we have seen in Chapter 2, innovation is an 
interactive and cumulative process with numerous 
feedback-loops between firms at different stages 
of the value chain and knowledge-generating 
institutions. In Thailand many opportunities for 
innovation remain unexploited due to the lack of 
interaction in inter-firm as well as industry-
science relations. Thailand’s technology policy 
and institutional arrangements still emphasize a 
linear concept of innovation which favors research 
at public and semi-public institutions and aims at 
the subsequent transfer of the knowledge created 
to the private sector, rather than supporting inno-
vative behavior in firms and fostering interactive 
processes geared to solving technological prob-
lems (on the weakness of inter-firm linkages and 
corresponding policies, see Chapter 4.2.). It is 
therefore necessary to switch from a practice of 
government-driven innovation towards an inter-
active and cumulative approach with strong 
private-sector involvement. 
Recently a number of fiscal incentives (e.g. a 
200 % tax exemption) have been created to foster 
private-sector R&D. These incentives have sev-
eral deficiencies, particularly for SMEs: 128 
— Most promotion schemes target mainly ad-
vanced technology capabilities, defining 
R&D narrowly, both in terms of eligible ap-
plicants and the activities covered. Thus they 
do not offer sufficient incentive for most Thai 
firms, which need support to develop their 
capacity at lower technology thresholds.  
                                                     
128  Turpin et al. (2002), p. 38 ff. 
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— To access the R&D funds, firms are required 
to be included on a list of agents approved by 
MoF and NSTDA. This requirement dis-
criminates against SMEs in particular that, in 
most instances, lack the organizational flexi-
bility or constancy required for a separate 
R&D unit.  
— Most of the current R&D support schemes are 
tax- or loan-based. These are not attractive 
compared to outside grants to SMEs, which 
already face problems with their cash flow or 
in raising collateral.  
— Less than five percent of firms are aware of 
the existence of the various incentives.  
As a result, only a very small number of compa-
nies have thus far been able to make use of such 
fiscal incentives. Correspondingly, R&D and 
other technology development capabilities within 
industrial firms remain rather limited. 
3. In delivering services to the private sector, 
some scientific institutions do not clearly distin-
guish between public and private goods. Gov-
ernment and semi-public research institutes are 
expected to carry out some basic research, provide 
expensive testing facilities, act as coordinators 
and facilitators for sector-specific policy meas-
ures, etc. These are typically public goods that 
cannot be delivered to customers on a cost-
covering basis. Subsidies are therefore justified, 
and basic public funding should be provided to 
ensure that these targets are met. At the same 
time, these institutes often provide standard ser-
vices which are basically private goods. Delivery 
of such services, e.g. business consulting and sim-
ple product testing – for which users could be 
expected to pay cost-covering fees – should usu-
ally be left to private-sector companies or at least 
delivered under commercial terms. Otherwise, 
highly subsidized services may distort existing 
markets and crowd out private competitors. 
Therefore it is important to have a clear idea about 
what services have a public goods character and to 
what degree government intervention is needed. 
In Thailand this does not always seem to be the 
case. University and research institutions deliver 
many standard services almost free of charge. In 
the case of semi-public-sector institutes, the gov-
ernment now seems to be shifting to the other 
extreme, demanding full financial self-sustain-
ability five years following their foundation. This 
is neither a realistic target, nor is it justified, as 
these institutes also provide public goods. Still, it 
is appropriate to put pressure on the institutes to 
increase their efficiency and to raise their income 
from service fees. A recent evaluation shows f.i. 
that the number of participants in training courses 
is low, and there is a fair amount of unused capac-
ity (see Box 4.9 for an more detailed overview of 
the results of the evaluation).  
Box 4.9:  Results of an evaluation of three semi-public institutes in Thailand 
An evaluation of the performance and effectiveness of three semi-public institutes – the National Food Institute, the 
Thai German Institute and the Thai Productivity Institute – concluded that most customers are satisfied with the ser-
vices provided by the institutes. A significant percentage of customers had obtained and applied new skills and made 
changes in various processes resulting in higher quality, lower cost, and improved delivery. However, the evaluation 
identified four critical aspects:  
- The institutes do not focus on complementary service markets and target groups not covered by the private sec-
tor; 
- Coordination between service delivery and customer needs has to be improved;  
- Financial self-sufficiency is not likely to be achieved; 
- Evaluation efforts are not fully integrated into the planning and budgeting process. 
The operating revenues, e.g. at TGI, covered only 18.5 % of the institute's total operating expenses. TGI would 
therefore need to increase the number of participants in training courses to thirty times the current level or to raise 
prices by 1,166 % to cover its total costs, given the current cost structure and customer-paid fees. Similar figures 
were found for the other two institutes. The institutes will therefore need to reduce costs, increase capacity utiliza-
tion, raise prices, and/ or shift their focus to higher margin services to become financially independent. 
Source: Nexus Associates, Inc. (2000). 
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4. Systematic performance monitoring and 
evaluation of universities and other research insti-
tutions has not yet been fully implemented. 
Institutions need to place more emphasis on 
specifying clear objectives and indicators for 
performance measurement, establish independent 
monitoring and evaluation bodies, link results of 
evaluation to policy formulation, funding and 
implementation (see Chapter 4.1). 
5. Another indicator of weak industry-science 
relations is the limited attention given to intellec-
tual property rights (IPR). Patenting and licens-
ing of intellectual property are necessary to pro-
vide incentives for investment in R&D and to 
protect and commercialize outcomes arising from 
research. Clarification of these aspects is often a 
pre-condition for cooperation between science and 
industry. IPR can be supported by granting exclu-
sive or non-exclusive rights as well as by defining 
what can be patented. Yet most of our interview-
ees in Thai industry did not consider IPR as an 
important issue, since they were not engaged in 
R&D. Even TNCs and joint ventures with foreign 
companies neglect local innovations and mainly 
rely on turnkey technology transfer from abroad, 
e.g. through licenses. As Thailand proceeds to-
wards the creation of knowledge-based competi-
tive advantages, IPR will become a much more 
important issue calling for improved incentive 
systems and regulations for patenting and licens-
ing.  
4.4 Formation of innovative entre-
preneurs  
Entrepreneurship promotion comprises support for 
the founding of new firms, activities aimed at 
upgrading existing enterprises as well as provision 
of an environment conducive to fostering an en-
terprising society.129 Since innovations play a 
crucial role for the development and dynamic of a 
knowledge economy, it is an important policy task 
to support entrepreneurs who introduce such in-
novations to the market, generating growth. In 
                                                     
129  GTZ (undated), p. 2. 
2002, Prime Minister Thaksin proclaimed the 
ambitious goal of establishing 50,000 new enter-
prises within the next two years and announced 
the allocation of 2 billion bahts toward that end. A 
new entrepreneurs promotion board, to be chaired 
by the Minister of Industry, Somsak Thepsuthin, 
will be established in pursuit of this plan.130 Thai-
land has also recently begun to participate in the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor surveys, which 
can be used by policy-makers and implementing 
agencies as an important information and monitor-
ing tool in the pursuit of entrepreneurship promo-
tion activities as well as for benchmarking entre-
preneurship in Thailand with a view to interna-
tional experience.  
At first sight, these developments seem to suggest 
that entrepreneurship development ranks high on 
the political agenda. Nevertheless, a number of 
shortcomings of the government approach can be 
identified:  
— there is a lack of strategic orientation toward 
market creation, innovation and competitive-
ness; 
— there is a gap between political goals and 
implementing capacity;  
— some important instruments for entrepreneur-
ship development are lacking; and  
— Thailand does not use a holistic policy ap-
proach. 
Lack of strategic orientation to market crea-
tion, innovation and competitiveness. In view of 
the fact that unemployment and poverty increased 
considerably in the wake of the economic crisis of 
1997, the government set the target of creating 
50,000 new enterprises within the following two 
years. Accordingly, the main concern of this ini-
tiative appears to be rapid employment creation 
rather than the pursuit of strategic entrepreneur-
ship development by targeting enterprises which 
develop new products and services and generate 
growth. Most entrepreneurship programs (as well 
as SME support in general) provide general man-
                                                     
130  Bunyamanee (2003), p. 7.  
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agement and technical training, marketing and 
financial support for SMEs in traditional indus-
tries and are not oriented to supporting innovative 
entrepreneurs.  
The Thai rate of entrepreneurial activity is among 
the highest in the world. More than 18 % of adults 
between 18 and 64 years of age are involved in 
entrepreneurial activities in Thailand.131 SMEs are 
a very important sector of Thailand’s economy, 
and they create a large proportion of jobs, provide 
important goods and services, and contribute sig-
nificantly to development and growth. At present, 
97 % of enterprises in Thailand are SMEs, all of 
them employing fewer than fifty workers. But 
most of these “entrepreneurs” are not really inno-
vators. Setting up a new business is mainly a re-
sult of necessity, and most entrepreneurs are com-
pelled to start up their own business because they 
lack suitable alternatives to gain income as wage 
earners. In this context promotion of entrepre-
neurs with traditional business ideas may not 
contribute to increasing productivity growth and 
income and reducing poverty, because such new 
SMEs cater to already saturated markets, as is 
often the case in the informal sector. Newly es-
tablished firms may even crowd out other market 
participants or reduce the earnings of all ven-
dors.  
                                                     
131  Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2002), p. 6. 
Support programs in industrialized countries have 
therefore shifted away from mere employment 
creation and towards promotion of innovative 
enterprises as one means of fostering innovation 
and technology development and thus long-term 
growth. The economic relevance of innovative 
enterprises lies not in their creation of short-term 
employment but in their medium- to long-term 
growth potentials and the structural change to the 
economy effected by the introduction of new 
products and services as well as the creation of 
new markets, e.g. for exports. Especially in Thai-
land, where the rate of entrepreneurial activity is 
very high in traditional activities with low barriers 
to entry (in terms of the know-how and capital 
required to form a new enterprise), it is important 
to raise the ratio of innovative, growth-oriented 
business start-ups. This does not imply only pro-
motion of high-tech sectors but applies for all 
products and services involved in the creation of 
new markets, e.g. also regional or with regard to 
new target groups.132 
Gap between political goals and implementing 
capacity. The budget of 2 billion bahts earmarked 
for the creation of 50,000 new enterprises, though 
promised for 2003, has not yet been allocated to 
any institutions. In 2002 the New Entrepreneur-
ship Creation Program (NEC) (see Box 4.10) e.g., 
                                                     
132  Eckardt (2002), p. 2. 
Box 4.10: The New Entrepreneurship Creation Program (NEC) 
One prime example for the shortcomings of strategic enterprise selection is the case of NEC. Although NEC seeks to 
target senior students, fresh university graduates and researchers for enterprise creation, it is striking that most of the 
enterprises supported by NEC operate in traditional areas such as furniture, textiles, ceramics, handicrafts, etc., where 
there is no reason to expect any significant market expansion.  
This be due to the selection mechanism for the support of entrepreneurs, which mainly amounts to random selection. 
Most of NEC’s clients are persons with no initial business idea, such as unemployed persons who come to NEC in 
search of new perspectives.  
Although NEC mainly seeks to support entrepreneurs on the basis of defined target sectors, which are at present IT 
and food, these sectors do not rank prominently on their business approval list. Targeting priority sectors may be one 
way to pursue strategic orientation, but then the question is, how those areas have been selected and how they match 
up with priority sectors defined by the government. The main problem, however, consists in the lack of guidelines 
and criteria for use in selecting innovative businesses.  
Source: Interview with Ms. Petcharee Vajirakachorn from the Bureau of Industrial Enterprise Development under 
DIP, on April 2, 2003 
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which is the largest program for entrepreneurship 
creation via provision of training and other business 
development services and therefore has the main 
responsibility for implementing the target figure, has 
trained 7,450 people, 955 of whom afterwards estab-
lished their own businesses. This rate of 12.8 % 
successful enterprise creations suggests that to 
achieve the goal of 50,000 entrepreneurs, NEC, 
together with the other institutions responsible for 
entrepreneurship creation, would have to train al-
most 400,000 individuals. Altogether, these aspects 
of financing and training capacity, as well as a lack 
of applications, cast serious doubt on achievement of 
the target of 50,000 new enterprises.  
Missing elements. A look at the institutional land-
scape for entrepreneurship promotion reveals only 
a limited number of institutions devoted to entre-
preneurship creation – and lacking many instru-
ments that are in widespread and common use in 
other countries. Most programs and implementing 
institutions are still too new to allow for an as-
sessment of their quality. Figure 4.3 shows the 
different stages of an integrated entrepreneurship 
concept that ranges from early awareness-building 
to expansion of support for existing enterprises. 
The arrows underneath point to the intervention 
levels of existing institutions and programs in 
Thailand. The figure shows that only the training 
of entrepreneurs appears to be more or less inten-
sively covered, while it is striking that especially 
the initial stages of entrepreneurship creation and 
follow-up support for new businesses are miss-
ing. 
Most of our interview partners complained that 
the Thai education system does not concentrate on 
promotion of entrepreneurship. The education 
system in Thailand has traditionally been an-
chored in a teacher-oriented philosophy, with 
Figure 4.3: Promotion levels in business creation 
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learning by rote one of its fundamental character-
istics.133 Since the Education Reform Act in 1999, 
many reform efforts have been undertaken in 
Thailand which put emphasis on lifelong learning 
and initiate a learner-centered approach. The Min-
istry of Education plays a pivotal role in this re-
form process and sets initiatives geared to intro-
ducing entrepreneurship elements into the educa-
tion system. But Thailand's “entrepreneurship 
culture” still appears to be quite underdeveloped, 
and our interview partners noted that setting up 
one’s own business is not considered to be a valu-
able goal. Unlocking the entrepreneurial potential 
in Thai society calls for a long-term education 
policy and awareness-building for society as a 
whole which promotes the values of independ-
ence, self initiative, creativity, etc.  
New projects such as the innovation awards initi-
ated by the Innovation Development Fund (IDF) 
are steps in the right direction. One of the mis-
sions of IDF is to use awards, public relations, and 
training programs to support an “innovation cul-
ture.” The IDF has initiated several annual awards 
such as the „Thailand Innovation Award“ at the 
university level or the „Samart Innovation Award" 
for to ICT projects. Such award programs and 
start-up competitions are among the newest in-
struments for enterprise creation and are espe-
cially suited to selecting promising business ideas. 
They target innovative start-ups with high market 
potential, i. e. those enterprises which have been 
described above as strategically important. The 
initiatives can be designed in different ways: They 
can promote innovative business ideas in general 
or concentrate on sectors such as e-business, mul-
timedia or biotechnology; they can be designed as 
business plan competitions that target entrepre-
neurs prior to the establishment of a business; or 
they may give support for the drafting of a busi-
ness plan. In Germany, for instance, in 2002 there 
were 82 awards and start-up competitions organ-
ized by universities, public institutions, as well as 
private initiatives, e.g. by banks or newspapers. In 
contrast, in Thailand there are very few initiatives 
                                                     
133  GTZ (undated), p. 6. 
similar to the IDF awards. More such award pro-
grams and start-up competitions should be initiated. 
Deficiencies with regard to entrepreneurship are 
also reflected at the level of universities and 
RTOs. Our interviews at such institutions revealed 
that very few new spin-offs emerge from these 
institutions, and the percentage of start-ups by 
university graduates and academic staff, the most 
promising target group for the promotion of inno-
vative enterprises, is very low in comparison to 
total enterprise creation. This can in part be traced 
back to the education system, which not only does 
not promote entrepreneurship but is also ham-
pered by a lack of infrastructure at the university 
level. Thai universities still have neither estab-
lished technology transfer offices nor specialized 
chairs for business creation, which are common 
phenomena in OECD countries. 
In a similar vein, there are also a very limited 
number of incubators in Thailand. Two examples 
of existing incubators are the Software Park Thai-
land and the Thailand IC Design Incubator (TIDI). 
The Software Park Thailand is a government 
agency under NSTDA, which was established as 
part of the National Information Technology Plan. 
The Software Park works as a support center for 
the Thai Software industry, and one of its main 
roles is to serve as an incubator of software entre-
preneurs during their start-up period. In 2002, 20 
of 60 applicant start-up companies were accepted 
at the Software Park. Of these 20, two are already 
producing for export, three more are expected to 
be successful, but the rest will probably fail. In 
2003 there were already 200 applicants, and 40 
companies were selected. The candidates are se-
lected for their business potential, which is as-
sessed by a panel interview with applicants. Sub-
sequently, their business skills are improved by 
training. Other services include facilitation of 
technical infrastructure, legal services, ICT infra-
structure, conference rooms, training rooms etc.134 
The Software Park has no own funding mecha-
                                                     
134  Interview with Dr. Rom Hiranpruk, Director of Software 
Park, on March 21, 2003; see also: www.swpark.th.or 
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nisms and works mostly with venture capital from 
abroad  
Another example is the Thailand IC Design Incu-
bator (TIDI), initiated by NECTEC. TIDI’s vision 
is to provide an IC Design infrastructure and to 
help Thailand’s Design Community in world-class 
IC product and development.135 One if its main 
functions is to serve as a small-scale self-suf-
ficient facility to support in-house design and 
local IC start-ups, as one way of strengthening IC 
design capability for strategic projects. Although 
TIDI focuses on one sector of great importance 
for the upgrading of the Thai electronics industry 
(see the chapter on electronics), its impact is still 
limited, and it has thus far hosted only one start-
up company. However, the introduction of tech-
nology and start-up centers is a very important 
measure in support of innovative businesses and 
should be used more widely in Thailand. Such 
centers and incubators should also be set up at or 
closely tied to universities and target additional 
promising innovative sectors (see Box 4.11). 
Moreover, funding is still a major problem in 
Thailand, a fact which is also reflected in a lack of 
financial infrastructure that rewards profitable 
business innovations such as Thai venture capital 
                                                     
135 Interview with Mr. Chumnarn Punyasai, Researcher at 
the IC Design Section of TIDI, on March 7, 2003; see 
also: www.tidi.nectec.or.th. 
companies. In our interviews, Thai start-ups were 
found to need about ten times the amount of 
money they were able to obtain. On a concluding 
note, entrepreneurship creation in Thailand is 
characterized by a lack of spin-offs, business an-
gel networks, technology centers and incubators. 
Consequently, university graduates in Thailand 
frequently prefer to work for the public sector or 
large, mainly foreign, companies.  
Lack of a holistic approach. International ex-
perience from SME development programs sug-
gests that none of the above-mentioned policy 
instruments alone can offer a solution; and that the 
actors involved in entrepreneurship creation 
should not necessarily be multiplied but better 
coordinated and focused. An integrated entrepre-
neurship development strategy is needed that in-
cludes the whole range of policy instruments and 
organization of support institutions in networks 
offering complementary and coordinated serv-
ices.  
Furthermore, funding should be allocated more 
often through public tenders and competitive bid-
ding. This implies that the implementing agencies 
would have to present their promotion concepts 
and compete with each other to obtain public fi-
nance. One way to successfully promote coopera-
tion and networking among different institutions, 
such as universities, business associations, banks, 
venture capital funds and business angel net-
Box 4.11:  Technology and Start-up Centers 
The term technology and start-up centers is used as a generic term, refers to the instruments of e.g. incubators or 
technology parks, and is defined as entrepreneurial centers hosting young and newly established businesses for a 
certain period of time. The businesses located in such centers are mainly engaged in the development, production, 
and marketing of technologically new products and services and profit from extensive support by the technology 
and start-up center. 
These centers mostly focus on knowledge- and technology-intensive enterprises and are often linked directly to 
universities. They offer technologically well-equipped premises at moderate cost. Furthermore, they provide access 
to networks of consultants, investors, business angels, and big companies. 
The concept of technology and start-up centers is widespread at international level. The governments of Taiwan, 
Australia, Ireland, and the UK have explicitly included establishment of technology and start-up centers in their 
SME and entrepreneurship promotion policies. In 2001, the UK e.g. set up a “Business Incubation Fund” with a 
budget of more than 75 million pounds, and approximately 800 technology and start-up centers have been estab-
lished in the USA so far. 
Source: Eckardt (2002), pp. 23-30. 
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works, would be to allocate funds only to groups 
of applicants. This may lead to joint projects un-
dertaken by public-private partnerships. In this 
context, the experiences with EXIST Regions136 in 
Germany (see Box 4.12) could serve as a role 
model for the most important organizational char-
acteristics of such networks. 
Conclusion. Altogether, Thailand displays many 
promising starting points for an effective promo-
tion of innovative entrepreneurs. There is a high 
rate of enterprise creation in the economy, and the 
government’s attention has shifted towards pro-
motion of entrepreneurs and SMEs. Furthermore, 
the education system has become more supportive 
of an enterprise culture, and there are important 
new initiatives in place, such as the introduction 
of award programs to raise awareness and to ad-
                                                     
136  See www.exist.de 
dress people with innovative ideas. As outlined in 
the above chapter on industry-science relations, 
Thailand’s scientific infrastructure is improving; it 
consists of public research institutions and univer-
sities that offer high potential, especially for the 
introduction of technology and start-up centers 
and promotion of networking. The task ahead is 
therefore to redirect programs towards promotion 
of entrepreneurs who use innovation to seize mar-
ket opportunities. 
Box 4.12:  The “EXIST – University-based start-ups” program 
The EXIST program is based on four principles: 
- establishment of a permanent “culture of entrepreneurship” in teaching, research and administration at universi-
ties, 
- consistent translation of academic research findings into economic wealth creation, 
- targeted encouragement of the great potential for business ideas and start-up personalities at universities and re-
search institutions, 
- a marked rise in the number of innovative start-ups and the creation of new and secure jobs. 
EXIST's aim is to improve the start-up climate at universities and increase the number of start-ups from academic 
institutions. Different ways of motivating, training and supporting entrepreneurial personalities have been tried out 
in regional networks. In these networks, universities work together with external partners from academia, industry, 
and public institutions, such as extra-university research institutions, companies, capital donors, technology and 
start-up centers, management consultancies, chambers of commerce, associations and local authorities. These part-
ners jointly develop an integrated program designed to encourage students, employees and graduates to engage in 
innovative start-ups. 
EXIST was initiated by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research in 1997 as a competition of ideas. 
What was envisaged wascooperation between at least three different partners from a region, including an institution 
of higher education. In total, over 200 institutions of higher education took part, submitting 109 outlines of ideas for 
regional networks. An independent panel selected five model regions in a two-stage procedure. 450 new enterprises 
have been created in those five regions so far. However, the objective of the program is not only to augment the 
number of start-ups but also to change the image of entrepreneurship at universities and research institutions. 
Since the summer of 2002, ten additional regional networks have been received supported in the EXIST framework. 
They are given financial support amounting approximately to a total of 10 million euros and profit from the know-
how and experiences of the existing five model regions. 
Source:  www.exist.de 
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5 Sector studies 
In the following case studies, the electrical and 
electronics manufacturing and the shrimp-
farming sectors are analyzed with regard both to 
the challenges they face in building knowledge-
based competitive advantages and the contribution 
of the NIS. The two sectors have been selected 
because they are important for the Thai economy, 
represent a broad spectrum of economic activities, 
and are both confronted with the need to upgrade 
technologically. Both sectors are faced with grow-
ing competition from neighboring countries and 
are marked by a lack of the policy vision needed 
to guide sectoral development. However, they also 
differ in various aspects: First, looking at the sec-
toral structure, the shrimp sector is dominated by 
a nationally-based lead firm which governs the 
major segments of the value chain, while the elec-
trical and electronics sector displays a dualistic 
structure, with TNCs and SMEs focusing on dif-
ferent market segments. Second, there are immi-
nent challenges bound up with the ecological and 
health-related (e.g. antibiotics) problems involved 
in shrimp-farming as well as with technological 
upgrading and creation of inter-firm linkages for 
electronics manufacturing. Thirdly, and as a result 
of the above, the NIS for both sectors address 
different issues, with varying degrees of determi-
nation and success: Whereas, for instance, indus-
try-science relations are making significant con-
tributions to solving the problems of ecological 
and economic sustainability in the shrimp sector 
(e.g. research on the domestication of broodstock, 
eco-efficient production methods), such collabora-
tions in the electrical and electronics sector are 
still limited to a few pilot projects. The following 
sector studies will address these issues and conse-
quently place different emphases on specific in-
novation policies. 
5.1 The electrical and electronics 
industry 
The electrical and electronics sector is Thailand’s 
biggest export earner and hence important to its 
economy. The sector is marked by a dualistic 
structure: While foreign companies manufacture 
high-technology products for export markets, the 
bulk of local SMEs focus on the domestic market 
in lower-technology segments. Due to the techno-
logical gap, few vertical linkages exist between 
the two. The sector faces competitive pressure 
both from more advanced countries such as Ma-
laysia and low-cost countries such as Vietnam and 
China. Therefore the Thai electrical and electron-
ics industry will either be able to upgrade itself 
and thus remain attractive for foreign investors or 
risk losing its market shares. However, since 
Thailand exhibits significant potentials, the sector 
is not bound to become an economically irrelevant 
“sunset industry” if political support can be 
gained and four imminent challenges tackled: 
policy formulation, human resource development, 
technological upgrading, and linkage creation and 
embedding. 
5.1.1 Relevance for the economy, 
characteristics and profile of the 
industry 
The electrical and electronics sector is important 
for the national economy as it contributes 4 % to 
the country’s GDP, employs a workforce of more 
than 400,000 and accounts for nearly 35 % of 
Thailand’s exports. With exports amounting to 
US$ 23.6 billion in 2000, it is Thailand’s biggest 
export earner, with a positive trade balance of 
US$ 6.2 billion (for further specification of ex-
ports according to product categories, see Table 
5.1.).137 Furthermore, the sector has attracted US$ 
17 billion of FDI, and accounts for roughly 20 % 
of yearly investment inflows. 138 
For Thailand it is useful to distinguish between 
the electrical and consumer electronics segment 
and the electronic component and com-
puter/peripherals segment. The former displays a 
higher involvement of local companies. Firstly, 
local SMEs serve the needs of the domestic mar-
ket in lower-tech product segments such as rice 
                                                     
137  McKinsey (2002), p. 171. 
138  Sudjit (2001). 
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cookers, lighting equipment, fans and radios. Sec-
ondly, many joint ventures have been set up be-
tween Thai and – mainly – Japanese companies in 
both electrical appliances and consumer electron-
ics. Pursuit of an import-substituting industrial-
ization strategy in the 1960s and early 1970s and 
the use of local content requirements enabled local 
companies to benefit from technology introduced 
by their foreign partners. In this segment vertical 
linkages have been developed to some extent, and 
local suppliers play a significant role depending 
on whether the markets served are export or do-
mestic markets. Notwithstanding the dominant 
technological role of foreign joint venture partners 
in the electrical and consumer electronics seg-
ment, a number of large local companies have 
been able to develop own technologies and export 
their products to regional markets, particularly air-
conditioners and refrigerators. 
In contrast, the electronic component and com-
puter parts segment is dominated almost entirely 
by TNCs. Since the mid-1970s Thailand has fo-
cused on export-oriented production. In pursuing 
this strategy, generous investment incentives were 
handed out to TNCs who came in to take advan-
tage of cheap labor costs to perform labor-
intensive assembly tasks. Export production in 
Thailand focuses on electronic components such 
as integrated circuits (IC) and printed circuit 
boards (PCB) as well as computer parts such as 
hard disk drives (HDD). In this segment the sup-
plier base is very weak as the technological gap 
between TNCs and local companies is too wide, 
and only a few companies are qualified to meet 
the demands of TNCs in terms of quality, cost, 
delivery, and service.139 Such successful local 
companies are mostly engaged in subcontracting 
assembly (e.g. Hana Semiconductor, NS Electron-
ics) or in supplying low-technology products such 
as simple metal parts, tools, packaging etc. Thus 
the electronics segment is not embedded in the 
Thai economy and has consequently been de-
scribed as a “high technology enclave”.140 
With TNCs carrying out labor-intensive assembly 
activities in Thailand, and the country lacking a 
deep supplier base, national value added in the 
electronics segment is rather low, estimated to be 
                                                     
139  The World Bank (2000) has carried out a benchmarking 
study which showed Thai microelectronics companies 
lagging behind best international practices in most as-
pects (rejection rate, customer contact time, equipment 
age etc.).  
140  Doner/ Brimble (1998). 
Table 5.1.: Composition of the sector and export value in 2000  
Product categories Exports in US$ billion 
Electronic Components 
 Semiconductors 
 PCB/ PCB Assembly 
 Other parts (resistors, transistors, micromotors) 
 9.5 
 4.8 
 1.1 
 3.6 
Computer and peripherals 
 Hard disk drives and parts 
 Monitors and parts 
 Printers and parts 
 Peripherals 
 7.9  
 5.0 
 1.2 
 1.1 
 0.6 
Consumer Electronics (e.g. TVs, VCRs, radios, microwaves)  3.6 
Electrical Household Appliances (e.g. AC, refrigerators, washing  
machines) 
 1.4 
Telecom and office equipment (faxes, telephones, photocopiers)  0.9 
Source: McKinsey (2002), p.174 
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around 10-15 %.141 More value-creating activities 
such as design, product engineering and R&D are 
carried out offshore and then imported. Also, 
more sophisticated components and raw materials 
are imported, leading to a very low import content 
(85-95 %).142  
Given Thailand’s limited technological capabili-
ties and specialization in mass production/assem-
bly and testing, it faces competitive pressure from 
two sides. Competing in factors such as quality, 
flexible production and design capabilities, tech-
nologically-advanced countries such as Malaysia 
and Singapore currently attract the more value-
added, technology-intensive investments. Singa-
pore has achieved competitive advantages in high-
quality engineering services and complementary 
business services, for instance regional coordina-
tion of supply chains and financial services.143 
Malaysia has gained a reputation for its abilities in 
flexible mass production, for the emergence there 
                                                     
141  According to an Electronics Cluster Study, national value 
added in the main product categories of electronics are 
20% in HDD (because of a longer supply chain, with 
many TNCs producing in Thailand), 10% in IC assem-
bly, and 20-30% in PCB (BUILD 2001). 
142  Konishi (2001), Wipplinger (2000), p. 4. 
143  Best (2001), p. 44. 
of a locally owned supplier base (especially in 
machine-tooling), and the incipient incorporation 
of design activities in manufacturing.144 
From below, latecomer countries such as Vietnam 
and China are now competing in cost advantages. 
Catching up technologically, these countries can 
perform labor-intensive mass production similar 
to that currently carried out in Thailand (see Table 
5.2. for an illustration of the regional division of 
labor). China in particular poses a threat since its 
large, expanding domestic market offers compa-
nies economies of scale. Thus Thailand is in dan-
ger of having its production sites relocated a well 
as of attracting fewer investments.  
5.1.2 Opportunities 
Currently, Thailand is worried about competition 
from China. However, if it comes to realize its 
lack of ability to compete on factor costs, it could 
move to a new strategic outlook: Rather than try-
ing to compete in labor-intensive mass produc-
tion, in seeking chances to sustain its electrical 
and electronics sector Thailand's will have to give 
                                                     
144  Rasiah (1998). 
Table 5.2: Thailand’s “sandwich position” illustrated by the regional production facilities of the American 
transnational company Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) 
Location Activity  
Singapore 
IC design 
Testing of highly sophisticated processors 
Failure and device analysis 
Penang, Malaysia Developing  design packages for advanced logic and memory devices 
Assembly and testing of memory and logic devices 
Bangkok, Thailand Assembly of plastic parts 
Testing, marking and packing of logic and memory products 
Suzhou, China Assembly and testing of cost-sensitive high-volume devices  
Distribution 
 
 
 Increasing 
 knowledge  
 content 
Source: http://www.amd.com, Interview with Yuthana Hemungkorn, Managing Director, AMD Thailand, 31 March 
2003 
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some thought to entering higher, knowledge-based 
market segments currently occupied by Malaysia 
and Singapore. Pursuit of such a strategy hold 
promises of higher investments, introduction of 
modern technologies and development of deeper 
inter-firm linkages. Industry trends render this 
optimistic scenario plausible: TNCs, while con-
centrating on product development, design and 
marketing, outsource manufacturing services to 
specialized subassemblers and contract manufac-
turers. At the same time, flexible production ca-
pabilities are required, i.e. supply of customized 
products in small batches on short notice, which 
calls for rapid development of designs and solu-
tions. This in turn increases the need for a local 
supplier base capable of quickly providing spe-
cialized tools and parts. 
Specialization in high-end activities and tighten-
ing labor markets are increasing cost pressure in 
Singapore and Malaysia. As a result, there is 
scope for Thailand to attract relocations and have 
manufacturing and supplementary services con-
ducted in the country. Thailand displays several 
potentials which make the strategy of entering 
more knowledge-intensive markets realistic: There 
are over 835 companies in the electrical and elec-
tronics sector,145 and a number of TNCs have 
invested in modern production facilities. The Thai 
workforce has acquired a lot of experience in per-
forming medium-skill assembly activities and 
production engineering. In addition, Thailand can 
still compete in cost efficiency and reasonable 
wages for higher-skilled labor (see Table 5.3.). 
 
                                                     
145  Sudjit (2001). 
Opportunities for Thai companies are therefore 
manifold (see Table 5.4), and all such chances 
require an upgrading of existing capabilities. In 
the electronics segment, becoming parts suppliers 
and subcontractors to large Original Equipment 
Manufacturing (OEM) companies is a realistic 
option, as the latter are increasingly interested in 
procuring parts locally. This trend is largely due 
to more customized demand, but also due to the 
devaluation of the baht. The supporting industries 
path, which consists of supplies of high quality 
machine-tooling, mould & dies, plastic and metal 
parts, is worth pursuing. Engaging in supplier 
relations, however, demands capabilities in tech-
nology management and, increasingly, design and 
reengineering. 
Both near-term and future opportunities may be 
seen in chip design activities, which are increas-
ingly in demand. This market segment is particu-
larly attractive because the value added in design 
is high. Given the number of well-educated chip 
designers and companies in IC and PCB manufac-
turing, IC and PCB design as well as embedded 
systems represent a hitherto untapped market. 
In the electrical parts and appliances segment, 
there is a potential for innovative Thai companies 
to design and manufacture niche market products 
and to create their own brands. Companies en-
gaged in Own Design Manufacturing (ODM) and 
Own Brand Manufacturing (OBM) can serve both 
domestic and regional export markets. Examples 
of promising markets are found in the fields of 
energy-saving technology and products requiring 
adaptation to local environments (air-condition-
ing, PABX switchers, uninterrupted power sup-
plies etc.). 
Table 5.3.: Labor costs in the hard disk drive industry in US$/ month, 1999 
 China Thailand Malaysia Singapore 
Direct labor 75 170 205 390 
Engineers 170 425 680 1,290 
Source:  Panichapat (1999) 
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5.1.3 Challenges 
Keeping the electrical and electronics industry 
competitive and tapping these opportunities re-
quires a concerted drive that puts technological 
upgrading and embedding of the TNC-driven 
export sector at the heart of the agenda. Since the 
country currently lacks political commitment, the 
first of four impending challenges is thus policy 
formulation, i.e. formulating a shared vision and 
implementing jointly designed programs. These 
need to address the remaining challenges in the 
fields of human resource development, techno-
logical upgrading, and linkage creation and em-
bedding.  
Policy formulation. The sector currently suffers 
from benign neglect by the government. It has not 
been included as one of the five priority clusters, a 
fact that indicates that the government – due to 
low local content, value added, and indigenous 
technological capabilities – regards electronics as 
a “sunset industry” that is losing its competitive 
advantages. How little attention it receives from 
the National Competitiveness Committee and the 
Ministry of Industry is reflected in the slow pro-
gress that has been made in revamping the tax and 
tariff structure, bringing national standards to 
international levels and supporting private-sector 
initiatives within the sector (more below). 
Even though a Master Plan of Electrical Appli-
ance, Electronics and Information Technology 
was produced in 1998, it does not provide a com-
monly shared vision and a specific action plan. 
Despite some initial private-sector enthusiasm for 
formulating a plan that would guide the sector’s 
development, this involvement has gradually 
faded. Today there is no ownership for a plan that 
is widely regarded as neither providing a guiding 
vision nor focusing the efforts of sectoral players. 
More often than not, it sets very general, ambi-
tious strategies (“To increase the value-added 
processes of the Thai portion of assembly and 
production,” “Initiating Thai-owned brand names 
and aggressive marketing plans”), but without 
specifying the actions that need to be taken to 
achieve these goals. At the same time, commonly 
identified bottlenecks such as international stan-
dards certification are not even mentioned in the 
Table 5.4: Opportunities for Thailand’s electrical and electronics sector 
 Domestic market Export market 
Customer-specific PCB/IC design and embedded 
systems 
X (X) 
Precision engineering (high quality tools, moulds and 
dies, jigs and fixtures) 
X (X) 
High quality plastics and metal parts (for casings, 
keyboards etc.) 
X X 
Indirect materials (foam, cardboard, packaging, print-
ing manuals). 
 X 
Subassemblies  
(mass manufacturing on a contract basis for transna-
tional customers)  
 X 
Electrical components (customized transformers, 
capacitors, uninterrupted power supplies, PABX 
switchers, energy saving devices, adapters 
X (X) 
Electrical Appliances (AC, refrigerators) X X 
Consumer Electronics (TVs, VCRs, radios) X X 
Source: own interviews; X denotes current opportunity, (X) denotes future opportunity 
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plan. Furthermore, the drafting of the plan was not 
based on systematic benchmarking or foresight.146  
The lack of political support and orientation can 
be attributed to the inability of industry players to 
find a common platform and to jointly address the 
government. On the one hand, TNCs are pursuing 
their goals independently of industry associations 
such as the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI). 
They address the government directly, mostly 
through foreign chambers of commerce or through 
their own industry association, the Electronics and 
Computer Employers Association (ECEA). Con-
sequently, the FTI and its Electrical and Electron-
ics Club do not represent the whole sector and 
therefore have only limited lobbying power. In the 
same vein, the Electrical and Electronics Institute 
(EEI), the main sectoral institution with a net-
working role, focuses solely on the electrical 
segment, with almost no interaction with foreign 
companies engaged in the electronics segment. 
This failure to join forces politically reflects just 
how little embedded the whole sector is.  
Given the limited lobbying power of the private 
sector and the lack of communication between 
sector agents, policy support is generally thought 
to be weak. Other countries show how public- and 
private-sector efforts can create sector dynamics. 
For example, Malaysia has used a region-based 
cluster approach and installed something akin to a 
cluster manager responsible for creating networks 
(both horizontally and vertically) that involve 
local and foreign companies147 as well as institu-
tions in finance and education. Closely cooperat-
ing with TNCs and focusing on technology man-
agement and skill formation, the region of Penang 
has succeeded in creating a regional innovation 
                                                     
146  One positive development is the technology foresight 
project for the electronics and electrical industry decided 
upon by the MoI, which might be able to identify prom-
ising technological targets within the sector. 
147  Best (2001, p. 73) emphasizes the importance of target-
ing „entrepreneurial firms“ to drive regional growth. 
Such firms are characterized by high technological ca-
pabilities and the capacity to create many niche markets 
for SMEs in complementary areas, e.g. product devel-
opment, supply of parts or after-sales services.  
cluster that involves a growing local supplier 
base.148 
Even though Thailand is pursuing cluster ap-
proaches, surprisingly little has materialized on 
the ground in the country. And this despite the 
existence of several clusters (such as the PCB 
assembly cluster in Lampoon Province) that 
would provide an ideal ground for such network-
ing. A strategic political initiative and convincing 
targeting of key foreign companies might there-
fore prove beneficial for stimulating regional in-
novation clusters. 
Human resource development. Electrical and 
electronics companies in Thailand generally per-
form low- to medium-skill activities. Most of 
these are in assembly, but not in high-value-added 
production and services. Capabilities to design 
new products or production technologies are to a 
large extent lacking. Hence the scope for value-
added activities is limited.  
Thailand faces a pronounced labor shortage, par-
ticularly as regards qualified technicians and en-
gineers with high-end capabilities in design as 
well as in research and development. This despite 
claims that 60,000 electronic and electrical tech-
nicians and engineers are being trained annual-
ly,149 and the statements of some TNCs that they 
have no difficulties in hiring qualified labor. The 
human resource problem is bound up with with 
quality, which is of particular concern to SMEs 
interested in engaging in design activities or be-
coming suppliers to foreign companies.150 These 
shortcomings are a result of low regard for train-
ing in firms and the fact that vocational training 
and engineer education in public institutions is 
insufficiently oriented towards the needs of the 
industry. The latter include independent problem 
solving, application of theoretical knowledge to 
industrial processes, capabilities in electrical, me-
chanical and software engineering, and creativity 
in design.  
                                                     
148  Best (2001), p. 52. 
149  Wanapha (2002). 
150  McKinsey (2002), p. 179. 
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This situation is beginning to change: At the firm 
level, companies are increasingly setting up in-
house training facilities. Also, there is a trend to 
spend more company money on training. Micro-
electronics companies’ expenses rose from 3.7 % 
to 4.8 % from 1995-2000.151 However, such in-
creases are not sufficient if these companies in-
tend to increase their global competitiveness. At 
the institutional level, higher education institu-
tions and training programs are not yet systemati-
cally and broadly linked to the private sector. 
Even though a few initiatives in cooperative edu-
cation are being introduced to universities such as 
Kasetsart University or the King Mongkut Insti-
tutes of North Bangkok and Ladkrabang, these are 
only pilot projects. It is necessary to incorporate 
such industry-science cooperation schemes in 
operational routines of institutions of higher edu-
cation. 
A systematic approach to human resource and 
skills development needs to be highly demand-
oriented and coordinated with the private sector. 
A best practice model can be found in Malaysia, 
where the Penang Skills Development Center 
(PSDC, see Box 5.1) displays how regional 
growth dynamics can be linked with skills forma-
tion. A key success factor of the Penang model 
lies in closely incorporating foreign companies in 
the management of the training center, thus ensur-
ing a skills development that matches the indus-
try's needs. As a result, the Penang region has 
                                                     
151  According to the Thailand R&D and Innovation Survey, 
20 of 26 firms have a separate human resource devel-
opment unit. 
been able to upgrade its operations and is now in 
possession of a vibrant local supplier base.  
In comparison, skills development in Thailand 
consists of isolated initiatives that lack an inte-
grated approach. Nevertheless, a number of initia-
tives and institutions stand out for their close co-
operation with industry in skills development and 
training efforts. The Thai-German Institute (TGI), 
for instance, provides training in fields such as 
tool & die technology, automation technology etc., 
using high-tech precision machinery, state-of-the-
art equipment and a learning-by-doing teaching 
philosophy.152 A further example is the joint estab-
lishment of the Ayutthaya Technical Training Cen-
ter (ATTC) by the Hi-Tech Industrial Estate and 
the King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology North 
Bangkok (KMIT-NB), which conducts training and 
assists companies in recruitment.153 Pointing in a  
 
                                                     
152  Interview with Walter Kretschmar (Director, TGI) and 
Dr. Michael Grosse (SME Development Project, TGI), 
25 March 2003; http://www.tgi.or.th. 
153  It has received training equipment and new technology 
from a number of Japanese companies, led by Canon 
Ltd. In 1996 the Mitutoyo Corporation donated about 
30 million bahts worth of precision instruments and 
measuring equipment for the Mitutoyo-ATTC Metrol-
ogy Center. While still only at the vocational level, the 
ATTC offers the potential for KMIT-NB to interact 
with private companies and identify their longer-term 
training needs. At the same time, private firms can ac-
cess a range of university services beyond the training 
provided by the ATTC. The Brooker Group (2002a), p. 
18. 
Box 5.1:  Penang Skills Development Center 
The Penang Skills Development Center (PSDC) was established in 1989 with a mission “to be a resource for the 
promotion of the shared learning for manufacturing and service industries by providing proactive human resource 
initiatives to strategically support and strengthen business requirements.” A joint initiative of the State Government 
of Penang, the Penang Development Corporation and 24 TNCs, this training institution is led by the industry. In-
volvement of private-sector representatives, especially from foreign companies, in the management council and 
joint development of curricula ensure that the needs of the regional electronics cluster are being served. With a 
membership of over 80 companies, and courses offered for over 8,000 students and employees a year, the PSDC 
has not only contributed to the upgrading of existing companies but also to technology diffusion to local SMEs. 
Thus it not only serves as an example of how a local supplier base can be formed, it also shows how foreign com-
panies can be brought in to contribute to the development of local industries. 
Source:  Rasiah (1998), Best (1999) 
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similar direction, the Asian Institute of Technology 
(AIT) and IDEMA, the association of the hard-
disk drive industry, have developed a training 
program specific to the industry and issue a Cer-
tificate of Competence in Storage Technology (for 
more details on IDEMA, see Section 4.6).  
Technological upgrading. To tap the market 
opportunities described above, technological up-
grading needs to take place at the firm and sector 
level. Firstly, at the firm level, process and prod-
uct upgrading with regard to quality, just-in-time 
delivery, technology intensity, product differentia-
tion, design capacity etc. is crucial for Thai SMEs. 
Only then will they be able to make themselves 
available to international value chains, create 
linkages and thereby embed the sector.154 Sec-
ondly, enhanced capabilities at the firm level 
would pave the way for intra-chain upgrading. 
More functions of value chains could be shifted to 
Thailand: technologically-complex production, 
mass customization, product design and R&D 
activities etc. As a consequence, the profile of 
Thailand’s electrical and electronics sector would 
more resemble Singapore’s or Malaysia’s. This 
upgrading of the value chain requires organiza-
tional changes in companies’ operations as well as 
intensified inter-firm linkages and industry-
science relations.  
However, the necessary upgrading drive is prov-
ing slow in getting on its way. On the one hand, 
many Thai SMEs do not realize the urgency of the 
need to upgrade. Their complacency is only rein-
forced by Thai consumers, who emphasizing 
price, not quality, thus providing little incentive 
for product differentiation.155 At the same time, 
the Thailand Industrial Standards Institute (TISI), 
the agency responsible for setting standards, has 
set only 11 mandatory standards for electrical 
                                                     
154 Upgrading and linkage creation/ embedding are dialecti-
cally related, since upgrading is a precondition for creat-
ing vertical linkages with TNCs. On the other hand, link-
age creation is expected to contribute to upgrading as 
technology is transferred to local companies. Therefore 
these notions cannot always be strictly separated. 
155 Interview Chotiwutti Innada (Industrial Engineer, BSID), 
14 March 2003. 
products safety and quality. Given the varying 
quality requirements in domestic and export mar-
kets, local companies find it difficult to compete 
internationally, and this compounds the dualistic 
structure of the sector. Some private-sector agents 
in Thailand have realized that the issue of quality 
and standards is hampering industrial develop-
ment. For example, the FTI is planning to launch 
a quality mark (Q-mark) which could help com-
panies to command premium prices in the domes-
tic market. The EEI envisages introducing an EEI 
“test-mark” for quality products that comply with 
standards higher than the mandatory domestic 
standards set by TISI. 
On the other hand, the technological environment 
in Thailand is not yet conducive, and institutional 
support is rated insufficient by private-sector 
agents. There are still too few clear government 
incentives, public-sector programs resemble 
patchwork, are supply-driven, and have low out-
reach or limited capacity. For instance, even 
though the government is supporting a drive to 
achieve greater quality and reliability of Thai 
SME products by subsidizing consultancy ser-
vices for companies seeking ISO certification, the 
outreach of these projects is rather low, any only 
51 companies have benefited from the scheme.156  
Another example, the EEI Testing Center (EEI-
TC) is a well-regarded institution that tests prod-
ucts for their compliance with safety or electro-
magnetic compatibility standards. However, it is 
not endowed with the technical and financial re-
sources (e.g. for new testing equipment) that it 
needs to meet national demand for such ser-
vices.157 More testing facilities are needed because 
tests related to improving new products or mate-
rial tests are crucial for product innovation, and 
few such service providers exist. Further reflect-
ing the lack of strategic outlook, TISI has been 
slow to obtain international accreditation, so that 
                                                     
156  NSTDA (2002), p. 8. 
157  According to Katiya Greigarn, Vice-Chairman of the FTI 
Electrical, Electronics & Allied Industry Club, the EEI-
TC had a budget of 30 million bahts, while it would need 
1,000 million bahts to buy testing equipment (Interview, 
14 March 2003). 
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the EEI-TC and other institutions are unable to 
issue international standard certificates.158 As a 
result, local companies have to pay high fees to 
international agencies to get certification for their 
products.  
The contribution of public RTOs to technological 
upgrading is not yet at a sufficient level and has 
not lived up to its actual potential, given the im-
pressive infrastructure at the Science Park. For 
example, NECTEC, a main player in the scientific 
landscape, is in the process of coordinating its 
research activities more closely with industry. 
Currently, there are interesting cooperation proj-
ects with foreign companies, focusing on latest 
technology such as laser diodes or nano-techno-
logy. Furthermore, NECTEC is pursuing a push in 
IC design capabilities and has set up the Thailand 
IC Design Incubator (TIDI), which aims at provid-
ing infrastructure and design services for local 
companies. Such research in generic technologies 
as well as related efforts in IC design point in the 
right direction of successful industry-science rela-
tions and calls for further public support.  
However, a focus on what one interviewee de-
scribed as “fancy technology” will have its price if 
local SMEs are neglected. This may inhibit local 
innovative firms from upgrading products (for in-
stance, enhancing transformer capability from 50 to 
                                                     
158  Interview Kanis Muangsiri (Acting Manager, Marketing 
Department, EEI-Testing Center), 28 Feb. 2003. 
100 Hz) and from entering new markets, thus com-
pounding the dualistic structure. As a result, public 
research institutions and universities find them-
selves ranked at the bottom of potential sources of 
technology.159 On a different note, this discrep-
ancy can also be attributed to the fact that Thai 
companies are not demanding R&D support or are 
not capable of further developing prototypes.  
With public-sector programs not showing the 
expected results, and private-sector initiatives too 
few in number and not sufficiently supported by 
the government, what is called for is a more sys-
tematic and coordinated approach for support of 
upgrading – in networks operating in specific 
market segments. As an example of intra-chain 
upgrading, Thai companies could move into the 
market for IC design and embedded systems, 
which constitute the “brain” of electrical and elec-
tronic products. Demand for such customer-
specific solutions is expected to increase consid-
erably both worldwide and in Thailand, where the 
growing automotive industry is creating new mar-
kets for auto electronics. Well-trained young elec-
trical engineers designing chips and prototypes, 
for instance at the TIDI and the Institute of Field 
Robotics (FIBO) at King Mongkut University of 
Technology Thonburi, constitute the human po-
                                                     
159  The Brooker Group (2002a), p. 28. 
Box 5.2: Thai Embedded Systems Association (TESA) 
The Thai Embedded Systems Association (TESA) is a private-sector initiative founded in 2002. “Embedded,” as 
defined on TESA’s homepage, is a “small computer system that is hidden inside equipment (machine, electrical 
appliance, or electronics gadget) to increase the intelligence of the equipment for better or more efficient functional-
ity (...) (that) involves both the software and hardware co-development.” The association comprises developers, 
some large TNCs such as Seagate, local companies and university professors. It aims at collaboration among these 
agents, promotion of the embedded systems R&D network, and development of SMEs and supply chain networks. 
To achieve these objectives, it has already initiated several activities, the most prominent of which the embedded 
systems contest. 150 projects participated in the first year, revealing both the considerable potential in the country 
and the success of the initiative to foster creativity and competition. As a promising follow-up, establishment of an 
embedded systems incubator is envisaged. 
Source:  www.thaiesf.org; Interview Prof. Apinetr Unakul (King Mongkut Institute of Technology – Ladkrabang, 
Computer Engineering,) 05 March 03.  
Strengthening knowledge-based competitive advantages in Thailand 63
tential needed by these markets.160 Transforming 
developed technical solutions into commercialized 
products as well as diffusing created knowledge 
and technology are the tasks ahead for the NIS in 
electronics. These are best tackled by agile entre-
preneurs and developers organized in networks 
like the Thai Embedded Systems Association 
(TESA, see Box 5.2). The public sector should 
support innovative entrepreneurs and network 
initiatives within the private sector by furnishing 
R&D funding, forum sponsorship and public ser-
vices (e.g. testing facilities), thus helping to ex-
pand such networks in order to reach a critical 
mass of firms. 
Linkage creation and embedding. Embedding 
denotes the building by foreign companies of 
linkages to local companies and institutions by 
integrating them into their value chains and by 
collaborating with RTOs. Unfortunately, there is 
too little of this in Thailand, where the electronic 
component industry in particular may be charac-
terized as footloose with regard to local supplier 
linkages.161 
The Thai government has paid almost no attention 
to embedding the industry and proactively sup-
porting the development of an indigenous supplier 
base capable of supplying quality products. Nei-
ther have there been any supplier development 
programs focusing on capability development nor 
have leading companies been given incentives to 
create vertical linkages and engage in technology 
transfer.162 Consequently, despite the multitude of 
investments in the country, the outcome has not 
been integration of SMEs into international value 
chains. Foreign companies in electronics prefer to 
source either outside the country or to force their 
international suppliers to move to Thailand (as has 
been the case in the hard disk drive industry). 
                                                     
160  Interview with Dr. Djitt Laowattana (Director FIBO), 
20 March 2003; Dr. Suthee Phoojaruenchanachai (Re-
searcher, NECTEC), 7 March 2003. 
161  Doner/ Brimble (1998). 
162  Instead, KR Precision, a company in the hard disk drive 
industry, has had its proposal to establish a National 
Tool and Die Institute turned down. 
Only recently has there been a shift in outlook, 
with the BUILD program seeking to enhance the 
creation of vertical linkages. However, the techno-
logical gap prevents any significant linking of 
SMEs to TNCs. Partly as a result of this gap, the 
Subcontracting Promotion Club (SPC) has been 
set up to enhance the capacity of local SMEs in 
electronics, plastics, metal parts and polymers. 
However, the approach followed focuses more on 
horizontal networking, since many of the compa-
nies concerned do not yet feel qualified to ap-
proach TNCs on their own. 
On a more positive note, cooperation between 
TNCs and RTOs and universities is on the rise. 
Personal networks have led to initial contacts be-
tween the two agents. As public sector institutions 
show signs of greater openness to collaboration, 
companies such as Read-Rite and Fabrinet are 
carrying out joint research projects with MTEC, 
NECTEC and universities (FIBO at King Mong-
kut).163  
Taking these positive developments as a starting 
point, and drawing on experiences of neighboring 
countries (for instance the LIUP of Singapore, see 
Box 4.7), a redirected embedding effort could be 
launched. Such an effort would use a more fo-
cused approach aimed at dynamic market seg-
ments. For instance, Singapore, in cooperation 
with large customers, has fostered promising local 
SMEs in establishing machinery shops. In re-
sponse to industry trends favoring local purchas-
ing of specialized tools for automated large-
volume manufacturing, a supplier base of preci-
sion tooling companies has been established. 
However, at the moment neither such incentives 
nor high-end capabilities exist in Thailand. A joint 
effort is therefore necessary to supplement the 
operations of TNCs with machine-tooling ser-
vices, high-quality mould & dies or plastic parts.  
 
 
 
                                                     
163  Interview Mr. Tawan Suppapunt (Vice-President) and 
Mr. Chakkrit (Development Director) of Read-Rite, 28 
April 03; Interview Dr. Djitt Laowattana (Director 
FIBO), 20 March 2003; Doner/ Brimble (1998). 
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Taking large customers’ needs as the point of 
departure, efforts aimed at enhancing local com-
panies’ capabilities would have to involve a com-
mitment by TNCs and broad support by private- 
and public-sector institutions such as universities, 
the National Institute for Metrology and Testing 
(NIMT), MTEC, EEI and the Material Property 
Analysis Department (MPAD). 
5.1.4 Conclusions 
As the present analysis has shown, there are po-
tentials and opportunities for Thai companies in 
the electrical and electronics sector. However, 
ambitions to tap into higher-technology market 
segments call for commitment of both public and 
private agents in the NIS to induce the necessary 
upgrading and embedding by enhancing industry-
science relations and inter-firm linkages. Best 
practice experiences from other countries suggest 
that such initiatives should be conducted in net-
works involving TNCs, promising SMEs, industry 
associations, and public sector institutions such as 
universities, sector institutions (EEI) or research 
institutes (NECTEC, MTEC). Furthermore, they 
ought to be driven by private-sector agents, with 
governments playing a complementary role in 
coordinating the various stakeholders, providing 
infrastructure and fostering capability develop-
ment. It is therefore essential to overcome current 
hesitations regarding financially support for pri-
vate-sector initiatives, and support should be pro-
vided for evolving networks such as IDEMA or 
TESA. Such an approach might just create the 
dynamics the sector needs in Thailand, and pre-
vent it from becoming a sunset industry after all. 
5.2 The shrimp aquaculture sector 
5.2.1 Relevance of the Thai shrimp-
farming sector  
Thailand is the world’s largest producer and lead-
ing exporter of cultured (farm-raised) shrimp, 
supplying 35 % of the world market for Black 
Tiger shrimps (Penaeus monodon).164 This ac-
counts for approximately 3.5 % of it’s the coun-
try's total exports of goods and services. In 2001 
exports of farmed shrimp amounted to 280,000 
MT165 and earned Thailand US$ 2.2 billion. The 
largest export markets for Thai shrimps are the 
United States and Japan, which account for 46 % 
and 17 %, respectively.166 Favorable agro-climatic 
and economic conditions, the country’s 2,600 km 
coastline in the Central, Eastern and Southern 
provinces as well as the particular organizational 
structure of the Thai shrimp sector – with a large 
national conglomerate with leading technological 
expertise – account for Thailand’s comparative 
advantage in shrimp production. 
A drop in production from 200,000 tons in 1996 
to 170,000 tons in 1997, as shown in Figure 5.1., 
is due to serious outbreaks of a virus disease 
(“white spot disease”). The devaluation of the 
baht during the Asian Crisis in 1997 led to in-
creased revenues for the shrimp-exporting indus-
try and set incentives for shrimp farmers to further 
intensify farming methods, e.g. by increasing 
stocking rates, which in turn facilitated the spread 
of diseases.167  
Shrimp-farming has positive employment effects. 
In addition to 15,800 registered farms (1998),168 
with several people working at each farm, em-
ployment is created by related industries such as 
processing factories, feed companies, middle-
men/brokers etc. It is estimated that approxi-
mately 150,000 people are directly employed in 
the shrimp industry.169 Since illegal immigrant 
workers are frequently hired by shrimp farmers, 
the real employment figure is assumed to be even 
higher. Taking family members into account, the 
                                                     
164  Patmasiriwat/ Kuik/ Pednekar (1998), p. 30. 
165  http://www.globefish.org/publications/commodity 
update/200206/200206.htm. 
166  Kagawa (2003), p. 118.  
167  Kagawa (2003), p. 32. 
168  Kagawa (2003), p. 33. 
169  Patmasiriwat / Kuik / Pednekar (1998), p. 30. 
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number of people depending on the shrimp indus-
try amounts to approximately 300,000.170 
Farm-raised shrimp production is one of the fast-
est-growing industries world-wide, and global 
demand for fish products is rising, with shrimp 
being by far the most valuable species. In re-
sponse to the global market, a drastic reorientation 
of agricultural priorities from basic food crops, 
such as rice, to higher-value and more capital-
intensive export products, such as shrimp, is ex-
pected in the long term.171 
5.2.2 The value chain of shrimp 
aquaculture: an overview 
Shrimp aquaculture is a very complex and knowl-
edge-intensive activity. To understand the com-
petitive and ecological challenges of the sector 
and identify the needs for improving the innova-
tion system in this sector, it is necessary to briefly 
describe the main characteristics of the production 
chain in Thailand.  
— Gravid female brooders are called brood-
stock. These mature female brooders which 
are caught in the sea and sold to hatcheries 
have become smaller and increasingly rare 
                                                     
170  Kagawa (2003), p. 33.  
171  Flaherty / Vandergeest/ Miller (1999), p. 2050. 
due to overfishing. So far, it is not commer-
cially viable to reproduce Black Tiger shrimp 
in captivity. R&D endeavors in the shrimp 
industry mainly focus on the domestication of 
broodstock, i.e. the reproduction of shrimp 
fry in laboratories or research centers. 
— In hatcheries shrimp fry is grown for ap-
proximately two weeks. After several stages 
they become “post-larvae” and are sold to 
shrimp farmers. There are several thousands 
of hatcheries in Thailand, some of them being 
very small enterprises. 
— Shrimp farms cultivate the shrimp for an-
other 90-100 days before they can be har-
vested. On average, shrimp farms in Thailand 
are small: 80 % of all farms are smaller than 
three rai.172 Altogether, shrimp farms in Thai-
land cover an area of 80,000 hectares.173 
— Feed production is dominated by the Charoen 
Pokphand (CP) Group with a market share of 
75 %; further feed companies are Thai Union 
(10 %), Grow Best (10 %), Gold Coin (3 %).174 
Chemical companies provide hatcheries and 
farms with the pesticides and antibiotics 
which have increasingly been used to control 
 
                                                     
172  Lebel (2002), p. 317. 1 rai is the equivalent of 0.16 ha. 
173  Kagawa (2003), p. 24.  
174  For details see interview with Gold Coin. 
Figure 5.1: World shrimp production, 1996 – 2000 (in ‘000 metric tons) 
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the outbreak of diseases. Feed and chemicals 
together account for the lion’s share of pro-
duction costs. At the same time, large compa-
nies which supply these inputs are the main 
providers of farming technology and also of-
fer a variety of services such as seminars and 
water-testing services. The CP Group alone 
employs 400 consultants to provide advisory 
services. 
— Whereas some farmers sell their shrimp yield 
to brokers, other deliver to the central 
wholesale market themselves. Still others sell 
to processors directly.  
— At the processing company, shrimp are 
processed into raw and value-added product 
forms, such as sushi ebi and tempura.175 Very 
often, processors are also exporters. 90 % of 
                                                     
175  Kagawa (2003), p. 120.  
Thai shrimp production is exported. Thai 
processing companies also import shrimps, 
mainly from Japan, process them and reex-
port them to the Japanese market.176 
— A large number of institutions have been 
created to promote and regulate shrimp-
farming, represent shrimp farmers' interests, 
minimize ecological damage, conduct re-
search, provide extension services, set and 
implement standards, etc. Among the most 
relevant research institutions are Kasetsart 
University, Mahidol University, the Shrimp 
Culture Research & Development Co., Ltd. 
(SCRD), the Center of Excellence for Shrimp 
Molecular Biology and Biotechnology (Cen-
tex), and the BIOTEC research program.  
                                                     
176  Kagawa (2003), p. 122.  
Figure 5.2: Production chain of the Thai shrimp industry 
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The main actor in the field of shrimp culture is the 
CP Group, a Thai-based agro-business transna-
tional. In the mid-1980s, CP became the industry 
leader in the Thai shrimp sector. Since the mid-
1990s, CP has been Thailand’s largest transna-
tional company, Asia’s largest agro-industrial 
conglomerate,177 and the world’s largest shrimp 
feed producer, controlling 60-70 % of the world 
shrimp feed market. In Thailand, CP’s operations 
range from feedmills, hatcheries and demonstra-
tion farms, laboratory testing and diagnostic ser-
vices for shrimp farmers to shrimp-processing 
plants. Several extension centers equipped with 
laboratories and staffed with experienced biolo-
gists provide water-quality testing, disease diag-
nosis and seminars. Furthermore, CP is engaged 
in research activities regarding the domestication 
                                                     
177  Goss /Burch/ Rickson (2000), p. 516. 
of broodstock, improvement of feed, and genet-
ics.178 
In developing and emerging economies, the 
dominance of an entire sector by national compa-
nies is rather unusual; the more common case is 
that TNCs from developed countries govern the 
value chain. Market leadership and control of 
technology packages by a nationally based com-
pany create a competitive advantage for Thailand 
as a business location. However, since the CP 
group runs operations not only in Thailand but 
also in Vietnam, China, India, Cambodia and 
Bangladesh, there is a risk that the company might 
shift important activities away from Thailand to 
these countries, e.g. because of relatively higher 
wages or disease problems at their Thai home 
base. To retain a competitive edge in Thailand, 
                                                     
178  Patmasiriwat /Kuik / Pednekar (1998), p. 11. 
179  Kagawa (2003), p. 24. 
Box 5.3: The farm-level economics of shrimp farming 
The production process of intensive shrimp-culturing can be broken down into four stages: pond preparation, stock-
ing, culturing and harvesting.  
At the first stage, farmers drain the ponds and remove the wet mud by tractor or water jets. Dikes and drains are 
repaired, pond sediments are sterilized with lime. Preparations for the next production cycle can take up to one 
month.  
The second stage comprises the stocking of shrimp larvae. For the Black Tiger Shrimp, a stocking rate of 69 ani-
mals/m2 is common; and even densities as high as 100 animals/m2 are not unusual. The major production method is 
intensive farming; in 2000 intensive farming methods accounted for 85 %, with semi-intensive farming methods 
accounting for 5.8 % and extensive farming methods for 9.2 %.179 The average output of intensive farming is more 
than 600 kg/rai. In the economic and environmental management of farms, stocking density is considered as a key 
variable.  
At the third stage, culturing, water management is a central element; it includes water exchange (on average 2.6 
times per crop), feeding, aeration, and disease management. Almost 80 % of intensive shrimp farms use manufac-
tured shrimp feed, only 20 % use fresh fishery products. The feed conversion ratio (FCR), defined as the ratio of the 
dry weight of the feed administered and the wet weight of biomass increase, is a further key variable. The average 
FCR attained is 1.7, i.e., 1.7 kg of feed produces 1 kg of shrimp biomass (ADB/NACA, 1995). Disease manage-
ment includes treatment of ponds with chemicals or antibiotics. 
The fourth stage, harvesting, usually takes place about 120-140 days after stocking. Usually the pond gate is cov-
ered with a net. while the water is let out of the pond.  
In terms of production economics, the average size of a shrimp farm in Thailand is 3.6 ha. Typical yields of – com-
monly – two crops per year are between 5 to 9 tons per ha per crop.  
Source: Patmasiriwat /Kuik/ Pednekar (1998), p. 13. 
 Tilman Altenburg et al. 68
policy-makers should seek to further increase the 
degree of national embeddedness of shrimp pro-
duction, especially the more knowledge-intensive 
and value-adding stages of the value chain. As we 
shall see further on, this may require enhanced 
inter-firm co-operation, establishment of jointly 
agreed codes of conduct, closer ties with national 
research facilities, etc.  
5.2.3 Challenges for shrimp-farming in 
Thailand  
Favorable agro-climatic and economic conditions 
have contributed to Thailand’s leading position in 
the world shrimp market. However, economic 
success is being achieved at high environmental 
costs. For some years, shrimp-farming was very 
profitable as environmental costs were easily ex-
ternalized. Today, as diseases spread throughout 
the country and import countries ban shrimp trea-
ted with antibiotics, environmental problems have 
grown to such an extent that they challenge the 
viability of the sector itself. What follows is an 
overview of the main ecological problems related 
to shrimp-farming: 
1. In the past, many shrimp ponds were es-
tablished in mangrove areas and other 
wetland ecosystems. The destruction of 
these ecosystems has had major im-
pacts.180 Since mangroves are essential to 
protect coastal areas from erosion, storm 
damage and flooding, their destruction 
renders these areas much more susceptible 
to natural disasters. The deforestation of 
mangroves not only affects the ecological 
equilibrium, it has also far-reaching eco-
nomic consequences for Thailand’s sea-
food sector. Since two thirds of the fish 
caught for human consumption live in 
coastal mangrove ecosystems or depend 
on them as nursery areas for their larvae, 
construction of shrimp ponds in mangrove 
areas threatens many species of fish and 
                                                     
180  Lebel (2002); Flaherty/ Vandergeest/ Miller (1999), pp. 
2050 ff. 
other marine resources. Fishing is there-
fore becoming less and less profitable, 
and entire coastal communities which de-
pend on fishing are impoverishing.181 
Thanks to overexploitation and the defor-
estation of mangroves, wild-caught Black 
Tiger broodstock has become extremely 
rare. Revenues from shrimp-farming de-
crease as broodstock caught from the sea 
becomes scarcer and smaller, a factor 
which reduces their economic value.  
2. A further problem involved in shrimp cul-
tivation is drainage of wastewater from 
shrimp ponds. Frequently the effluent, 
containing chemicals and feed residues, is 
directly discharged into irrigation canals, 
a practice which seriously affects the prof-
itable usage of coastal land and adjacent 
paddies. The consequence is that infec-
tions very easily spread through wastewa-
ter to neighboring shrimp farms.  
3. Apart from chemicals, groundwater and 
soil quality are affected by the saline wa-
ter transported in enormous amounts to 
inland shrimp farms. Growing demand for 
shrimps is leading to an expansion of 
shrimp-farming from coastal areas to the 
inland, e.g. to the Central Plains (tradi-
tionally Thailand’s ‘rice bowl’). Numer-
ous rice farmers have taken up the more 
lucrative, but also more risky, business of 
shrimp-farming. At the end of the 1990s, 
inland shrimp-farming accounted for be-
tween 40 % and 50 % of Thailand’s total 
cultured shrimp production.182 Since 1998 
expansion of inland shrimp farms has 
been banned by the Thai government. 
However, existing farms are allowed to 
continue cultivation. Contamination of 
groundwater has led to declining yields 
and repeated crop failures. In the long run 
it even renders land unsuitable for cultiva-
tion.  
                                                     
181  http://www.american.edu/TED/THAISHMP.HTM. 
182  Flaherty/ Vandergeest/ Miller (1999), p. 2049. 
Strengthening knowledge-based competitive advantages in Thailand 69
It has always been clear that ecological damage 
caused by shrimp-farming has economic repercus-
sions for other activities, especially for the agri-
cultural sector and inland and coastal fishery. In 
some cases, this has even led to serious conflicts 
with other user groups.183 Today these unresolved 
environmental problems have reached a new di-
mension, and they threaten the viability of shrimp 
production itself. In a worst-case scenario, shrimp- 
farming might even collapse, as it did in Taiwan 
in 1988, as a result of an overly intensive shrimp 
production at high environmental costs.184 Due to 
high stocking rates and discharge of wastewater 
into irrigation canals, diseases have spread 
throughout the whole country. Several viruses, 
e.g. white spot disease, have become a serious 
threat for shrimp cultivation, leading to frequent 
crop failures and substantial economic losses. 
Short-term solutions have focused on the heavy 
usage of a wide range of industrial chemicals, 
mainly antibiotics such as nitrofurane, to control 
diseases, aquatic vegetation, and to disinfect wa-
ter. These chemicals not only have a negative 
impact on the quality of soil and water but also  
 
 
                                                     
183  E.g. Vandergeest/ Flaherty/ Miller (1999); interview 
with Mr. Asea Sayaka, Director of the “Wetlands Inter-
national” Thailand Programme, 4 April 2003. 
184  Kagawa (2003), p. 23. 
threaten exports as importing countries impose 
increasingly rigid conditions. In particular the 
European Union (EU) has recently introduced a 
zero-tolerance policy for antibiotic residues and 
rejected contaminated shrimp.185  
This in turn affects Thailand’s competitiveness in 
the world shrimp market. If Thailand does not 
succeed in establishing eco-efficient production, 
countries with fewer disease problems, better ac-
cess to healthy broodstock and lower land and 
labor costs, such as China – with its world market 
share in shrimp production of 22 % – Indonesia 
(12 %), India (9 %), and Vietnam (8 %),186 may 
challenge Thailand's leading position.  
                                                     
185  See Bangkok Post, March 28, 2003. Because of the 
small export share of Thai shrimp to the EU (only 5 %), 
the harm caused by EU's zero-tolerance policy to the 
Thai shrimp industry  is yet not dramatic. More dra-
matic for Thailand is the pending threat that Japan and 
the USA, the main exporters of Thai shrimp, may fol-
low the European example.  
186  Institute for Management Education for Thailand Foun-
dation (2002), p. 5. 
Figure 5.3: Thailand’s share of world shrimp production 
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5.2.4 Coping with the challenges and 
developing knowledge-based 
competitive advantages in the 
shrimp sector 
To cope with the above-discussed environmental 
and economic challenges, knowledge-intensive 
innovations are called for at different levels. If 
Thailand manages to become a leader in eco-
efficient farming systems, this will both minimize 
the environmental impact of shrimp-farming and 
increase its efficiency, thus offsetting price-based 
disadvantages. In eco-efficient farming systems 
pond management is optimized, chemical inputs 
are reduced, virus infections better controlled, 
saline and organically contaminated wastewater 
reduced, and overexploitation of marine resources 
avoided. In sum, the concept of eco-efficiency 
implies that the use of natural resources is opti-
mized to reduce environmental damage, while at 
the same time the net revenue of a company or an 
economic sector increases.  
To develop eco-efficient farming systems, it is 
necessary to intensify existing research coopera-
tion between industry and science and enhance the 
regulatory capability of national institutions with a 
view to domesticating broodstock, strengthening 
disease control and genetic research, improving 
pond and wastewater management systems, reduc-
ing chemical usage, enforcing environmental 
regulations, promoting good cultivation practices, 
implementing standards and establishing a testing 
infrastructure and certification bodies. To further 
increase the competitiveness of the sector, Thai-
land should embark on development of high-end 
markets, such as for ready-to-eat products, delica-
cies, and organic markets. Value added can be 
augmented by developing brand names.  
Improved pond and wastewater manage-
ment 
Pond and wastewater management refers to the 
removal of uneaten food and other waste products 
from a pond by exchanging its water. Improved 
water management systems, e.g. closed-water sys-
tems, treat wastewater in a sedimentation pond 
before releasing it into the drainage system, 
thereby reducing the detrimental impact of or-
ganic residues and chemicals on adjacent paddies 
and ecosystems.187 Furthermore, construction of 
sufficient pumps and aerators is crucial to main-
taining good water quality. Whereas in 1997 only 
a few farmers had an extra sedimentation pond in 
addition to their grow-out ponds (since this re-
duces production),  our field survey has shown 
that this practice seems nowadays to be wide-
spread.  
A common problem in water management is over-
feeding, a practice which reduces the efficiency of 
feed conversion and pollutes pond water. Water 
management is a very critical process, as some 
farmers do not change the water of their ponds as 
frequently as they should, because they are afraid 
that diseases might spread to their ponds with new 
water, which may be contaminated by neighbor-
ing farms. 
Sustainable farming systems with lower stocking 
rates permit chemical inputs and feed materials to 
decompose faster and more easily, countering the 
spread of diseases. In combination with less inten-
sive farming methods, ‘clean solutions’ such as 
closed-water systems with a focus on the treat-
ment of wastewater should be promoted to reduce 
the detrimental impact of wastewater and chemi-
cals on adjacent paddies. As we found during our 
empirical research, farmers have made positive 
experiences with less intensive farming systems. 
Most farmers reported that with lower stocking 
rates and less chemical input, they had lower out-
puts; but since this approach enabled them to cut 
expenditures and produce shrimp of larger size 
and economic value, their overall revenues had 
increased.  
Shrimp producers obtain the major part of their 
technological “packages” from large feed and 
chemical companies. This includes know-how 
concerning the use of aerators and pumps, the use 
of chemicals, stocking rates, feed conversion etc. 
                                                     
187  For more information concerning sedimentation ponds, 
see Thongrak et al. (1997).  
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Obviously, these input-producing companies are 
interested in intensive farming systems with high 
inputs and high outputs. Nevertheless, it can be 
stated that awareness of the need for sustainable 
farming systems is rising, a fact manifest in an 
increasing number of farms with sedimentation 
ponds over the last few years. Further enforce-
ment of regulations concerning sustainable pond 
and wastewater management, e.g. implementation 
of eco-efficient closed-water systems, would in-
crease Thailand’s competitive advantage in 
shrimp production.  
Reduction of chemicals 
Antibiotic residues in shrimp, mainly nitrofurane, 
have become a major consumer concern in indus-
trialized countries. Although the use of most anti-
biotics had already been banned for food-pro-
ducing animals in the EU, Thailand, the US, and 
Canada several years ago,188 the ban was extended 
to a zero-tolerance policy by the European Union 
in April 2003. The zero-tolerance policy means 
that at the European borders batches of frozen 
shrimp are checked even for metabolites, which 
are products of the decomposition of antibiotics. 
Consequently, the export of Thai shrimp to the 
European Union is expected to decrease signifi-
cantly.189 
Although awareness has increased considerably, 
the use of antibiotics is still widespread among 
shrimp farmers. The search for less intensive but 
still economically viable farming methods is being 
hampered by feed and chemical firms, which are 
the main source of information for farmers but are 
interested in maximizing inputs, such as feed and 
chemicals.  
Given these particularist interests of the feed and 
chemical corporations and their prominent role as 
advisers to shrimp farmers, the public sector 
should become more active in the promotion of 
                                                     
188  http://www.deltha.ece.eu./int/en/news_2002/chlor 
amphenicol_in_shrimps.htm. 
189  Bangkok Post, March 28, 2003.  
less intensive farming methods, e.g. by supporting 
research on its viability, providing testing services 
or exploring market opportunities for organically 
grown shrimp. This would reduce the dependence 
of shrimp farmers on a small number of private 
corporations. Moreover, successful initiatives to 
trace residues back to the producers, e.g. on the 
basis of movement documents, should be further 
promoted.  
Enforcement of land-use and related envi-
ronmental regulations 
The effective enforcement of land-use and related 
environmental regulations is often problematic, 
because the same government agencies are re-
sponsible for in part contradictory tasks, e.g. en-
forcement of environmental policy on the one 
hand and industrialization and export promotion 
on the other hand.190 Adding to this complexity is 
the fact that shrimp culture is affected by a large 
number of laws and regulations including land 
laws, water laws, environmental laws, fishing 
laws etc. To ensure that government regulations 
are enforced, it will be necessary to improve the 
coordination of departments  in charge of different 
issues related to shrimp production needs.  
Several regulations have been successfully im-
plemented, e.g. expansion of inland shrimp-
farming was banned in 1998, because it increases 
salinity levels in soil and groundwater, and this 
has led to a considerable reduction of inland 
shrimp-farming. Other regulations, e.g. concern-
ing the drainage of saltwater into public freshwa-
ter systems or farming areas,191 and further defor-
estation of mangroves have not been fully en-
forced. It appears that visible aspects, e.g. sedi-
mentation ponds and the ban on inland shrimp-
farming have by and large been enforced, whereas 
regulations concerning the reduction of antibiot-
                                                     
190  Flaherty / Vandergeest / Miller (1999), p. 2053, refer to 
Kaosa-ard et al. (1995). 
191  Which was announced by the Department of Fisheries 
in 1999. 
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ics, regulation of discharge of effluents are more 
difficult to put into effect. 
Promotion of good cultivation practices 
Taking into account that many thousand of farms 
throughout the whole country are engaged in 
shrimp-farming, trying to enforce command-and-
control mechanisms for environmental protection 
would far exceed the capacities of Thailand’s 
public administration. It is therefore necessary to 
complement government regulation on by means 
of industry self-regulation based on standards and 
codes of conduct. Such standards not only con-
tribute to internalizing environmental costs of 
shrimp farming, but they are also an important 
means of regaining consumer confidence, differ-
entiating the market and thus increasing the com-
petitiveness of the shrimp sector. If seafood com-
panies are to gain access to international markets 
and also to maintain their competitiveness, they 
are going to have to comply with international 
quality standards in the global market. 
Several standards have already been introduced, 
but none of them has gained sufficient outreach 
and impact to solve the problems mentioned 
above:  
— The Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Point System (HACCP) is an international 
hygiene standard for food processing and was 
implemented in the Thai shrimp production 
sector in the late 1990s.192 HACCP deter-
mines critical control points (CCP) in the pro-
duction process and establishes critical limits 
as well as corrective actions for each CCP. 
HACCP is applied to control different stages 
of production, such as sanitation and manu-
facturing practices, including phytosanitary or 
pesticide residue requirements.193 It sets stan-
dard practices for plant staff to avoid hazards 
and establishes rules to monitor and audit 
these practices, e.g. by establishing quality 
                                                     
192  Unnevehr/Jensen (1999), p. 626. 
193  Gibbon (2001), p. 101.  
control laboratories which test bacteria levels. 
Introduction of the HACCP code in the Thai 
shrimp sector has improved hygiene stan-
dards. It requires some governance of the 
supply chain, e.g. in contract farming ar-
rangements, and HACCP standards are re-
quired and enforced.194  
— The Code of Conduct (CoC) for shrimp-
farming provides guidelines for the develop-
ment of voluntary management systems to 
reduce negative social and environmental im-
pacts. It comprises systems for impact identi-
fication, formulation of standards, identifica-
tion of indicators etc.195 The program was ini-
tiated by the Department of Fisheries in 1999. 
So far only approximately 2,000 hatcheries 
and farms have been certified.196 
— The Good Aquacultural Practises (GAP) 
comprise regulations concerning internal 
farm management, such as appropriate area 
use, buildings and structure, water quality for 
shrimp culture and consumption. In addition, 
certain standards concerning culture methods, 
culture periods, feed quantity, water transfer 
volume etc. are required as well. Since the 
GAP requirements are not as rigid as the CoC 
requirements, e.g. controls for chemicals are 
not necessary,197 GAP is considered as a first 
step towards the CoC. 
— Green labels for “organic” markets are more 
demanding than any other standard. The mar-
ket share of certified “organic” shrimps is still 
very small, but it has been rising constantly 
over the last few years because of the increas-
ing influence of the green consumerism 
movement. Cultivation of shrimp under ecol-
ogically sound conditions is thus becoming a 
promising option. Developing technological 
                                                     
194  See Patmasiriwat/ Kuik/ Pednekar (1998). 
195  Consortium Program of WB, NACA, WWF, FAO 
(2002). 
196  For further information about the Code of Conduct see 
www.thaiqualityshrimp.com. 
197  See Interview with Dr. Waraporn Prompoj, Department 
of Fisheries. 
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solutions for this “organic” high-end market 
may be a profitable and knowledge-based 
niche market for Thai producers. In Ecuador, 
for example, a GTZ project in cooperation 
with the German organic food producer 
Naturland fosters ecologically sound produc-
tion systems. 
So far, self-regulation by the shrimp industry has 
not been very effective. In the case of HACCP, 
and even though shrimp processing plants and 
exporters are certified, the system still fails to 
ensure that no banned antibiotics are used up-
stream in the value chain, and contaminated 
batches cannot always be traced back to the farm 
of origin. The CoC is neither compulsory nor has 
the government succeeded in developing a pre-
mium market for certified CoC shrimp. Without 
such a label the code provides no economic bene-
fits to participating farmers, which explains the 
rather low number of certified farms. Recently, 
the hyper-market chain Carrefour has shown in-
terest in promoting a CoC label for shrimp. The 
CoC will only gain general acceptance among 
farmers if such initiatives on the marketing side 
prove to be successful. Ecological labels such as 
the German Bioland or the Japanese alter trade 
also aim at developing high-end markets, but in-
troduction of organic shrimp-farming is still in its 
very beginnings. If CoC and ecological labels are 
to gain consumer confidence, it will be to estab-
lish certification bodies and a transparent tracking 
and tracing system along the whole value chain to 
enable authorities to trace a batch of shrimp back 
to the producer.  
Industry-science relations in the shrimp 
sector: Domestication of broodstock, dis-
ease control and genetic research 
For many of the above-mentioned problems of 
Thailand’s shrimp aquaculture, technological so-
lutions still have to be developed, and these in 
some cases require a considerable research effort. 
Among the most pressing research issues are 
— domestication of broodstock, because sea-
caught broodstock is becoming increasingly 
rare and therefore threatens the survival of the 
whole industry; in addition, only domesti-
cated broodstock can guarantee disease-free 
parent generations, 
— detection and treatment of diseases,  
— genetic improvement; and  
— secure and efficient pond management tech-
niques, including the development of low-
salinity culture techniques. 
Several universities198 and the Department of 
Fisheries have placed emphasis on shrimp re-
search, and BIOTEC funds a special Shrimp Bio-
technology Program, reflecting a national research 
priority in this sector. Furthermore, several pri-
vate-sector companies, like CP and the Belgian 
INVE corporation, are highly committed to 
shrimp-related R&D. In some cases, concerted 
efforts are undertaken to advance research. The 
Center of Excellence for Shrimp Molecular Biol-
ogy and Biotechnology (CENTEX), for instance, 
is a joint research center of Mahidol University 
and BIOTEC which has close research contacts 
with the CP group. In addition, the Shrimp Cul-
ture Research & Development Co., Ltd. (SCRD) 
has been set up as a public-private cooperation 
project aimed at the domestication of broodstock. 
Much of public research is directed towards the 
achievement of eco-efficiency. CENTEX, for 
example, has set the goal of achieving „healthy & 
healthful, domesticated shrimp cultivated in bio-
secure ponds with no negative environmental 
impact“ by 2007.  
All in all, shrimp aquaculture is one of the most 
prominent examples in Thailand of how research 
and technology institutes can pool resources and 
cooperate with the private sector to create knowl-
edge-based competitive advantages. Research is 
being conducted to address the main challenges 
facing the sector, and linkages between science 
and industry are intense, compared to the electron-
ics sector. 
                                                     
198  E.g. Chulalongkom University; Mahidol University, 
Kasetsart University, Prince of Songkhla University. 
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Increasing value added of shrimp exports 
As an additional measure aimed at enhancing its 
competitiveness in the world market, Thailand 
should increase the value added of its shrimp ex-
ports by focusing on its advantages in the process-
ing business, e.g. its knowledge of export markets 
and the specific processing skills and techniques 
that are required especially by the Japanese mar-
ket.199 Product diversification includes high-value 
processed foods, e.g. microwave (ready-to-eat), 
“eco-shrimp” and sushi, as well as sophisticated 
packaging for demanding customers. In addition 
to product diversification, diversification of busi-
ness, such as customized processing, is a strategy 
that can be used to increase value added in the 
shrimp sector. Some processing companies in 
Thailand already import frozen shrimp from all 
over the world, e.g. from Norway, and process it 
for export markets. Several Thai companies have 
developed own brand names for export, another 
measure adding value to the product. The gov-
ernment initiative to promote Thailand as a 
“kitchen of the world” may help to tap into inter-
national high-end markets.  
5.2.5 Conclusions 
In sum, even though Thailand has progressed 
significantly in handling the economic and envi-
ronmental problems of the sector, much still needs 
to be done. Above all, what seems to be lacking is 
a shared vision of the future of Thailand’s shrimp 
industry as well as  policy coordination. A shared 
vision needs to be developed with the participa-
tion of all the relevant stakeholders of the private 
and public sector (including those indirectly af-
fected by shrimp-farming, such as fishermen, rice 
farmers, and environmentalists) and focus on the 
promotion of the above-discussed issues concern-
ing eco-efficiency and the development of high-
end markets. Research priorities, codes of con-
duct, market differentiation and marketing strate-
gies etc., should be derived from such an inte-
grated perspective.  
                                                     
199  Kagawa (2003), p. 83. 
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Annex 1: List of interview partners 
 
Firm/ institution Interview partner Date 
1. AMD (Thailand) Ltd. Mr. Yuthana Hemungkorn, Managing Director 31.03.03 
2. Aquatic Animal Health Research 
Center 
Dr. Kidchakan Supamattaya, Associate Professor 04.04.03 
3. Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) Prof. Huynh Ngoc Phien, Dean, School of Advanced Tech-
nologies  
Dr. Nitin Afzulpurkar, Associate Professor, Industrial Sys-
tems Engineering & Microelectronics Program; Coordinator 
Industrial Systems Engineering Program 
Mr. Khosak Achawakorn, Lab Supervisor, School of Ad-
vanced Technologies 
Dr. Voratas Kachitvichyanukul, Associate Professor  
24.03.03 
 
24.03.03 
 
 
13.03.03 
 
13.03.03 
4. Association of Electronics and Com-
puter Employers Association (ECEA) 
Mr. Yuthana Hemungkorn, Chairman 31.03.03 
5. National Center for Genetic Engi-
neering and Biotechnology (BIO-
TEC) 
Dr. Sakarindr Bhumiratana, Senior Specialist 20.03.03 
6. Black Tiger Shrimp Association Mr. Somsak Paneetatyasai, Trade Advisor 04.04.03 
7. Board of Investment (BOI)  Dr. Wisan Tanthawichian, Head, BOI Unit for Industrial 
Linkage Development (BUILD) 
05.03.03 
8. Brilliant Shine Co. Ltd. Mr. Korakot, General Manager 01.04.03 
9. Brooker Policy Research Co. Ltd. Dr. Peter Brimble, President 12.03.03 
10. Bureau of Supporting Industries 
Development (BSID) 
Ms. Uraiwan Chandrayu, Director, Subcontracting Promotion 
Division 
Mr. Chotiwutti Innada, Industrial Engineer 
06.03.03 
14.03.03 
11. Center of Excellence for Shrimp 
Molecular Biology and Biotechnol-
ogy (CENTEX) 
Prof. Dr. Timothy W. Flegel 
 
26.03.03 
12. Chiang Mai University Dr. Louis Lebel, Researcher and Science Coordinator, 
START Program 
23.03.03 
13. Chulalongkorn University  Dr. Naiyavudh Wongkomet, Department of Electrical Engi-
neering 
01.04.03 
14. Consultant Dr. Martin Godau, Senior Consultant 28.02.03 
15. Department of Fisheries  Dr. Waraporn Prompoj  
Dr. Pornlerd Chanratchakool, Fish Pathologist 
29.04.03 
11.03.03 
16. Department of Industrial Promotion 
(DIP): Industrial Promotion Center 
Region 1 
Mr. Wanchai Radchadamat, Director 17.03.03 
17. Electrical and Electronic Institute 
(EEI),  
Mr. Charuek Hengrasmee, President 
Dr. Kovit Masarat, Div. Director, Technique/Standards and 
Marketing 
Mr. Kanis Muangsir, Manager (Acting), Marketing Depart-
ment, Operation and Standard Center 
06.03.03 
06.03.03 
28.03.03 
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18. Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), 
Electrical, Electronics and Allied In-
dustry Club  
Dr. Katiya Greigarn, Vice Chairman 
Ms. Yupaporn Tantijitaree, Office Manager 
14.03.03 
19. GemCity Engineering Co. Ltd. Mr. James W. Gibson, Managing Director 28.04.03 
20. German-Thai Chamber of Commerce 
(GTCC) 
Mr. Stefan Buerkle, Chief of Business Economics and Advi-
sory Division 
11.03.03 
21. Gesellschaft für Technische Zusam-
menarbeit (GTZ) 
Mr. Juergen Koch, Program Director 
Mr. Peter Bolster, Project Manager 
Ms. Ricarda Meissner, Head of Advisory Team, SSIPP  
Project 
25.02.03 
19.02.03 
27.02.03 
22. Gold Coin Specialties (Thailand) Co. 
Ltd. 
Mr. Wuttichai Phichaiyut, Chemist, Q.C. Manager 12.03.03 
23. Green Net Mr. Vitoon, General Secretary 10.03.03 
24. Innovation Development Fund (IDF) Dr. rer. nat. Wantanee Chongkum, Assistant Director 
Mr. Supachai Loriowhakarn, Director 
13.03.03 
25. Intronics Mr. Chaiyasit Thampeera, Owner 
Mr. Viravat, Sirayobhas, Managing Director 
13.03.03 
26. King Mongkut’s Institute of Tech-
nology Ladkrabang (KMIT-L) 
Mr. Apinetr Unakul, Computer Engineering Assistant Profes-
sor; Embedded Systems Lab, Research Director 
05.03.03 
27. King Mongkut Institute of Technol-
ogy – North Bangkok (KMIT-NB) 
Prof. Helmut Maier 
Mr. Sinchai, Department of Engineering 
04.03.03 
28. King Mongkut University of Tech-
nology – Thonburi (KMUT-T) 
 
Dr. Djitt Laowattana, Director of Institute of Field Robotics 
(FIBO) 
Dr. Thavida Maneewarn, Research Scientist, FIBO 
20.03.03 
 
29. Lanna Agro Industry Co. Ltd. Mr. Chotiroj Wongwan, Managing Director 19.03.03 
30. Leo Foods Co. Ltd. Mr. Worasin Kuttiya, Assistant Managing Director 18.03.03 
31. Mangrove Action Project (MAP) Mr. Jim Enright, South East Asia Coordinator 13.03.03 
32. Material Properties Analysis and 
Development Centre (MPAD)  
Dr. Sutiporn Chewasatn, Director 05.03.03 
33. Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST) 
Mr. Alonkorn Laow-Ngam, Director, Strategy Development 
Section 
Ms. Kobkeao Akarakupt, Director, Office of Policy and 
Strategy 
29.04.03 
34. Ministry of University Affairs Dr. Sumate (Senior Advisor & Specialist for Policy and Plan-
ning) 
02.04.03 
35. National Economic and Social De-
velopment Board (NESDB) 
Mr. Wanida Pichalai, Director, Industry Division 
Mr. Panithan Yamvinij, Director, Competitiveness Develop-
ment Office 
13.03.03 
13.03.03 
36. National Electronics and Computer 
Technology Center (NECTEC) 
Dr. Thaweesak Koanantakool, Director 
Dr. Suthee Phoojaruenchanachai, Researcher 
Mr. Chumnarn Punyasai, Researcher, IC Design Section 
02.04.03 
07.03.03 
07.03.03 
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37. National Food Institute (NFI) Dr. Amorn Ngammongkolrat, Director, Technological Ser-
vice Department 
Dr. Jocelyn O. Naewbanij, Director, Department of Informa-
tion Services 
25.03.03 
 
25.03.03 
38. National Metal and Materials Tech-
nology Center (MTEC) 
Dr. Paritud Bhandhubanyong, Director 05.03.03 
39. National Science and Technology 
Agency (NSTDA) 
Prof. Dr. Chatchanat Thebtaranonth, Vice President 
Dr. Chatri Sripaipan, Vice President  
Dr. Patarapong Intarakumnerd, Policy Research 
02.04.03 
02.04.03 
25.02.03 
40. National Thai Co. Ltd. Ms. Chanphorn Phisanbut, Executive Director 26.03.03 
41. Network of Aquaculture Centers in 
Asia-Pacific (NACA) 
Mr. Hassanai Kongkeo, Special Advisor 
Mr. Jesper Clausen, Research Assistant 
11.03.03 
11.03.03 
42. New Entrepreneurship Creation 
(NEC)  
Ms. Petcharee Vajirakachorn 02.04.03 
43. Nithifood Co. Ltd. Mr. Surapol Thaveelertnithi 18.03.03 
44. North Bangkok Innovation Cluster 
(NBIC) / Thailand Science Park 
Dr. Sutham Vanichseni, Faculty of Engineering, Chulalong-
korn University 
28.03.03 
45. Office of Industrial Economics (OIE)  Mr. Damri Sukhotanang, Director General 13.03.03 
46. Office of SME Promotion (OSMEP) Mr. Pak Tongsom, Director,  Research and Planning Depart-
ment 
Ms. Pairin Yamchinda, Chief, SMEs Promotion Policy and 
Planning Section 
05.03.03 
 
05.03.03 
47. Pollution Control Department (PCD) Dr. Wijarn Simachaya, Director, Inland Water Branch; Direc-
tor, Center for Environmental Modeling and Risk Assessment 
24.03.03 
48. Prince of Songkla University Dr. Wutiporn Phromkunthong, Associate Professor, Aquatic 
Science Research Center 
13.03.03 
49. Read Rite (Thailand) Co. Ltd. Mr. Tawan Suppapunt, Vice President  
Mr. Chakkrit, Development Director 
28.04.03 
50. RWTH Aachen Prof. Dr.-Ing. Rolf H. Jansen, Project Chair, Dean of EE & IT 
Faculty; New Thai-German Graduate School of Engineering 
29.03.03 
51. Shrimp Culture Research Center 
(SCRD) 
Dr. Boonsirm Withyachumnarnkul 28.03.03 
52. Siemens Dr. Ockert van Zyl, President and Chief Executive Officer 27.03.03 
53. Software Park Thailand (NSTDA) Dr. Rom Hirnpruk, Director 21.03.03 
54. Subcontracting Promotion Club (SPC) Mr. Pattanasak, Vice President 
Mr. Lersak Nuangjhamnong 
24.04.03 
30.04.03 
55. THACOM, Thai Compressor Manu-
facturing Co., Ltd. 
Mr. Arnon Simakulthorn, Executive Chairman 03.04.03 
56. Thai Development Research Institute 
(TDRI) 
Dr. Somkiat Tangkitvanich, Research Director (Information 
Economy), Science and Technology Development Program 
26.02.03 
57. Thai Energy Conservation Co. Ltd. Ms Korapin Intarawicha, Production and Operations Manager 03.04.03 
58. Thai Frozen Food Association (TFFA) Ms. Chinda Chongkamanont, Vice President 
Mr. Lers Thisayakorn, Secretary General 
27.03.03 
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59. Thai-German Institute (TGI) Mr. Walter Kretschmar, German Director of TGI 
Dr. Michael Grosse, SMEs Development Project 
25.03.03 
25.03.03 
60. Thai Industrial Standard Institute 
(TISI) 
Representatives of several departments 26.03.03 
61. Thailand Institute of Scientific and 
Technological Research (TISTR) 
Ms. Sumalai Srikumlaithong, Senior Expert 
Ms. Dr. Nittaya  
04.03.03 
62. Thai Research Fund (TRF) Dr. Suteera Prasertsan, Director of the Industry Division 21.03.03 
63. Thaitel Engineering Co. Ltd. Mr. Kritpaisit, General Manager 31.03.03 
64. Thai Union Seafood Co. Ltd. Ms. Matana Maka-apirak, General Manager 12.03.03 
65. Trang Seafood Products Public Co. 
Ltd. 
Mr. Boonchu Saisakphong, Audit Director 13.03.03 
66. United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (UNIDO) 
Mr. Nguyen Khac Tiep, Technical Advisor 10.03.03 
67. Vanusnun Co. Ltd. Mr. Chadcharn, Managing Director 17.03.03 
68. V&P Freshfoods Co. Ltd . Mr. Yongyut Chobtamdee, General Manager 17.03.03 
69. Wetlands International – Thailand 
Programme (NGO) 
Mr. Asea Sayaka, Director 04.04.03 
In addition, interviews were conducted with approx. 30 shrimp farmers, owners of hatcheries, and processors. 
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Annex 2 
 
Thailand: Key Economic Ratios 
 
 1980 1990 1999 2000 
GDP (US$ billion)  32.4  85.3  122.1  121.9 
Average annual 
growth 
1980-90 1990-2000 1999 2000 
GDP  7.6  4.2  4.2  4.3 
GDP per capita  5.7  3.3  3.4  3.5 
Exports of goods and 
services 
 14.1  9.5  9.9  15.4 
Structure of the econ-
omy (% of GDP) 
1980 1990 1999 2000 
Agriculture  23.2  12.5  11.2  10.5 
Industry  28.7  37.2  39.3  40.1 
    Manufacturing  21.5  27.2  31.1  31.9 
Services  48.1  50.3  49.5  49.4 
Average annual 
growth 
1980-90 1990-2000 1999 2000 
Agriculture 3.9 2.1 2.6 2.2 
Industry 9.8 5.3 9.8 5.1 
    Manufacturing 9.5 6.4 11.9 5.9 
Services 7.3 3.7 -0.1 4.1 
TRADE 1980 1990 1999 2000 
Total exports in US$ 
million 
6,449 22,881 58,549 67,942 
Manufactures .. 16,588 49,339 59,766 
Source: Thailand at a glance, World Bank Thailand Office, 9/07/01, 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/tha_aag.pdf 
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